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Social capital is a rich topic in the development literature. Despite this, there is an incomplete 
understanding of how social capital is formed when placed within the enabling or constraining 
structure of Global Value Chains. While governance of Global Value Chains is well understood as a 
powerful force that shapes the participation of farmers, the literature to date has not effectively 
explored the extent to which governance may shape participation among farmers. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how, if at all, governance shapes the formation of two types of 
farmers' social capital: structural and cognitive. 
 
Within the context of Peru's Alternative Development Program, where there is a purposeful effort to 
develop the social capital of farmers, qualitative research was conducted on two case study Global 
Value Chains: cacao and palm oil. Interviews were conducted with stakeholders across the Global 
Value Chain, from farmers and collective organisations to exporters and importers. 
 
The case studies revealed that governance can be an enabler of structural social capital formation, 
but its role is shaped by the institutional context and existing attitudes towards social structure. 
Governance can be an enabler or barrier to cognitive social capital formation, depending on the 
nature of the governing relationship between buyer and supplier. 
 
To date, the literature on social capital formation has typically focused on factors internal to a 
collective group. The findings in the thesis shed light on the role of exogenous structures on the 
formation of social capital. 
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1.1 Research Background and Context 
 
Defined as the  “ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ? ŶŽƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƚƌƵƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵƵƚƵĂůďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?(Putnam 1995, p. 67), social capital 
was originally popularized by Robert Putnam to explain economic disparities between Italian 
districts and the economic impact of falling bowling club membership in the United States 
(Putnam et al., 1993, Putnam, 1995). Despite its original orientation towards economic 
development and civic action in industrialized countries, the development literature has adopted 
the concept to provide the missing link in sustainable development (Grootaert, 1998). 
 
Notwithstanding a rich account of the benefits in the literature, the governing role of buyers in 
shaping the social capital of farmers has been paid scant attention; even though the networks, 
norms and social trust that constitute social capital are embedded in the governance structures 
of Global Value Chains (GVCs) (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2004). How these GVCs are governed 
could represent an enabling or constraining structure for social capital development. Using the 
context of the Alternative Development Program (ADP) in Peru, this thesis sheds light on this gap 
by exploring how, if at all, the social capital of farmers can be shaped by the governance of 
GVCs. 
 
EĞǁ  ‘ƌƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐĂŵĞ ’ ĂƌĞ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů ĂŐƌŝ-food sector that mean the way we 
understand the linkages between rural production and global consumption have had to evolve 
(Poole and de Frece, 2010) ?dŚĞƐĞŶĞǁƌƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞĂƌĞĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ŝŶƚŚĞ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ’ŽĨ
GVCs, becoming a growing topic of interest in both supply chain and development research 
(Gereffi and Lee, 2012). This notion of governance was first put forward by Gereffi (1994) in the 
literature as a way to explain patterns of geographical fragmentation across value adding 
activities in GVCs; from arms-length spot markets to the full integration of activities owned by a 
single firm. This framework continues to be particularly relevant to development studies 
because the scope for countries and regions to thrive depends in large part on their participation 
in GVCs that are typically coordinated by more powerful buyers. This coordination, 
conceptualized as governance, is the idea that  “ƐŽŵĞ ĨŝƌŵƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŝŶ ƐĞƚ ĂŶĚ ?Žƌ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞ
parameters under which others in ƚŚĞĐŚĂŝŶŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?(Humphrey and Schmitz 2004, p. 96). 
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There are calls in the literature to combine the vertical aspects of governance with the 
horizontal aspects facing farmers (Bolwig et al., 2010) and despite the explanatory power of the 
GVC framework, there has been no known attempt to combine the governance of GVCs with the 
process of social capital formation. This thesis addresses this gap within the context of 
international development. 
 
1.2 Social Capital and International Development 
 
International development is a complex subject area, not least of all because its meaning has a 
multitude of dimensions (Elands and Wiersum, 2001). In the past, the dominance of traditional 
approaches to development resulted in an explicit emphasis on modernization and production 
factors as the engines for economic growth (Clammer, 2005, Eade, 2002, Lunn, 2009). The focus 
ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚŝƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐǁŚĞŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨĂ ‘ŵŝƐƐ ŶŐůŝŶŬ ’ŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ(Grootaert, 
1998), social processes gathered a greater focus of research. The focus has broadened from the 
 ‘ŚĂƌĚǁĂƌĞ ’ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ’of development (Black, 2007); expanding beyond the role of 
infrastructure and technology to processes that are unseen but still contribute to development 
goals. 
 
One aspect in this new paradigm is social capital. The development literature has had a greater 
focus on social capital than other disciplines, as Ellis (2000) notes:  “ĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ŽŶůǇ ũƵƐƚ
beginning to come to grips with social capital, although it has already become mainstream in 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽŽƌ ? ?(p. 296). The implementation of 
 ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĨƵŶĚƐ ’ďǇƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂŝŵƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐ ĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽŽƌ ?ŝƐĂƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
of how seriously the social capital concept is taken in development circles (Vajja and White, 
2008). There is a broad consensus in the literature that social capital is a critical element for 
agricultural development and broader development for rural areas (Rainey et al., 2003, 
Fafchamps, 2006). 
 
The application of social capital in development is especially distinct from its application 
elsewhere, as Molyneux (2002, p. 170) notes:  “dŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ŽĨ ďŽǁůŝŶŐ ĐůƵďƐ ĂŶĚ ƐĞǁŝŶŐ
groups in the United States is clearly not the social capital of the pŽŽƌ ŝŶ >ĂƚŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?. The 
concept itself is context specific (Cleaver, 2005, Bebbington, 2007), with Serra (2011) arguing 
that any attempt to standardize social capital between too-different contexts is simplistic. 
Gotschi et al. (2009) also supports this view, suggesting that the social capital in developed 
 8  
countries is different to the social capital in developing countries and therefore theories 
concerning the concept cannot be exported like-for-like. On an intuitive level, the argument for 
distinguishing social capital in development from elsewhere holds strong. The way in which 
social capital manifests itself in a developing country context is incomparable to that of an 
industrialized country; the implications of the Indian caste-system (Mosse, 2006) or the Aztec 
influenced community working groups in the rural Andes (Maclean, 2010) would be unsuitable 
to analytically compare with, say, the European Union LEADER initiative for rural development 
(Ray, 1999). Distinguishing social capital within the development literature from elsewhere is 
pursued in the present research. 
 
1.3 Agri-Food in an Agricultural Development Context 
 
Agricultural development has long been considered a necessary component of rural 
development strategy. dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ’Ɛ ƉŽŽƌ ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ŝŶ
agricultural based activities (Markelova et al., 2009) and is an important tool for rural economic 
development (Fan and Rao, 2004). However agriculture alone only goes so far in the economic 
development of a country or region, particularly as economies grow from initial stages of 
development to industrialization (Byerlee et al., 2005). This demands going beyond the farm 
gate to a consideration of the agri-food chain as a whole for rural development research. 
 
Agri-food chains are considered a crucial unit of analysis in the development literature because: 
1) its main stakeholders consist of the rural poor; 2) it goes beyond farming as the only 
agricultural activity in rural areas; and 3) building on basic inputs improves the cost 
competitiveness of farming. There has been a growth of value added production through 
agribusiness, relative to primary production (Fair Trade Labelling Organization, 2007), and off- 
farm economic activity is of growing significance to the lives of the rural population; as the 
World Bank (2003) notes: 
 
 “ŐƌŽ-enterprise activity employs the poor, either through self or wage employment. A rough 
estimate based on household income field surveys is that 25 percent of total rural incomes come 
from these non-ĨĂƌŵ ?ǇĞƚĂŐƌŝďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ )ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŐƌŽ-processing accounts for 20 to 35 percent 
ŽĨǁĂŐĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?(p. 6). 
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Agri-food value chains account for one third of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in developing 
middle income countries such as Chile, Brazil and Thailand, compared to a lower contribution of 
20-25% in sub-Saharan Africa (Wilkinson and Rocha, 2009). This supports the view that the agri- 
sector has a particularly strong developmental impact on countries that are transitioning into 
industrialized economies and are not subject to extremely poor living standards in the third 
world (figure 1), in part because a prosperous domestic market generates greater opportunities 
for agribusiness development (World Bank, 2003, Wilkinson and Rocha, 2009). All of the above, 
coupled with evidence that suggests off-farm income is crucial to rural households in developing 
countries (Lanjouw and Feder, 2001, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001, Ellis, 2005), indicates that 
rural development is enhanced when intervention is extended from the farm to the agri-food 
chain, especially for middle income countries. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between human development and the agribusiness/agriculture ratio 
 Source: Wilkinson and Rocha (2009) 
 
Farm production capabilities have historically been the focus of research, especially considering 
the dominance of traditional theories of rural development over the past century (Cruickshank, 
2009). 'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ƐŚŝĨƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĂƌĚǁĂƌĞ ’ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ’ (Black, 2007), the 
trajectory of the literature has expanded the debate towards an emphasis on facilitating access 
to agri-food chains and enabling actors, particularly smallholder farmers, to compete effectively 
in increasingly competitive global export markets (Shepherd, 2007). The structure of agri-food 
chains are also changing dramatically; as Poole and de Frece (2010) note, vertical coordination 
 10  
of economic exchange has become the choice organisational relationship in the agri-food 
industry as it moves away from reliance on spot exchange. The defining problem for researchers 
is to understand how farmers can participate in agri-food chains in a way where they can 
improve their livelihoods while at the same time understanding what intensifying governance in 
GVCs means to this end (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002, Gereffi et al., 2001). 
 
One context where such as effort is taking place is in Peru. The ADP aims to move farmers away 
from illicit coca production towards cacao exportation through the formation of social capital. 
Peru is categorised ĂƐ Ă  ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ’(World Bank, 2011) and therefore is also a 
country where agri-food development is more likely to have its most significant impact 
compared to a subsistence agricultural context (Wilkinson and Rocha, 2009). 
 
1.4 WĞƌƵ ?ƐWĂŶĚƚŚĞZŽůĞŽĨ^ŽĐŝĂů Capital 
 
Coca, the base plant for cocaine, has a long history in South America. Even prior to the arrival of 
Spanish colonialism, coca was a religious symbolic commodity in the region that now comprises 
Bolivia, Columbia and Peru (Goncalves and Bastos, 1992 ) ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ? ƚŚĞ
religious symbolism of coca has transformed into an arena for organised crime involving drug 
cartels, law enforcement, terrorism and politics; with severe consequences for rural areas which 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ƚŽďĞ ƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ’  ?Bastos et al., 2007). In part because the 
impact of coca production goes beyond the borders of producing into consuming countries, a 
range of international organisations are now involved in creating strategies to tackle the 
problem. The principal strategy of this is ADP. 
 
Attempts to tackle the problem of coca production can be categorized into two strategies. The 
first is through long-standing forced eradication methods whereby the army and law 
enforcement destroy illicit coca crops in the hope that it deters farmers from growing coca in the 
future. Forced eradication has a mixed record, with some arguing that such methods in isolation 
have had limited success because crops have merely been displaced rather than eliminated 
(Bastos et al., 2007, Lupu, 2004). The economic benefits of coca production are certainly factors 
in this regard. It takes roughly twice the acreage of coffee compared to coca to provide equal 
returns, coca requires little maintenance and multiple crops can be grown throughout the year 
(Lupu, 2004, Léons and Sanabria, 1997). For a country where 80% of those classified as 
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 ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƉŽŽƌ ’are engaged in agriculture (IFAD, 2011), the economic incentive to grow coca 
heavily outweighs the threat of forced eradication. 
 
A different strategy, brought about through ADP, consists of socio-economic investments in 
alternative crops to coca; including cacao and palm fruit (Likins, 2012). Incentivising alternative 
ĐƌŽƉƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐĂƌƌŽƚ ’ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚŝĐŬ ’ ŚĂƐ ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇ ŚĂĚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ǀŝƐŝďůĞ
impact than forced eradication in isolation (Lupu, 2004). Some areas of Peru have experienced 
improvement in practically all economic, social and institutional indicators through 
strengthening collective organisations and facilitating access to international markets (UNODC, 
2013). ADP involves a wide range of institutional organisations, from the national government of 
Peru to international development agencies. 
 
In principle, social capital is an integral part of ADP because, as the literature has established, the 
ability of farmers to access lucrative export chains is facilitated by its existence (Asfaw et al., 
2009, Kaganzi et al., 2009, Melo and Wolf, 2007). According to the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (2010) and referring to the specific definition used by 
Putnam (1995), ADP has created social capital: 
 
 “^ŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ŚĂƐ ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƵƐĞƐ ? dŚŝƐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ĂƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ
ZŽďĞƌƚWƵƚŶĂŵ P ?^ŽĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƐŽcial organisations such as networks, 
ŶŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƚƌƵƐƚƚŚĂƚĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵƵƚƵĂůƚƌƵƐƚ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ
social capital generated by ADP includes the investments of community members in associations 
and cooperatives to improve training, acquisition of production inputs, and improved and value 
ĂĚĚĞĚƉŽƐƚŚĂƌǀĞƐƚĂŶĚŵĂƌŬĞƚŝŶŐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?(p. 19-20) 
 
Both USAID and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) explicitly refer to the 
concept of social capital as a critical success factor of the ADP (USAID, 2010, UNODC, 2013). The 
integration of farmers into export chains is a fundamental part of ADP and therefore GVC 
stakeholders; buyers, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other institutional 
organisations have the potential to shape social capital formation of farmers. Social capital 
thinking has been prominent in development policy and practice in Latin America, exemplified in 
a United NatŝŽŶƐ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞŵĞĚ  ‘^ŽĐŝĂů ĂƉŝƚĂů ĂŶĚ WŽǀĞƌƚǇ ZĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ >ĂƚŝŶ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƌŝďďĞĂŶ ’  ?Molyneux, 2002). ADP presents a valuable context to explore the 
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gap in the development literature precisely because the program aims to build social capital 
within the framework of governed GVCs (USAID, 2010, UNODC, 2013). 
 
1.5 Cacao and Palm Oil GVC Context 
 
Cacao in Peru, although smaller relative to other exports, has experienced significant growth in 
recent years. In 2001, the cacao sector in Peru was valued at 8.5 million USD and in 2007, the 
sector had grown to 44.6 million USD (Peru Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism, 2007). Cacao 
is also a relatively high value product  W the second highest exported agricultural product per 
tonne in the country (FAO, 2011). Cacao can be transformed into a variety of different end 
products, however food and drink are the most common (Kaplinsky, 2004a). Speciality export 
markets represent an important opportunity and Peru has already made inroads into these 
speciality markets; Zurich-based Barry Callebaut ? ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ’Ɛ ůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ĐŚŽĐŽůĂƚĞ ŵĂŬĞƌ, uses 
Peruvian cacao in a high end chocolate product that targets elite consumers in Europe (Reuters, 
2010). While cacao is growing into a key economic driver for Peruvian exports, it also holds a 
social and very unique purpose, summed up in a quote from the secretary of a cacao 
cooperative in Peru:  “tĞƵƐĞĚƚŽďĞŬŶŽǁŶĨŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŽĐĂŝŶĞƉĂƐƚĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽǁǁĞĂƌĞŬŶŽǁŶĨŽƌ
ĐŚŽĐŽůĂƚĞ ?(Chauvin, 2010). Cacao is one of three crops substitutable for coca in ADP and has 
been subject to significant stakeholder interventions to develop collective organisations (USAID, 
2010, UNODC, 2013). 
 
Alongside cacao, palm fruit is also a replacement crop for coca supported by the ADP. As with 
ĐĂĐĂŽ ?ƉĂůŵĨƌƵŝƚǁĂƐĨŝƌƐƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶWĞƌƵŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ’ƐĂŶĚĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ? ’s by international 
donor agencies and the Government of Peru (USAID, 2010). Prior to this, palm fruit was grown 
first by African nations but then more recently Malaysia, which has since dominated global 
production (Poku, 2002). However given that tropical environments suit palm fruit production 
(Stickler et al., 2007), Peru has the potential to exploit the nine fold increase in global demand 
over the past 40 years (Ismail, 2011). Palm oil can be transformed into both food (e.g. frying fats, 
biscuits, snacks) and non-food (animal feed, cosmetics, industrial use) products, although 
typically the food retail and service sector dominate consumption of palm oil (DEFRA, 2011). 
 
An exploratory look at the academic and grey literature reveals that there is likely to be a degree 
of governance by buyers over cacao and palm oil agri-food chains. In the cacao GVC: traders, 
millers and food manufacturers typically have a high degree of power in the chain (USAID, 2006) 
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and the distance in terms of stages in the chain between producers and consumers is large 
(Talbot, 2008, Kaplinsky, 2004a). The place of quality standards and certifications in the global 
cacao market also suggests that some coordination of and among smallholders is necessary 
(Wood and Lass, 1985). dŚĞƐĞ  ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ’ ? ƚŚĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ ǁŝŶ  ‘ƚŝĐŬĞƚƐ ’ ŝŶƚŽ
lucrative value chains (Messner, 2004), have an important place in the development literature 
(Ponte and Ewert, 2009, Ponte and Gibbon, 2005, Fischer and Qaim, 2012). In the palm oil GVC, 
refineries set the standards for the export market and are typically located in the consumer 
market (DEFRA, 2011). As with cacao, there is a distinct separation between upstream and 
downstream stakeholders (Wakker et al., 2005, Geibler, 2012). Even upstream between farmers 
and millers, governance plays an important role because of the issue of quality degradation 
between the time when palm fruit is picked and when it is milled (Hai, 2002). Cacao and palm oil 
therefore lend themselves to a research topic concerning the concept of governance. 
 
1.6 Overview of the Thesis 
 
This chapter has introduced the context for the thesis in terms of: where social capital is placed 
in the development literature; the place of agri-food chains within the development debate; ADP 
in Peru; and the suitability of ADP in Peru as a valuable context to examine interventions in 
cacao and palm oil agri-food chains. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is associated with the research topic. It begins with an 
historical summary of the development literature which has evolved from a technocratic view of 
development that focused primarily on physical factors such as technology and infrastructure as 
ĚƌŝǀŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?ĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ƐŽĨƚ ’ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞůĞƐƐƚĂŶŐŝďůĞǇĞƚĞƋƵĂůůǇĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?
such as culture and human capital. Within this latter debate sits the concepts of social capital 
and governance where the gap in the literature lies. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework where the main factors influencing social capital 
have been identified from the literature and the concepts developed by Gereffi et al. (2005) is 
adapted to explore how governance shapes social capital formation. A brief explanation of the 
concepts are included that refers back to the literature and detailed propositions are laid out 
that flow from the research question. 
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Chapter 4 describes and justifies the methodology to be used to collect and analyse the data. 
Any discussion of research methods typically begins with a philosophical underpinning which is 
presented in this section. A qualitative case study approach is proposed followed by a discussion 
of methodological issues and how the methodology addresses these in its design. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 presents the findings of the two case studies  W the PeruCacao GVC, from cacao 
collective organisations in Peru to the cacao importer based in Switzerland; and the PalmPeru 
GVC, where the principal governing relationship is between a producer association and a palm 
fruit miller. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the findings from the two case studies in relation to the existing body of 
knowledge, identifying the similarities and differences through a cross-case comparison. The 
chapter ends with presenting the contribution to knowledge that gives a novel perspective on 
social capital formation compared to existing viewpoints in the literature. The final chapter (8) 
draws out the key conclusions  W for academics, practitioners and policy-makers, identifying the 
limitations of the thesis and potential areas for future research. 
 
The next chapter moves onto a review of the literature and the identification of gaps in the 
existing body of knowledge, setting the foundations for the research question that this thesis 
addresses. 
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This chapter reviews the development literature and where appropriate, relates it back to the 
context of agriculture. It begins by defining development followed by discussing different 
approaches. Traditional theories, composed of neo-classical theory and modernization theory, 
put a strong emphasis on bringing agricultural productivity up and pushing food prices down. 
While these approaches put productivity at the forefront of agricultural development, they have 
limitations in that historically, prices fell for urban consumers but only benefitted farmers when 
ĐŽƐƚƐĨĞůůĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƵƐďĂĐŬƚŽĂĐŽƌĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĨĂĐŝŶŐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ? ‘ƵƌďĂn ďŝĂƐ ’ ? 
 
The antithesis to the traditional frameworks of rural development is dependency theory. This 
approach argues that ceasing trade linkages between development and developing regions, 
rather than building on them, is the only way development can be achieved. However, this 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŵĞƚĂŶ  ‘ŝŵƉĂƐƐĞ ’  ?ŽŽƚŚ ?  ? ? ? ? )ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
that managed to build on world trade links, as well as offering few constructive policy choices. 
 
The last approach discussed is the endogenous approach. Those who advocate this position 
argue that rural development is best developed from the bottom-up, rather than the top-down 
initiatives of modernization theory. Within the bottom-up theory is the territorial/neo- 
endogenous approach which makes the case that the linkages within rural spaces and with 
extra-local forces enables rural actors to positively change their economic position. A distinct 
trajectory in the literature is demonstrated, from farm based production capabilities towards 
newly uncovered, unseen forms of capital. 
 
Social capital, as one of these unseen forms of capital, is then reviewed  W distinguished between 
macro (national), meso (organisational) and micro (individual/household) applications. The key 
weakness of social capital is presented - its definition and lacking conceptual clarity (Durlag, 
2002). This is a fundamental issue to address for the research topic, as a study on how social 
capital is shaped requires a clear understanding of what it is. While it is clear this is a weakness, 
Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000), in their distinction between structural and cognitive social 
capital at the meso-level, have provided greater conceptual clarity which the present study 
adopts. A theme running through the social capital literature is that while there has been 
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progress in understanding the benefits and detriments of social capital, a conceptual framework 
for understanding how it is formed is incomplete. 
 
An important notion that links with how farmers participate in GVCs is governance. Governance 
is a growing topic of relevance in development research (Gereffi and Lee, 2012), principally 
because the opportunities for countries and especially rural areas to move beyond poverty is 
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ'sƐĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇŵŽƌĞƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůďƵǇĞƌƐ ?Gibbon and 
Ponte, 2005, Gereffi and Lee, 2012, Reardon and Farina, 2002, Lee et al., 2011). The definition of 
governance in the GVC literature is different from how the term is used elsewhere and this 
distinction is described in the review. Governance as a concept is complex and multi-faceted 
(M4P, 2008) and therefore the literature review on governance breaks down the concept into 
key dimensions linking back to the literature: standards, upgrading, relationships and trust. 
 
While the concept of governance provides explanatory power for how buyers actively shape the 
participation of farmers in GVCs, it has typically failed to be linked with dynamics on the ground, 
leading to a number of scholars to argue that the future of governance research lies in its 
integration with analysis at the rural level (Challies, 2008, Fold and Gough, 2008, Bolwig et al., 
2010, Neilson, 2008, Messner, 2004). There are therefore two distinct notions emerging from 
the literature review: 1) a framework for social capital formation is incomplete; and 2) there is 
scope for bringing the concept of governance to social phenomena at the rural level. The 
chapter ends by using these two notions, derived from the literature review, to justify exploring 
how the governance of a GVC shapes social capital among farmers. 
 
2.2 Defining Development 
 
Development has three dimensions to its definition: it is a process, in that it is a series of steps 
which leads or hopes to lead to a particular outcome; a strategy, because development is 
incorporated into plans and policies; and a phenomenon, in that it can be observed as an 
outcome from the first two dimensions just described (Elands and Wiersum, 2001, Singhe, 
2009). Similarly, Gasper (2004) ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĨŽƵƌŵĂŝŶƵƐĂŐĞƐŽĨ ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ’ŝŶƚŚĞ literature: 
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1. Development as a structural change, such as income; 
2. Development as an intervention; 
3. Development as an improvement towards a positive outcome; and 
4. Development as the foundations for future outcomes. 
 
The last usage suggests that development can be considered as the facilitation of an outcome at 
a later date. It is important to understand this multitude of usages because they do not always 
take place at the same moment and can even be contradictory, for instance Potter and others 
(2008) note that income may rise at the expense of equality, therefore pitting definitions 1) and 
3) against each other. Given that social capital is a building block for development, it can be 
associated mostly with 3) and 4) since it is both an improvement towards a positive outcome as 
well as a foundation for future income generation. 
 
There is no comprehensive definition of rural development in the literature (van der Ploeg et al., 
2000, Clark, 1997). While defining rural development on a conceptual level is yet to be agreed 
on, we can begin with a basic definition of development as something which means progress and 
advancement beyond the current state (Singhe, 2009, Potter et al., 2008). It is the difference 
between where things are and how they should be. It then leads on that rural development is 
this definition applied to the definition of rural; the countryside rather than the town (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2011 ) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƐŝĚĞ ’ŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐĂůƐŽ ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚ ? 
 
^ŝŶĐĞWĂŚů ’Ɛ(1966) ŝŶŝƚŝĂůĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌƵƌĂů-ƵƌďĂŶĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ ’ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶůŝƚƚůĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ
of what constitutes a rural space (Elands and Wiersum, 2001) and it remains a contentious issue 
in the literature (Trauger, 2009). There are large disparities among countries in the definition of 
 ‘ƌƵƌĂů ’in census and survey data (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001). Bhagat (2005) lists examples of 
how diverse the range of definitions are. In South Asia, Nepal defines rurality based on 
population size but Bangladesh and Sri Lanka define urban and rural areas based on 
administrative assets such as the existence (or absence) of local councils and committees. In the 
United States, ƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌďĂŶŝƐĞĚĂƌĞĂ ’ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝƐƵƐĞĚ, which defines a urban area as a central city 
and surrounding suburbs with a minimum 50,000 population and a population density of 400 
people pĞƌŬŵA?. In China, definitions are political with no clear criteria (Zhu, 2001). In the UK and 
ƌĂǌŝů ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ďƵŝůƚ ƵƉ ĂƌĞĂ ’ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ƵƌďĂŶ ĂƌĞĂƐ (United Nations, 2001). 
Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) state that rurality is most commonly defined to include 
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communities of 5,000 people or less, yet just from the various national definitions provided 
above, an attempt to generate a generalizable classification is a difficult task and largely context- 
specific. 
 
Rather than being entrenched in the various ways to define rurality, the present research takes a 
simple definition of what rural and rural development is. Rurality can be considered as an area 
that contains particular aspects that are associated with rural life, including farming, extension 
services, small crafts, pastoral tourism and rural infrastructure (e.g. irrigation) (Singhe, 2009). 
From this logic it follows that rural development seeks to develop these aspects of rural life for 
the benefit of the people who live there. Given that farming is an activity largely confined to the 
rural environment (Singhe, 2009), agriculture is a dimension of rural development and the 
present research is placed within this context. 
 
Prior to the 1960's, economic indicators were the primary measurement for development 
outcomes (Elliot, 2002). This very much reflected the theoretical path of the time where 
development and economic growth was considered two sides of the same coin. Influenced by 
sociologists like Mark Weber, modernization theories and the 'rationalŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ’put 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ ŝĚĞĂƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚ ŽĨ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? dŚĞ ůŝŶŬ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇ ’ ĂŶĚ
economics, coupled with the emergence of growth theories, led to a strong emphasis in the 
literature on using objective economic measurements to understand processes of development 
(Willis, 2005). 
 
dŚĞ ĂƐŝĐ EĞĞĚƐ ƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ  ?E ) ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ĂŶĚ ůŽĐĂů- 
orientated objectives, allowing for a diversity of development outcomes (Elliot, 2002). BNA is 
based on a belief that poverty can be defined by a range of resource requirements, such as food, 
clothing, drinking water, health and education (Ingham, 1993). During the same period, 
institutional organisations such as the United Nations and World Bank began to use social in 
addition to economic indicators to measure development. In addition, Freire (1970) pushed for 
Participatory Action Research apprŽĂĐŚ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ’ŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ
an environment where they can express their needs and therefore identify and judge 
development outcomes. This participatory approach to measuring development was largely seen 
as a reaction to the failings of Eurocentric, positivist and top-down development initiatives 
(Mohan, 2002). The emphasis on participatory rather than economic measurements of rural 
development mirrors the acceptance of qualitative tools in development studies. Using several 
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quotes, McIlwaine (2002) (p.82) demonstrates how poverty is experienced in different ways to 
different people and as a result, the value of a qualitative approach to development research: 
 
 “&ŽƌŵĞ ?being poor is having to wear trousers that are too big for ŵĞ ? ?
 “/ƚ ?ƐƉŽǀĞƌƚǇƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐŵĞĚƌŝŶŬƵŶƚŝů/ĨĂůů ŽǀĞƌ ? 
 
The first person, a young boy, defines poverty in terms of the second hand clothes that are 
passed onto him. The second person, a 35 year old man, defines poverty in the context of the 
social problems that are associated with it; namely alcohol abuse. Clearly the meaning of 
poverty is different in these two quotes and demonstrates its subjective nature. 
 
Amartya Sen (1983), an influential development economist, put forward the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and other capability orientated development measurements in the 
literature. This created a bridge between welfare and development economics and drew an 
important distinction between economic growth and development. Other capabilities theorists 
have further developed the capabilities approach, most notably Seers et al. (1979) and 
Nussbaum (2000) that include capabilities such as employment, participation and education. 
 
While there are certain deficiencies when using monetary indicators to measure rural 
development, this does not mean that economic growth is not an important element of such a 
process. The way that economic growth is translated into development differs between 
countries and regions and as a result, economic growth should be considered an  ‘engine ’for 
development rather than an end to itself (UNDP, 1997). Rather than replacing economic 
indicators, approaches such as BNA and HDI enriched understandings of development outcomes. 
 
As eluded to, the different ways that development is defined very much depends on the starting 
point for theory. What is also evident in the literature is that theory and policy are intertwined, 
for instance a discussion of modernization theory inevitably leads to examples of a policy 
paradigm based on state intervention. The following section details the main theories of 
development in the literature within the context of agricultural and rural development. 
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2.3 The Emerging ZŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘^ŽĐŝĂů ?ŝŶ Development 
 
2.3.1 Neo-ůĂƐƐŝĐĂůdŚĞŽƌǇ ?DŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘,ĂƌĚǁĂƌĞ ?ŽĨ Development 
 
ĚĂŵ ^ŵŝƚŚ ’Ɛ(1776) principle ŽĨ ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ ZŝĐĂƌĚŽ ’Ɛ(1817) principle of 
comparative advantage in trade argues that some countries or regions will have a relative 
advantage over others in producing certain goods and services. This creates a theoretical 
underpinning for rural specialization in agriculture and other goods that can be produced more 
efficiently in rural regions. An important element of the neo-classical approach is the role of 
production constraints on the profitability of rural firms and as a consequence, rural inputs and 
outputs. When production costs increase for rural labour and capital investment, the supply of 
outputs in the form of the food supply and rural goods and services fall (Herzfeld and Jongeneel, 
2011). Any factor seen to negatively impact on production costs reduces profitability and 
demand for inputs/supply of outputs, both upstream and downstream. This led to the view by 
neo-classical economics of institutions and regulation as  ‘methodological irritations ’(Raina, 
2003) where deregulation, privatization and reducing government interference is the advocated 
position (Arce, 2003). 
 
One of the arguments made in the neo-classical discourse is that when governments are 
involved in rural development, such as the intense processes of agricultural modernization that 
have taken place throughout Asia, the propensity for corruption increases; a notion that 
Mackinnon describes as the equivalence of ethical government and limited government (2002). 
However there is sizeable evidence which shows that government intervention generates rural 
economic growth and reduces rural poverty, in particular: agricultural research and extension 
services (Fan and Zhang, 2008, Fan et al., 2008, Hazell and Braun, 2006, Salehezadeh and 
Henneberry, 2002); rural infrastructure (Minten and Kyle, 1999, Fan et al., 2000, Corral and 
Reardon, 2001, Lanjouw, 2001, Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001, Renkow et al., 2004, Deininger et 
al., 2007, World Bank, 2009, Kirubi et al., 2009, Winters et al., 2009, Gibson and Olivia, 2010, 
Dillon et al., 2011, Cunguara and Darnhofer, 2011, Datta, 2011); and dealing with external shocks 
to rural systems (Aggarwal, 2006). 
 
Simpson (1974) finds that productivity growth in rural labour is unlikely to lead to development 
of rural areas without a form of cooperative organisation. The conceptual basis of cooperative 
organisations; local networks and linkages, have been shown to be an important factor for 
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successful rural economic growth (Terluin, 2003, Jenkins and Parrot, 1998, Kristiansen, 2002, 
Kostov and Lingard, 2003, Galloway et al., 2011, Galdeano-Gómez et al., 2011, Bagnasco, 1988) 
as well as for specifically increasing rural incomes (Bair and Gereffi, 2001, Carrillo, 1998, Czaban 
and Henderson, 2003). This leads to the charge against neo-ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌ- 
ƐŽĐŝĂůŝǌŝŶŐ ’ ůŝŶŬĂŐĞƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝt only conceptualizes linkages as trade rather than representing 
resources themselves (Granovetter, 1985, Granovetter, 1973). 
 
Modernization theory begins with the conceptual notion of society as an organism which evolves 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ŝƐŵĂĚĞƵƉŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝĐƉĂƌƚƐŽƌ  ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ’ ?dŚĞƐĞideas of 
society and social evolution were introduced by Spencer (1974), Durkheim (1965) and Weber 
(1967) in the 19th Century. Durkheim argued that societies went through a process of 
development change, from primitive states to Western styled societies; and this process is what 
ǁĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ĂƐ  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ’ ?As Ingham (1993) notes, modernization theorists felt after 
World Water Two that development could replicate the experience of existing industrialized 
countries by following the patterns of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. Rostow 
(1960), a notable modernization theorist, argued that societies and economies go through five 
stages of economic growth: 1) traditional society; 2) preconditions for take-off; 3) take-off; 4) 
drive to maturity; and 5) mass consumption. What brought together modernization theories was 
the role of structuralism; the idea that particular processes could be predicted based on their 
relationship to wider processes. 
 
As with neo-classical theory, modernization advocates an almost exclusive focus on reducing 
production costs and prices (Marsden et al., 2001). The notion that agriculture has the purpose 
of serving the industrialized urban population, is destined to decline in employment share and 
economic growth is equivalent to rural development are all central to both modernization 
theory and neo-classical economic positions on rural development. However the difference 
between the two approaches is that while neo-classical thinking promotes non-interventionism 
through the removal of production constraints, modernization theory explicitly argues for 
intervention in agriculture to bring it to a level of productivity that can meet the demands of 
urban population growth (Lernoud, 1999, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000). 
 
Infrastructure investment became and continues to be a driving topic for modernization within 
the rural development literature. Infrastructure are services which are typically supported by the 
public sector for the general population, although it can be provided by the private sector also, 
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and includes rural services such as water, sewerage, solid waste management, transportation 
and roads, electricity and telecommunications (Fox and Porca, 2001). The remote nature of rural 
areas with low population density means that infrastructure in rural areas is an essential 
element of the rural development mix (Davidova et al., 2008). 
 
The evidence behind the positive effect of infrastructure for rural areas is overwhelming (Minten 
and Kyle, 1999, Fan et al., 2000, Corral and Reardon, 2001, Lanjouw, 2001, Abdulai and 
CroleRees, 2001, Renkow et al., 2004, Deininger et al., 2007, World Bank, 2009, Kirubi et al., 
2009, Winters et al., 2009, Gibson and Olivia, 2010, Dillon et al., 2011, Cunguara and Darnhofer, 
2011, Datta, 2011), from water irrigation (Corral and Reardon, 2001, Dillon et al., 2011, World 
Bank, 2009) to rural road access (Corral and Reardon, 2001, Dillon et al., 2011, Datta, 2011) and 
communication technology (Overa, 2006). Only one empirical study could be found which 
disputed the effectiveness of rural infrastructure and this was largely because of problems 
associated with government failure (Davis et al., 2001) ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ?ƚŚĞĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ
irrigation in particular grew rapidly in the developing world through the construction of large 
dams and river barrages (Heathcote, 1983). 
 
Coupled with the importance of physical infrastructure is the impact of monetary infrastructure 
 ?Žƌ ‘ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂů ’ ), in particular rural finance. A multitude of studies show that rural finance 
has a significant impact on the ability of rural actors to change their economic position (Manig, 
1990, Binswanger et al., 1993, Sharma and Zeller, 1997, Tsai, 2004, Kuyvenhoven, 2004, 
Mukherjee and Zhang, 2007, Segers et al., 2010, Giné, 2011, Ahlin et al., 2011). Just taking one of 
these studies, Binswanger et al. (1993) found that rural banks in India positively impacts upon 
agricultural output which in turn spurs infrastructure spending that brings more rural banks to 
an area, thereby creating a strong multiplier effect for rural development. It is now well 
understood ƚŚĂƚƌƵƌĂůĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ďůŽŽĚ ’ŽĨ development. 
 
Alongside infrastructure and finance was the Green Revolution. The Green Revolution was a 
technological transformation that changed agriculture around the developing world, in 
particular India, Latin America and Asia, where food production was enhanced through 
combining high yield staple food seeds with mechanized agricultural technologies (Butler, 2007, 
Dethier and Effenberger, 2011). The benefits from the Green Revolution are both promoted and 
disputed in the literature. De Janvry and Sadoulet (2002) claim that it doubled and in some cases 
tripled yields in the developing world, acting as a powerful poverty reducing tool with income 
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generation in Africa, indirect agricultural employment generation in Asia and linkage effects in 
Latin America. In another paper, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) make the case that in Latin 
America, technology in agriculture has both direct effects on farmers and indirect effects for the 
wider area from lower food prices, employment and wage effects through production, 
consumption and savings linkages with non-agricultural sectors. Minten and Barrett (2008) and 
Cunguara and Darnhofer (2011) present similar findings for rural Madagascar and Mozambique 
respectively. Lipton and Longhurst (1989) push not just economic but also the significant social 
benefits which resulted from the Green Revolution. 
 
Other studies are not so supportive of the claimed gains accrued from the Green Revolution. 
Analysing the effects of the Green Revolution from 1960-2000, Evenson and Gollin (2003) find 
that although consumers gained from low food prices, farmers only benefitted where cost 
reductions outweighed price reductions In some developing countries, the Green Revolution was 
followed by a downward trend in real rural wages (Boyce and Ravallion, 1991), suggesting that 
not all rural actors benefitted as a result. What seemed to emerge from the modernization 
debate was that although improving productivity was an important strategy, more was required 
to bring these gains back to rural areas. 
 
While aspects of the modernization hypothesis hold strong, most notably in its consideration of 
government as a positive participant in development, the prognosis that developing countries 
and regions could follow the same steps as industrialized nations fell short. Modernization 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƚŽĨŽůůŽǁĂ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ’(Bernstein, 1971), but as Ingham 
(1993) notes, the circumstances facing Western democracies in the 19th century were profoundly 
different to developing regions today. 
 
In addition, some scholars argue that modernization focuses on intense commoditisation at the 
expense of local knowledge, equitable gains, cultural capital and specific problems facing 
smallholders (van der Ploeg, 1992, van der Ploeg et al., 2000, Murdoch, 2003, Lernoud, 1999, 
Zezza et al., 2008, Larsen, 2008, Barrett, 2008). A reaction to the perceived unfairness of both 
neo-classical and modernization theories of development led to the notion of dependency 
theory  W the idea that not only were traditional theories of development ineffective, but harmful 
for rural areas. 
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2.3.2 Dependency Theory as a Critique of Traditional Approaches to Development 
 
Modernization theory and economic growth models characterize the beginning of the 
development literature. But their perceived failure to explain why some regions of the world did 
not and have not gone through meaningful development, despite greater integration into the 
world economy, led to a pushback in the 1950- ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂŶ alternative 
theoretical framework. Dependency theory positioned itself largely as an antithesis to neo- 
classical and modernization theories, as Gore (2000) describes: 
 
 “ĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐ ŚŽǁ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ
articulation between internal and external factors, simply put forward an antithesis to the 
mainstream approach, arguing that external factors were the only ones that mattered, and then 
ĚĞĚƵĐĞĚ ďǇ ĚĞůŝŶŬŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ĂŶ  ‘ĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐ ? ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ƐŽůĞůǇ
ĨŽƵŶĚĞĚŽŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞŵĂĚĞƚŽŽĐĐƵƌ ?(p. 792) 
 
The core proposition from dependency theorists is that developing countries are economically 
marginalized because advanced, consumption-based economies seek to take advantage of low 
cost natural resources and labour surpluses (Preble, 2010, Kay, 2006, Galdeano-Gómez et al., 
2011). Dependency theorists attacked existing theories ? ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ’ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ
Western world had ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ’ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
rich and poor countries was the cause of the latter remaining poor. 
 
Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1962), the fathers of dependency theory, argued that historically, 
developing countries were obtaining a falling share of gains from trade with developed 
countries. Frank (1967) and Caputo and Pizzaro (1974) advanced the notion that the divide 
between rich and poor countries was not the lack of trade but the trade itself. In the context of 
dependency theory, Frank (1967) ĐŽŝŶƐƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ’ǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨ
dependency between poor and rich countries, rather than the stage prior to becoming 
developed. 
 
In ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ? ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ĂŶ  ‘ŝŵƉĂƐƐĞ ’ ? ĂǀŝĚ ŽŽƚŚ (1985) criticised 
dependency theory for being out of touch and having limited value in policy formation. Warren 
(1980) pointed out that dependency theory failed to explain why capitalist development had led 
to improving standards of living and economic growth in some developing regions ? ŽŽƚŚ ’Ɛ
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critique heavily influenced the development literature to the extent that since then, the 
literature has been concerned more with understanding why the theory failed rather than 
expanding and building on it (Manzo, 1991, Schuurman, 1993, Ray, 1995, Munck, 1999, 
Perraton, 2007). dŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨEĞǁůǇ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝǌĞĚŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?E/ )ŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ?ƉĂƌƚŝcularly in 
East Asia and Latin America, challenged the destitute image placed on developing countries by 
dependency theory advocates (Bienefeld, 1988, Gore, 2000). Bienefeld (1988) describes these 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐĂƐ ‘ŐůŽďĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ’ƚŚĂƚǁĞŶƚĂŐŝŶƐƚĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶcy theory advocates. 
 
Despite the impasse facing dependency theorists, the challenge that traditional theories of 
development were not benefittiŶŐƚŚĞƌƵƌĂůƉŽŽƌ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ  ‘ƵƌďĂŶďŝĂƐ ’
(Potter et al., 2008), remains valid. A new approach emerged that, rather than seeing urban 
ĂƌĞĂƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĚƌŝǀĞƌƐ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƌƵƌĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ůŽĐĂů  ‘ĂƐƐĞƚƐ ’ ĂƐ ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌƵƌĂů
development could draw upon. The emergence of endogenous development as a concept 
coinciĚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ’ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐ
for the establishment of social capital as a concept in development thinking. 
 
2.3.3 ŶĚŽŐĞŶŽƵƐĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘^ŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ?ŽĨ Development 
 
As expected, the evolution of the theoretical literature has influenced the direction of empirical 
research. Neo-classical and modernization theories put an almost exclusive emphasis on 
agricultural productivity as the driving force, with factors of production being the principal topics 
of research. Dependency theory highlighted the limitations of a purely exogenous view of 
development. With the expansion of theoretical perspectives, the literature has seen a widening 
focus towards intangible factors that take into account endogenous factors as drivers of 
development. 
 
Endogenous development is the notion that rural development is primarily driven by local rather 
than extra-local forces (Elands and Wiersum, 2001). Where traditional theories of development 
regard agriculture as a separate unit of analysis from the rural spaces they are situated in, and 
aim towards achieving scale economies; the endogenous, bottom-up approach to rural 
developments puts agri-chain activities back into the societies they are based (Murdoch et al., 
2000). There is a strong theoretical relationship between bottom-up approaches and the 
concept of endogenous development. Bottom-up approaches see rural spaces as the starting 
point for rural development, as opposed to over-arching organisation that begins from the top 
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ĂŶĚ ƐĞĞŬƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƚƌŝĐŬůĞ ĚŽǁŶ ’ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ŽĨ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ(Oskam et al., 2004). Similarly, 
endogenous development sees development as coming from within rural spaces rather than 
coming from external sources as advocated by exogenous development models that are 
observed in neo-classical and modernization theories. Table 1 shows the main differences 
between exogenous and endogenous development. 
 






Key principles Economies of scale 
and specialization 
Local resources as the 
source of development 
Dynamic force Needs of urban areas Local rural actors 
Functions of rural areas Primary commodities Capacity of local actors 
Major rural development 
problems 
Productivity Building rural environment 
to build capacity 
Criticism Urban-rural bias Complex unseen processes 
 
Adapted from Galdeano-Gómez et al. (2011) 
 
Unlike the top-down paradigm of exogenous development which has overarching principles and 
objectives, the bottom-up paradigm associated with endogenous development incorporates 
multiple strategies. This is largely because of the emphasis the bottom-up approach attaches to 
complex phenomena on the ground which requires more than one approach to reveal the 
underlying processes (Stöhr, 1981). There is a strong link between the idea of local 
competitiveness and bottom up development where local grass-root organisations, growing in 
ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞĂƐĂůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝƐĞĚĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ’(Uphoff, 1993), play a role in the coordination 
of local enterprises (Terluin, 2003). Sonnino (2004) argues that this approach leads to 
development outcomes which would otherwise be missed in a top-down paradigm, because it 
takes into account the high degree of diversity between rural areas  W ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŽĐĂů ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ’ ? ĂƐ
Poole et al. (2013) describes it. There is a perceived failure of government initiatives to bring 
development from the top (Bitzer, 2012). This is evident in the distinction made between all- 
purpose development factors, such as infrastructure and public sector services, which can be 
easily coordinated from the top because of their homogenous nature, compared to more 
specific and diverse needs of rural actors that require less centralized approaches (Zezza et al., 
2008). 
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Friedmann and Weaver (1979) put forward the argument that development theory was too 
concerned with functions at the expense of territorial spaces. This argument generated a new 
approach to development that considered rurality as a space in itself, rather than as a function 
of urban areas which was a view claimed to ŚĂǀĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƵƌďĂŶ ďŝĂƐ ’(Potter et al., 
2008). Instead of focusing on single rural sectors, the territorial approach (a derivative of 
endogenous theory) takes the position that rural development is best achieved when a 
multitude of rural stakeholders are incorporated and focused upon. This approach is 
characterized by diversifying and enriching rather than disconnecting rural-urban linkages, 
innovating rural processes and decentralization of power to the local level with a greater 
emphasis on the local context (Schejtman and Berdegue, 2004). A difference between the 
territorial approach with the wider endogenous approach to development is the inclusion of 
extra-local linkages, leading some to ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞŝƚĂƐ ‘ŶĞŽ-ĞŶĚŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ’(Ray, 2002). Here there is 
an acceptance of both internal and external linkages as important to rural development where 
the rural versus urban and agriculture versus non-agriculture conflict is replaced with an 
approach that attempts to maximise synergies between these dichotomies. 
 
The European Union ’Ɛapproach to rural development is sometimes described as territorial in 
nature (Ray, 1999, Zezza et al., 2008, Goodman, 2004, Furmankiewicz et al., 2010, Marquardt et 
al., 2011, Lee et al., 2005, Dargan and Shucksmith, 2008, Kovách, 2000, Shucksmith, 2000, Jones 
and Clark, 2003, Chanteau, 2002, Ward et al., 2003, Bosworth and Willett, 2011, Marsden and 
Sonnino, 2008). Indeed it has been argued that European Union rural development initiatives 
have alone re-vitalized interest in territorial rural development since its original theoretical 
conception by Friedmann and Weaver (1979) (Ray, 1999). The growing importance attached to 
non-farm income for rural households provides strong empirical support for the argument that a 
non-sectoral approach is the most effective method to improve rural incomes (Evans and Ngau, 
1991, Reardon et al., 1998, Reardon et al., 2000, Ferguson, 1998, Deininger and Olinto, 2001, da 
Silva and Grossi, 2001, Ferreira and Lanjouw, 2001, Lanjouw and Feder, 2001, Berdegué et al., 
2001, Ruben and Van den berg, 2001, Start, 2001, Reardon et al., 2001a, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 
2001, Ellis, 2005). 
 
A prominent idea that has developed as part of the divergence from traditional theories is 
Sustainable Development (SD). The concept of sustainability arose originally within the context 
of renewable resources to mean  “ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
human life at a specified level of well-ďĞŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĨƵƚƵƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?(Lele, 1991, p. 609). The 
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ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘KƵƌ ŽŵŵŽŶ &ƵƚƵƌĞ ’ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ
Development (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), is regarded as the 
catalyst for the discourse around SD. The definition of SD ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ  ‘KƵƌŽŵŵŽŶ&ƵƚƵƌĞ ’ ŝƐƚŚĞ
same definition that is used today:  “^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĞĞƚƐ ƚŚĞ
needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
ŶĞĞĚƐ ? ?(Sustainable Development Commission, 2015). 
Since its introduction to the development lexicon, SD is now a core tenant of current policy 
thinking. The United Nations has 17 Sustainable Development Goals, from gender equality to 
governance (United Nations, 2015). Although SD was initially orientated towards environmental 
concerns, it has incorporated both economic and social sustainability (figure 2). Balancing these 
three dimensions is a topic that gets to the heart of SD (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987); for instance, driving industrial growth to achieve economic sustainability 
can, in many instances, be to the detriment of ecosystem integrity. 
 
One component of SD is human capital (Veron, 2001). Schultz (1961) is seen as one of the 
founders of the human capital concept and while there are a number of different definitions, it 
can essentially be summed up as the learning capabilities of individuals that has value in the 
production of goods and services (Lucas, 1988). The basic proposition of advocates is that 
human capital matters because it is a significant contributor to economic growth (Nafukho et al., 
2004) and has a particularly strong impact within a developing country context (Psacharopoulos, 
1994). However there are two derivative theories that attempt to explain how and why this 
takes place. The neo-classical argument claims that human capital increases productivity and 
therefore boŽƐƚƐĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ’ƐŽƵƚƉƵƚ, whereas the endogenous understanding regards human 
capital as a driver of innovation and technology which in turn promotes growth (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2008). 
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Figure 2: The Three Dimensions of Sustainable Development 
 Source: Sustainable Development Commission (2015) 
Measuring human capital is an issue under dispute. Although educational enrolment and 
attainment have been the dominant proxies used to measure the concept, it is notoriously 
difficult to measure human capital because it incorporates a complex set of human attributes 
and is a multifaceted concept (Barrow and Lee, 2001) ?/ŶĚĞĞĚĞŶŽƐĂŶĚŽƚŽƵ ’Ɛ(2014) review 
of previous studies shows that even when controlling for publication selection bias, the large 
variances between degrees of influence of human capital on economic growth among studies 
can largely be put down to differences in measurements and models. This is also backed up in 
ĞŶŚĂďŝďĂŶĚ^ƉŝĞŐĞů ’Ɛ(1994) findings that when using one econometric model, human capital 
has a positive relationship with per capita growth rates but when using another, the relationship 
is insignificant. 
 
Despite questions over how human capital should be measured, there is evidence that human 
capital make a valuable contribution in developing countries. Baldacci et al. ’Ɛ(2008) study in 118 
less developed countries shows a positive relationship between educational enrolment and 
economic growth. Likewise Levine and Renelt (1992) find a positive relationship between 
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primary and secondary enrolment and economic growth in 103 countries. Noorbakhsh et al. 
(2001) study finds human capital is not just a determinant, but one of the most important 
determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows for developing countries  W a key driver of 
economic growth. There is also evidence that shows reduced child mortality rates can also be 
achieved through human capital development (Barrow and Lee, 2001). Moving to agri-chain 
development specifically, Fikru (2014) finds that a factor in ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ’Ɛ
human capital and other studies show the positive impact of human capital on agricultural 
productivity in developing countries (Azhar, 1991, Phillips and Marble, 1986,  
Chou and Lau, 1987). 
 
In some studies, the role of human capital on economic growth is less clear. From a study in 52 
African countries, Appiah and McMahon (2002) conclude that there is an insignificant 
relationship between primary/secondary school enrolment and economic growth. Furthermore, 
others make the case that expansion of school attainment does not assure the improvement of 
economic conditions (Pritchett, 2006, Hanushek, 2013). Hanushek (2013) argues that rather than 
attainment as an indicator, more should be done to measure human capital through school 
quality in developing countries, suggesting that cognitive skills are a better indicator. 
Psacharopoulos (1994) reviews the literature and concludes that while primary education is an 
important investment priority in developing countries, rates of return decline as the level of 
schooling and per capita income increases. Despite questions over the strength of the 
relationship and the methodologies used, the general conclusion from the literature is that 
human capital is an important part of the development mix, including agricultural development 
(Singhe, 2009). 
 
Alongside human capital came the notion of cultural capital. Early modern theorists made the 
assumption that cultural traditions constrain development activity (Hoselitz, 1952, Hagen, 1980). 
These authors took the view that development was a progressive force and traditional cultures 
were largely regressive, essentially creating a dichotomy between the two. However, more 
recently cultural caputal has been brought back as a part of bottom-up, endogenous rural 
development (Luloff, 2009). From the literature, culture can be seen as both a barrier (Ransom, 
2011, Platteau, 2009, Bowen and Master, 2011) and a resource (Ray, 1998, Murdoch et al., 2000) 
for agri-chain development. Where culture appears to have had its most significant positive 
impact for rural development is through the enhancement of rural tourism (MacDonald and 
Jolliffe, 2003, Hemphill et al., 2004, Jenkins and Oliver, 2001, Arnaboldi and Spiller, 2011). 
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The above discussion outlines a distinct trajectory in the literature, going beyond the  ‘ŚĂƌĚǁĂƌĞ ’
(ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ) ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ’  ?ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ) ŽĨ agricultural development. This 
trajectory reflects ĂĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐǁŚĂƚ ‘ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ’ŵĞĂŶƐ ?ĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ?ŽŶůǇĨŽƵƌ
main factors of production were considered; however this soon evolved to a multitude of 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ‘ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐ ’ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďƵƚ
were as important to understanding economic growth as the traditional grouping (Edvinsson and 
Malone, 1997). One such form of these contemporary understandings of capital is social capital, 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ ’ŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ(Grootaert, 1998) and one of the pillars of 
SD (Veron, 2001). The next section begins the discussion on social capital by reviewing the 
literature on collective organisation. 
 
2.4 Social Capital 
 
2.4.1 A Weak Concept? 
 
Before reviewing the empirical discussions around social capital in the development literature, it 
is important to discuss the discourse from a definitional point of view. Robert Putnam (1995), 
attributed with its popularity as a concept, defines social capital as the features of social 
organisation such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit. Since this definition is broad and open to interpretation, 
researchers have used the concept to describe a variety of phenomena and not all of them 
relatable to one another (Pender et al., 2012). Many of the criticisms of social capital are not 
ŽǀĞƌŝƚƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ĨƵǌǌŝŶĞƐƐ ’ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ĂƐƵƌůĂŐ(2002) notes P “ƚŚĞĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů
social capital literature seems to be particularly plagued by vague definition of concepts, poorly 
measured data, absence of appropriate exchangeability conditions, and lack of information 
necessary to ŵĂŬĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĐůĂŝŵƐƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ?(p.474). Fine (2010) makes the case that social 
capital is a term used fashionably in research circles that, when scrutinised, lacks analytical 
power because of the way the concept has been trivialised across disciplines; even going as far 
to say that it could be having a negative impact our understanding of development and 
globalization. 
 
Indeed, definitions of social capital are broad in scope. For instance, Sporleder and Moss (2002) 
define social capital as the  “ƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ ?(p. 1347). Woolcock (1998) defines it as 
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 “ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚƌƵƐƚ ? ĂŶĚ ŶŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐŝƚǇ ŝŶŚĞƌŝŶŐ ŝŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?(p. 153). The 
agricultural economics literature rĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĂƐ Ă  “ƐŽĐŝŽ-ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ŐŽŽĚ ? ĂŶĚ Ă
constituent of an economic transaction (Robison and Flora, 2003). Robison et al. (2002) defines 
social capital as:  ?Ă ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ Žƌ ŐƌŽƵƉ ?Ɛ ƐǇmpathy toward another person or group that may 
produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for another person or group 
ŽĨ ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?(p. 19). Van Staveren and 
Knorringa (2007), acknowledging that the literature is awash with definitions, boils them all 
ĚŽǁŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ’ ĂŶĚ ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞĂ ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ? ŵĂŶǇ
definitions (as well as measurements) can be related back to the notion of trust (Reyes and 
Lensink, 2011, Nilsson et al., 2012). 
 
Robison et al. (2002) states that the confusion over defining social capital in the literature stems 
from its merging with outcomes, arguing that social capital should only be defined as what it is 
and not what it can do. Likewise Portes and Landolt (1996) note that the problem of defining 
social capital is because of blurring lines between where it comes from, what it is and the 
consequences of it. Fine and Lapavitsas (2004) argue that social capital is a confusing concept 
that does not bring together, as it intends, the analysis of economy and social relationships. 
Ultimately these definitional problems around social capital can greatly impact its capacity as an 
usefully applicable concept (Dufhues et al., 2011). There are a variety of ways in which the 
concept is measured in the empirical research, from more concrete measures such as 
membership growth within a group (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, Asfaw et al., 2009, Gotschi et al., 
2009) to less tangible yet by no means less valuable indicators such as trust or participation 
(Botelho, 2013, Reyes and Lensink, 2011, Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
 
It could be argued that the way social capital is measured depends on what question is being 
asked and ultimately, what level of social capital is under interrogation (Grootaert et al., 
2004). WƵƚŶĂŵ ’Ɛ (1993) definition of social capital is defined at the macro level, based on the 
question it is attempting to answer; differences in economic performance between North 
and South Italy. This contrasts with much of the research conducted in partnership with the 
World Bank at the household level (Grootaert 1998, Grootaert 1999, Grootaert et al. 2004, 
Rishna and Sharder, 1999, Narayan, 1997), regarding social capital as a household asset 
rather than at the national, regional or societal level. Table 2 outlines the definitions of social 
capital in the literature, categorised into different levels of analysis. 
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Table 2: Definitions of social capital, by level of analysis 
 
Level of social capital Characteristics Sources 
Macro Social capital at a societal and/or geographical 
level 
Coleman (1990) 
Putnam (1993, 1995) 
Meso Social capital within collective organisations, 
typically co-operatives 
Uphoff and Wijayaratna 
(2000) 
Micro Social capital held among individuals and as an 
asset for households 
Grootaert (1998, 1999) 
 
A distinction in the development literature developed by Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) that 
gives conceptual clarity to social capital at the organisational level is structural and cognitive 
social capital. Structural social capital includes roles for decision making, rules, procedures 
and precedents that support collective action. It makes it easier to resolve conflicts, reduces 
transaction costs and enables social learning. Cognitive social capital consists of the 
norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that incline people to cooperate. Structural social capital 
could be best described as the hardware of social capital in that it provides a structure for 
cooperation to operate in, whereas cognitive social capital could be thought of as the 
software of social capital in that it is the programming which feeds into a structure and is 
conducive for cooperation. These two dimensions are reinforcing and there is a degree of 
overlap between them (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, van Rijn et al., 2012). 
 
Since the present study focuses on how groups of farmers operate in GVCs, it adopts Uphoff and 
tŝũĂǇĂƌĂƚŶĂ ’Ɛ(2000) definition of social capital at the organisational level. Within the context of 
the research objective; to uncover how social capital among farmers is shaped by the 
governance of a GVC, the distinction between the two types of social capital provides a thought- 
provoking proposition. If structural and cognitive social capital display different characteristics, 
then the process by which each is shaped by governance may also be different. This is a line of 
enquiry pursued in the thesis. 
 
This section presented the debate over the definition of social capital, settling on Uphoff and 
tŝũĂǇĂƌĂƚŶĂ ’Ɛ(2000) definition to provide the conceptual clarity required to conduct an 
empirical study. The next section moves the discussion onto the benefits and detriments of 
social capital in the development literature. 
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2.4.2 Social Capital Benefits 
 
Given the prominent position of collective organisation in development studies (Vajja and White, 
2008, Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith, 2005, Rosenfeld, 2002), social capital has been elevated 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ’ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĚŝƐĐŽurse because it is argued that the concept goes 
some way in explaining why there has been little or no rural development in cases where other 
conditions for success exist (Grootaert, 1998). Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) argue that social 
capital now has the same recognition in the literature as natural, physical, financial, human and 
political capital and there is a broad consensus in the development literature that social capital is 
a critical element of rural development (Fafchamps, 2006). This section reviews the empirical 
literature on the benefits of social capital, organised into three levels as noted in the previous 
section; macro, meso and micro. Followed by this is a discussion of the detriments of social 
capital. 
 
While research on the macro impact of social capital has been paid less attention compared to 
the meso and micro levels, the foundations of the social capital can be found at the macro level. 
WƵƚŶĂŵ ’s (1993) original study that popularised the concept made the case that, through 
comparative case studies of regional governments in Italy, social capital has economic and 
democratic benefits for societies. Likewise WƵƚŶĂŵ ’Ɛ(1995) later work, looking at bowling league 
membership in the U.S. (alongside other examples), argued that a rise in bowlers but a fall in 
bowling leagues had negatively impacted on relationships among members of society and 
ultimately resulted in political disengagement from the system. Goetz and Rupashingha (2006) 
on a study in local U.S. communities finds that society measures such as voter turnout, number 
of NGOs and participation in the census is reduced when social capital is eroded. El-Said and 
Harrigan (2009) look at the linkage between social capital and political responses to welfare 
changes across the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to benefits within a political 
context, there is also evidence of maco-economic benefits. Knack and Keefer (1997) use the 
World Values Survey to measure the relationship between social capital and macro-economic 
performance, showing that social capital is not just linked with higher incomes, but equality of 
incomes as well. 
 
While the literature on social capital at a macro level is more limited than other levels, a key 
theme that emerges from this stream is the role of institutions. An empirical study by Fafchamps 
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(2004) on a dozen African countries indicates that formal institutions are important only where 
transactions are large enough to warrant legal action, indicating that economies characterized 
by small transactions depend more on social capital and trust to regulate transactions  W a point 
that is reiterated by the author elsewhere (Fafchamps, 2006). Baland and Platteau (1998) 
theorise that there is a need for stronger institutions in societies where social capital is low and 
vice versa. Botelho (2013) analyses the relationship between social capital and institutional trust 
in Bolivia within the context of national decentralisation, suggesting that there is a relationship 
between interpersonal trust and institutional trust and that institutional trust is higher in those 
organisations with a local presence such as indigenous authorities and municipal governments. 
ŽƚĞůŚŽ ’Ɛstudy suggests there are linkages between different levels of social capital. 
 
Within the development literature, social capital has been extensively discussed at the meso 
level, due in large part to the concept of collective action far preceding the concept of social 
capital. The language around both concepts in the literature is similar because the conditions by 
which collective organisations arise and the benefits that they create mirror that of social capital 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Social capital is critical to every functioning of a collective group, 
from its creation where initial investments are required by members and demands of members 
placed on leaders, to the rules and sanctioning that regulates collective action  
(Nilsson et al., 2012). 
 
Before the development lŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂĚŽƉƚĞĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŵŝǆ ’ ?
collective enterprises had a long history in Europe. As early as the 13th Century, milk producers in 
France and Switzerland formed farmer cooperatives to pool milk to make cheese (Poole and de 
Frece, 2010). However it was not until the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th Century and the 
 ‘ZŽĐŚĚĂůĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞWŝŽŶĞĞƌƐ ’ǁĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŚĂƚĂŵŽĚĞƌŶ ŝĚĞĂŽĨĂĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ first 
came to light (Hind, 1999). As Hind notes, although the cooperative movement was generated in 
Europe and elsewhere within the context of the industrial revolution, collective organisations 
that resemble those of the Rochdale Principles in the developing world did not; not least of all 
because they did not go through the kind of industrial revolution that countries in the Northern 
hemisphere did. Given the conceptual similarities with social capital, it is not surprising that both 
the form and success of collective organisation varies to such a degree depending on context 
(Velez et al., 2010, Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004, Cardenas et al., 2011, Henrich et al., 2010, 
Prediger et al., 2011, Serra, 2011). 
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While there are a range of different types of collective organisation, from share-holder firms to 
non-profits (Mersland, 2009), cooperatives tend to be the most widespread type of organisation. 
There are roughly 750,000 cooperative organisations in the world which serve 730 million 
members (Ortmann and King, 2007), although the cooperative movement has been considerably 
more widespread and successful in North America and Europe than in the developing world 
(Barton, 2000). As Ortmann and King (2007) note, the attempt to organise farmers in developing 
countries have often failed, even though collective action has the potential to drive agricultural 
development in such countries. Yet despite the perceived failure of collective organisations to 
make the gains in developing countries that were expected from them, there still exists the 
notion that collective organisation has an important poverty alleviating role to play (World Bank, 
2008). 
 
Transaction costs  W an important concept behind collective action as well as social capital, was 
first advocated by Williamson (1981). Fukuyama (1995) sums up the link between transaction 
costs and cooperation based on trust:  “dƌƵƐƚ ĐĂŶ ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ǁŚĂƚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐ call 
transaction costs - costs of negotiations, enforcement and the like - and makes possible certain 
efficient forms of economic organisation that otherwise would be encumbered by extensive rules, 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ?ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ ? “(p. 90). Collective action acts as a mechanism to reduce 
transaction costs and therefore helps negate the weaknesses associated with size of smallholder 
farmers (van Rijn et al., 2012, Nilsson et al., 2012), especially in developing countries where 
strong institutions are missing (Fafchamps, 2006). 
 
Collective action has faced a great deal of scepticism in parts of the literature because of models 
formed from game theory that suggest collective action is inherently flawed. Two models in 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŚĂǀĞ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĚŽƵďƚ ? dŚĞ  ‘WƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ’Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ ’ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŝůĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ
collective best interest to do so, individuals may not cooperative because the collective good 
conflicts with the rational self interest in the face of potential cheating (Hardin, 1971). The 
 ‘dƌĂŐĞĚǇŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐ ’ůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĐŽůůĞctive action theory will likely fail because 
of free riding, especially within the context of resource depletion (Hardin, 1968). These notions 
represent a challenge to collective action because they suggest that, in principle, collective 
organisations are inherently flawed (Lichbach, 1996). However as Bardhan (1993) notes, their 
conclusions are based on abstract games which do not necessarily reflect reality and while they 
are analytically useful, such games are too rigid and mechanical to cope with nuanced internal 
group dynamics. Indeed where the game has been repeated, trust and new social norms can 
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develop between participants which reverses the single-game outcome ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ’Ɛ
Dilemma (Ostrom, 2000). 
 
Outside of a game theory environment, the empirics of collective action have demonstrated 
benefits for farmers. Collective organisations can reduce fixed transaction costs in terms of 
information search, negotiating price and enforcement, as well as variable transaction costs that 
depend on how much is traded such as transportation costs (Key et al., 2000). Staal et al. (1997) 
in case studies on dairy marketing cooperatives in Kenya and Ethiopia shows that farmers have 
been able to reduce the costs of dealing with buyers through producer organisations. Roy and 
Thorat (2008), using a case study of grape growers in India who successfully integrated into an 
export chain, demonstrate that farmers in collective groups earn significantly higher incomes 
than those outside of the group, even when controlling for potential selection biases. In 
addition, collective organisations enable greater bargaining power against buyers (Thorp et al., 
2005) and improve access to finance, technology and market information (Markelova et al., 
2009). Collective action can also facilitate access to emerging high-value chains (Narrod et al., 
2009), for example dairy marketing groups in Ethiopia (Holloway et al., 2000) and coffee 
cooperatives in Costa Rica (Wollni and Zeller, 2007). 
 
Many other studies support the idea that organised groups of rural actors that are able to 
coordinate their actions leads to particular development outcomes, including: innovation and 
technology take-up (Deroian, 2002, Oreszczyn et al., 2010, Fonte, 2008, Lambrecht et al., 2014); 
ethical brand legitimacy (Renard, 2003); market development in alternative food chains (Sage, 
2003, Morris and Kirwan, 2011); developing local governing models (Brunori and Rossi, 2007, 
Bebbington et al., 2005); competing in distant markets (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999); natural 
resource management and conservation (Bodin and Crona, 2008, Warriner and Moul, 1992, 
Mahanty, 2002); agricultural incomes (Weijland, 1994, Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999); non-farm 
incomes (Deichmann et al., 2009); organic practise take-up (Milestad et al., 2010); effectiveness 
of environmental policy (Morris, 2004, Burgess et al., 2000, Whelan, 2007); and rural tourism 
(Saxena and Ilbery, 2010, Arnaboldi and Spiller, 2011). Narrowing down to the problems that 
agri-chain actors face: small transaction sizes, strategic default, opportunism (cheating on 
contracts), monopoly power and limited political power; can be addressed through coordinated 
action among organised groups of actors (Poulton et al., 1998, Poulton et al., 2010). 
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Collective organisations are formations of social capital and ultimately, social capital is a 
prerequisite for collective action (Theesfeld, 2004). Social capital is something that exists within, 
but is not equivalent to collective organisation; as Uphoff (2000) notes, social capital is best 
understood as the stock variable made up of social connections from which collective  
action flows. 
 
Social capital at the meso level has also been shown to improve farmer productivity in 
developing countries. Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000), in their conceptual paper on structural 
and cognitive social capital, demonstrate how these two dimensions improved the productivity 
of Sri Lankan farmer organisations. Binam et al. ’Ɛ(2004) survey among smallholder farmers in 
Cameroon finds that social capital facilitated efficient production through the sharing of 
information of practices at farmer clubs which then spilled over to those who were not members 
such as family. In a study in rural Uganda on the impact of a social capital training project for 
female farmers, Vasilaky (2013) notes that the training led to increased productivity by 50% and 
had a significant effect on yields. 
 
Agricultural innovation is also a cited benefit of social capital for farmers. In a panel survey on 
the relationship between different dimensions of social capital and agricultural innovation, van 
Rijn et al. (2012) show that social capital is associated with greater adoption of innovation 
because it allows for more access to knowledge and resources. However the authors also find 
that cognitive social capital is negatively associated with innovation, suggesting this could be the 
consequence of creating an inward looking environment and/or pulling away time and resources 
that could otherwise be utilized for adoption. 
 
A relevant benefit of social capital among farmers integrating into GVCs is the adoption of 
standards and access to markets. From a survey on the impact of EU private food safety 
standards on pesticide use and farm-level productivity among small-scale vegetable producers in 
Kenya, Asfaw et al. (2009) argue that a lack of social capital is a major barrier that limits the 
adoption of standards among smallholders. Kaganzi et al. (2009), looking at a farmer ’s group in 
Uganda that successfully sold potatoes to a fast-food outlet in Kampala, suggests that social 
capital was critical for the organisation to access this channel. Likewise, Melo and Wolf (2007) in 
a case study of Ecuadorian bananas find that social capital enabled farmers to gain Fair Trade 
certification. While the evidence suggests that social capital is a critical factor for adopting the 
necessary standards to access lucrative markets, in some cases support from service providers 
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such as NGOs were a critical factor in enabling social capital to be utilized to access these 
markets (Kaganzi et al., 2009, Melo and Wolf, 2007). However the complexity of the chain also 
moderates the scope for social capital to improve ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’positions; chains which are high value 
and complex present a greater opportunity for collective organisations to shorten in a way 
where smallholders are able to better access markets which were either out of reach because of 
a higher stringency of standards or had to be accessed through multiple intermediaries (Fischer 
and Qaim, 2012, Poulton et al., 2010). 
 
Microfinance and group lending are typical strategic research sites for social capital because they 
require significant levels of trust to work successfully (Mackean, 2010, Woolcock, 1998). Dufhues 
ĞƚĂů ? ?Ɛ(2011) study on the repayment behaviour of debtors in Thailand finds that while strong 
ties among farmers have a significant and positive influence on repayment behaviour, weak ties 
among farmers and between farmers and others in a more powerful position (measured by 
occupational distance) does not; although this is somewhat disputed by another study in 
Thailand (Dufhues et al., 2013). Reyes and Lensink (2011) find that social capital enables access 
to financial capital in Chile. Shoji et al. (2012) looks at the reverse causality, suggesting that 
credit constraints negatively impact social capital in Sri Lanka because people are unable to 
invest the necessary resources (expenditure for group activities and participation in maintaining 
public goods) in creating social capital. 
 
There are also benefits of social capital that create broader outcomes that go beyond groups. 
Holloway and Lapar (2007) introduce the concept of the neighbourhood effect, meaning the 
propensity of neighbours to make the same decisions as one another, described as the 
correlation of behaviour. They show that the neighbourhood effect on farmers in the Philippines 
drove greater participation in markets. Likewise Binam et al. (2004) also demonstrates a strong 
spill-over impact through the sharing of information and practices. 
 
In addition to the macro and meso level, the empirical literature has shown there are benefits to 
social capital at the household level. More specifically, social capital has been shown impact on 
household income and poverty reduction efforts. Much of this research stems from studies 
conducted in conjunction with the World Bank. The Social Capital Assessment Tool, that is 
advocated by the World Bank, measures social capital at the household level (Krishna and 
Shrade, 1999). 
 
 40  
A study by Grootaert and Narayan (2000) indicates that social capital increases household 
welfare and can lead to poverty reduction. Narayan and Pritchett (1999), using the Social Capital 
and Poverty Survey in rural Tanzania, demonstrate how social capital is positively associatedwith 
the level of income. In a survey on household welfare in South Africa, Maluccio et al. (2000) find 
that social capital had a significant impact in 1998, although less of an impact earlier in 1993. 
When compared to human capital, there is also evidence that social capital has a stronger 
positive relationship with household welfare. Narayan and Pritchett (1999) find that social 
capital had a 4 to 10 times larger impact than human capital in rural Tanzania and Grootaert 
(1999) finds it twice as effective in Indonesia when compared to human capital at the household 
level. In addition to income, there is also evidence that social capital reduces the costs of 
migration (Henning et al., 2013) and increases individual contributions to public goods (Janssens, 
2010). 
 
While the empirics support the notion of the relationship between social capital and poverty 
reduction, the direction of causality could be under question. For instance, there is the 
suggestion that a barrier to social capital development is endemic poverty (Woolcock, 1998, 
Cleaver, 2005, El-Said and Harrigan, 2009), particularly given it requires an investment in money 
and/or labour (Narayan, 1997). This would suggest that the relationship is much more complex 
than a simple cause and effect and possibly interrelated, such that those who are in a relatively 
positive position benefit the most while those who are at a subsistence level may not be able to 
maintain social capital; while social capital may rise broadly, only some will ultimately benefit. 
 
This section has outlined the benefits of social capital highlighted in the development 
literature. Table 3 shows the benefits of social capital, organised into its macro, meso and 
micro dimensions. While social capital is largely regarded as a positive for development, there 
is also evidence to suggest that there are negative implications. The next section reviews the 
detriments of social capital. 
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Table 3: Benefits of social Capital, by level of analysis 






Maco Democratic engagement, macro- 
economic performance, role as an 
institution and institutional trust 
Putnam (1993, 1995); El-Said and Harrigan 
(2009); Knack and Keefer (1997); Fafchamps 
(2004); Baland and Platteau (1998); Botelho 
(2013) 
Meso Productivity, innovation and adoption, 
market access, repayment behaviour, 
information sharing, neighbourhood 
effect 
Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000); Binam et al. 
(2004); Vasilaky (2013); Rijn et al. (2012); 
Asfaw et al. (2009); Kaganzi et al. (2009); 
Melo and Wolf (2007); Dufhues et al. (2011, 
2013); Reyes and Lensink (2011); Shoji et al. 
(2012) 
Micro Household income, poverty reduction, 
reduced migration costs and 
individual contributions to public 
goods 
Grootaert and Narayan (2000); Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999); Maluccio et al. (2000); 
Grootaert (1999); 
 
2.4.3 Social Capital Detriments 
 
While the benefits are well established in the literature, another stream suggests that there 
are negative consequences of social capital. Portes and Landolt (1996) make the case that 
social capital can lead to antisocial norms and exclusion which challenges the so called 
 ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬ ’advocacy (Grootaert, 1998). Cleaver (2005) supports this position by arguing 
that instead of  “ŽǀĞƌƐŝŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚŵĂŶƚƌĂƐ ?(p. 904), it needs to be recognised that social capital 
may structurally reproduce exclusion for the poorest rather than provide a cure for it. Likewise 
Bebbington (2002) argues that social capital can be a mechanism for perpetuating patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion. Vervisch et al. (2013) also argue this point, noting that social capital 
should not be separated from its embeddedness within existing power relationships. Coming 
back to the different levels of social capital, the detriments of social capital highlighted in the 
literature is positioned as originating at the societal level where existing power relationships 
exist which then consequently shapes the meso and micro levels. 
 
Social capital can have a particularly negative effect on existing gender inequality. Gotschi et al. 
(2009) find that women in farmer groups in Mozambique have less chance of being elected 
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group leader and as a result the group agenda naturally favours men as the main beneficiaries of 
group benefits. Maclean (2010) based on a case study in rural Bolivia argues that because 
cultural traditions have such a significant impact on how social capital is shaped, the way that 
those cultural traditions treat women therefore also shapes how social capital will impact on 
gender. Looking at seven micro-finance programmes in Cameroon, Mayoux (2001) claims that 
although micro-finance programmes that build social capital make a significant contribution to 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ’Ɛempowerment, it may undermine empowerment where power relations are ignored. 
The reverse causation also appears to be true such that when women have greater participation 
in groups, social capital tends to be much higher in those groups (Westermann et al., 2005). 
Vasilaky (2013) shows that when social capital interventions are aimed at female farmers 
compared to standard extension projects, there is a more significant impact on productivity. 
 
Closely linked to exclusion is the notion of elite capture that can have anti-social effects 
(Goodhand and Hulme, 1997) and is defined as when power within a social system becomes 
increasingly centralized and able to reap benefits that would otherwise be distributed across the 
social system as whole (Vervisch et al., 2013). Adhikari and Godley (2010) in a study using 
qualitative and quantitative methods on community based organisations in rural Nepal note that 
a major problem with social capital in these organisations is elite capture of resources and that 
elites tend to be able to break rules with impunity, corresponding with WƵƚŶĂŵ ’Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ŶŽƚŝŽŶ
that sanctions are less likely to be imposed upwards. Vervisch et al. (2013) in an ethnographic 
study on community associations in Uganda argues that social capital between farmers and 
other actors in a more powerful position leads to elite capture if not accompanied by sufficient 
social capital among farmers. In particular, the authors lay out how there can be legitimacy and 
corruption in the same instance, evidenced by religious leaders who were allowed to continue 
embezzling community groups because of the wider religious context of the case study. This 
corresponds with other studies in the literature on how social capital can lead to elite capture 
(Malla et al., 2003, Marcus and Acharya, 2005). 
 
This notion of social capital as a concept that can produce harm as well as good reflects a 
political economy perspective on the concept in that it takes into account power relations that 
reinforce existing hierarchies (Vervisch et al., 2013). This goes against the somewhat more 
simple communitarianism position which sees social capital as inherently good for development 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). It appears evident that the political economy perspective is a 
more accurate perspective given the empirics on the negative consequences of social capital. 
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With a rich account in the literature on the benefits and consequences of social capital, the 
discussion now moves to the conditions by which it is formed on, where there is significantly less 
understanding and agreement in the literature. 
 
1.1.1 Conditions for Social Capital Formation 
 
While Putnam (1995) is generally considered to be the scholar who popularised social capital, 
Coleman (1990), an early theorist of social capital, was the first to create a theoretical 
framework for social capital formation. Coleman argues that there are three necessary 
conditions for the presence of social capital: 1) closure which is the power of a social system to 
place pressure (i.e. sanctions) on other members; 2) stability or the extent that members will 
stay where they are as opposed to individual mobility, a dynamic especially relevant for rural 
areas because of the static nature of family mobility (Beard, 2007); and 3) communitarian 
ideology, which could be best described as the combination of culture and cognition. 
Subsequent theoretical discussions mirror these conditions, typically referring to rules and 
sanctioning, diversity of norms and culture. The discussion on the conditions that lead to social 
capital formation begins by reviewing the empirics and debate over these three dimensions and 
ƚŚĞŶ ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ŽŶƚŽ ŶĞǁ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ƐŝŶĐĞ ŽůĞŵĂŶ ’Ɛ
framework. 
 
ŽůĞŵĂŶ ’Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨclosure corresponds closely with the notion of rules and sanctions. 
The argument for rules and sanctions presents an interesting proposition for social capital in that 
it reduces the needs for extensive rulemaking in economic organisation (Fukuyama, 1995), yet 
also requires such rulemaking to function in the first place. Rules and sanctions are there to 
ensure that the group interests are put above the individual interest, sometimes described as the 
 ‘ƌƵůĞƐof the ŐĂŵĞ ’(Taylor, 1982). The use of rules for economic organisation stems from the New 
Institutional Economics perspective which advocates institutions as necessary to influence 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ’ŚƵŵĂŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĨŽƌƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚŽĨƚŚĞwhole (North, 1990). Within the discourse on 
the role of the institutions, Uphoff (1993) distinguishes between two, overlapping types; the 
 ‘ŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞŚĂŶĚ ’ƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐƚŚĂƚŐƵŝĚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƚŚĞůĂǁ ) ?ĂŶĚ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ  ‘ŵĂĚĞ ’and have particular roles and 
responsibilities (e.g. The World Bank). 
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Hayami (2009) suggests that institutions are an outside entity separate from social capital even 
though the two are closely aligned. However, this point of view clashes with Uphoff and 
tŝũĂǇĂƌĂƚŶĂ ’Ɛ ?2000) definition of structural social capital which incorporates rules that facilitate 
mutually beneficial collective action as a dimension of social capital as opposed to a factor that 
influences it from the outside. Pretty and Ward (2001) also include common rules and sanctions 
as definitional elements of social capital. Regardless of these disputing perspectives, there is a 
broad consensus in the literature that enforceable rules are a determinant for social capital 
formation. 
 
Molinas (1998) argues that a determinant of social capital is the extent that sanctions are 
enforceable and rewards for cheating outside of the rules are high. Woolcock (1998) in a review 
paper on social capital and economic development presents a similar conclusion that weak or 
unenforced rules are detrimental to social capital formation. Cechin et al. (2013) in a study on 
Brazilian cooperatives finds that more market-driven or hierarchical cooperative structures 
create greater commitment towards developing social capital by members, which the authors 
suggest is because of the fear of being excluded and therefore represents a sanction. Barham 
and Chitemi (2008) links rules with the maturity of a group in their case study of Tanzanian 
farmer groups:  “it is clear that the group maturity and activity level variables are positively 
associated with a ŐƌŽƵƉ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ŝƚƐ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? hŶůŝŬĞŶĞǁ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ŵĂƚƵƌĞ
groups had a set of institutions to guide group behaviour ?(p. 58). In a discussion paper on the 
relationship between social capital and institutions, Nooteboom (2007) argues that rules or 
habits that enable or constrain action and carry sanctions for non-compliance are necessary 
conditions. Adding nuance to the role of sanctioning, Nooteboom notes that sanctions can be 
not just material but also non-material, for instance social exclusion from a community or 
reputational damage. 
 
An interesting perspective from Baland and Platteau (1998) is that the degree of rules and 
sanction mechanisms that are needed ultimately depends on the level of existing social capital. If 
there is a group with low social capital which the authors coin the distrust equilibrium, there is a 
need for more hierarchical regulatory structures, whereas the necessity of such systems diminish 
as social capital rises. Although only a theoretical discussion, it suggests that while in the early 
stages of social capital formation rules are critical, they can then be substituted by social capital 
if social capital increases to a sufficient level. 
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While the literature strongly advocates rules and sanction mechanisms, there may also be 
friction created as a result. The breakdown of social capital within a group of farmers is typically 
related back to dissatisfaction of its members (Nilsson et al., 2009). As cooperatives grow larger, 
management becomes increasingly autonomous and divorced from its members and there is 
greater need to enforce stricter rules and regulations (Hind, 1999). This change in the regulatory 
structure may also destroy social capital. As Nilsson et al. (2012) theorises, for cooperatives to 
be more competitive, they must streamline their business processes which requires more 
control  W however members of such groups typically do not want to be controlled. The dilemma 
for fast growing collective organisations in particular is how management can streamline 
processes and put into place control mechanisms necessary for competing in competitive value 
chains without degrading the commitment of its members (Cechin et al., 2013). Therefore while 
enforceable rules are important for social capital, in some cases the two may conflict if they are 
considered too restrictive (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). 
 
A second condition for social capital theorised by Coleman (1990), and one which is disputed to 
a greater degree than the role of rules and sanction mechanisms, is the extent that a social 
system is stable; manifest in the extent that members will stay where they are as opposed to 
migrating to a different area. The intuitive argument for this condition is that where a social 
system is unstable through migration there are greater qualitative differences between people 
such as ethnicity and religion. This is highly relevant to rural areas because of rural-urban and 
rural-rural migration conflicting with the static spatiality of rural life (Beard, 2007), in essence 
suggesting that migration is a barrier to social capital formation when people leave or enter a 
geographic space. 
 
Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan (2007) argue that when people migrate away from their place 
of home, social capital deteriorates because previous relationships weaken. Miguel et al. (2006), 
using Indonesian panel surveys, find that areas which experience industrialisation have higher 
social capital whereas periphery areas which do not go through industrialisation experience a 
reduction of social capital. The authors hypothesise that migration from rural areas to cities 
leads to lower social capital in those rural areas while bolstering social capital in industrialized 
places. Other authors support the notion that ethnic or religious diversity has a negative 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚĂďŝůƚǇ ’ ŽĨ Ă social system (Woolcock, 
1998, Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan, 2007, Beard, 2007, Klitgaard and Fedderke, 1995, 
Easterly and Levine, 1997, Castle, 1998, Mavridis, 2015). However, there is opposing evidence 
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that contradicts the role of diversity within networks of people (Bhattacharyya et al., 2004). 
There is also evidence that suggests the reverse where social capital improves opportunities to 
migrants; as Henning et al. (2013) notes, social capital can reduce the cost of searching for a job 
and information costs related to rural migration. 
 
Closely linked with stability are cultural and historical factors, generally agreed to be a critical 
factor for social capital formation (Nilsson et al., 2012, Molyneux, 2002, Maclean, 2010, 
Woolcock, 1998). The relationship between culture and social capital is intuitive given that both 
ĂƌĞ ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ?  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ’ĐŽŶƐtructs within societies. As Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) 
note, social capital is embedded within culture and therefore it is inseparable from the 
formation of social capital, reflecting the wider issue of separating social capital from its causes 
and effects (Lyon 2000). 
 
Going beyond the theoretical model of Coleman (closure, stability and communitarian ideology), 
other factors have been identified that influence social capital formation. Leadership is one key 
factor, as well as its associated dimensions of transparency and accountability. The social capital 
literature argues that for people to come together, rally around a shared interest and form a 
group, some form of leadership is necessary (Serra, 2011, Vollan, 2012, Goetz and Rupasingha, 
2006, Krishna, 2004), especially during times where members of that group may have a 
particular propensity to leave or break the rules due to unfavourable circumstances at a given 
moment (Kaganzi et al., 2009). 
 
Based on the notion that social capital is a lengthy process to build, time is a factor to consider 
(El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). However, what precisely is the length of time necessary for 
formation is debatable. Within the context of cultural and historical explanations for social 
capital formation (Maclean, 2010, Woolcock, 1998), hundreds of years would be a possible 
implication. However more recently there are suggestions that social capital could be built in 
much shorter time frames (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002), with Krishna (2004) noting that 
this issue is  “ĨĂƌ ĨƌŽŵƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚ ?(p. 303). For instance, Kaganzi et al. (2009) in a case study of 
farmer groups in Uganda concludes that social capital was able to significantly build up within 
four to fiveyears. Khwaja (2009) also comes to a similar conclusion for rural Indian villages. 
However Lyon (2000) implies that social capital is a far more organic process than this and by its 
nature takes many years to develop. 
 
 47  
Much of the theoretical debate around external influences of social capital has traditionally been 
concerned with the role of the state. Coleman (1990) sees it as a zero-sum relationship, 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂƐĂƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ “ĐƌŽǁĚƐŽƵƚ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ǁhereas Putnam (1993) 
argues for synergy between the state and social capital. Theoretically, the state should be an 
important agent in creating social capital based on a New Institutional Economics perspective 
(North, 1990). Given that rules and regulations are important for guiding behaviour in collective 
organisations in terms of enabling or constraining actions, and the state can play a role in setting 
appropriate rules and regulations from the outside, we should expect a complimentary role for 
the state in terms of social capital formation (Hayami, 2009, Barham and Chitemi, 2009). As 
Nooteboom (2007) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ P “countries vary in the extent that there are institutions that support 
trust, and to the extent that there are no such institutions, trust must be built entirely from 
relationships, and without institutional support that can be laborious and such trust can be 
ĨƌĂŐŝůĞ ? ?(p. 30). WĞƚƌŽ ’Ɛ(2001) influeŶƚŝĂů ƐƚƵĚǇŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘EŽǀŐŽƌŽĚDŽĚĞů ’ ŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ
how the state played a powerful role in social capital development. Other authors support the 
potential for positive interaction between the state and rural social capital (Serra, 2011, Narayan 
and Pritchett, 1999). 
 
With the exception of the role of the state, the above discussion has so far described mostly 
factors for social capital formation that are endogenous to rural areas. Even the issue of 
migration is put in terms of stability of a collective group (Coleman, 1990). A contentious debate 
exists on the extent that outside agents can influence the development of social capital. Lyon 
(2000), in a case study on social capital in Ghana, argues that trust (a closely related concept to 
social capital) cannot be influenced from the outside. Likewise Vollan (2012) looks at externally 
initiated collective action in South Africa, finding that that a higher number of externally initiated 
organisations have a negative effect on trust and reciprocity within a community.  
 
Despite the above cases, there are some instances where social capital has been successfully 
created from the outside. Khwaja (2009) asks the simple question:  ‘can good projects succeed in 
bad communities? ’ ?to which the answer is yes, depending on the way interventions are 
designed (simplification, equitable distribution of returns and effective leadership). From a study 
on community based development projects in Indian villages, Janssens (2010) concludes that an 
external intervention led to social capital development, however she also highlights that this 
intervention was through bottom up (directed from rural spaces) rather than top-down (directed 
from above) mechanisms. >ŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ ? sĂƐŝůĂŬǇ ’Ɛ(2013) study of interventions in rural Uganda 
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shows how social capital can be externally initiated when designed in a way where it grows from 
the bottom up, in this case through mentoring programs between female farmers. Grootaert 
and Narayan (2004) find that NGOs can play an important role in building social capital, but 
support must be attuned to context specific factors (political, institutional and economic) and 
mediated through local organisations. 
 
While a number of studies suggest that social capital formation in rural areas can under certain 
circumstances be influenced from the outside, the role of buyers and GVC governance in social 
capital formation is a relatively unexplored issue. Theoretical discussions thus far have tended to 
take a negative view of its role. Messner (2004) proposes that integration into governed GVCs 
may translate into tensions between rural actors. For instance, it could be the case that 
relationships with buyers is regarded by some farmers as the relationship that matters most, 
which in turn leads to declining attention being paid to relationships among the group 
(Rabellotti, 2004), especially given that social capital requires investments in time (Shoji et al., 
2012). Pretty and Ward (2001) also suggests that demands from the outside may impact on 
group cohesion:  “There may be cases, however, where a group might benefit from isolation, 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĐĂŶĂǀŽŝĚĐŽƐƚůǇĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?(p.212). In a typology for different investments for 
linking farmers to markets, Bingen et al. (2003) argues that investments financed by private 
buyers do not lead to the development of social capital as a priority. All of these theoretical 
discussions imply that buyers are either ineffective or destructive for social capital; however this 
has not been seriously explored in the empirical literature. 
 
Based on the discussion so far, the question of how governance and social capital could be linked 
is a pertinent one. Globalization has opened the door to farmers to integrate into GVCs and, as a 
result, benefit from reaping higher incomes and sustainable growth research while creating a 
new set of challenges for scholars (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002). The structure of agri-food chains 
in the developing world are going through a dramatic change, with vertical coordination in GVCs 
becoming the choice organisational relationship (Poole and de Frece, 2010) and governance 
playing an ever prominent role in the literature as a result (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). What is 
absent from the empirical literature is what this means for social capital among farmers who 
participate in these GVCs. There are still gaps in a framework for social capital formation (Staber, 
2007, Durlauf, 2002, Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, Miguel et al., 2006) and the concept of 
governance could shed light on this issue. If governance of GVCs shapes participation of farmers, 
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then it is legitimate to ask whether governance of GVCs shapes participation among farmers. 
The next section reviews the GVC and governance literature. 
 
2.5 Global Value Chains and the Centrality of Governance 
 
2.5.1 A Global Value Chain Definition of  ‘'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? 
 
Governance is a multi-dimensional term that incorporates a number of overlapping definitions 
(Campos and Nugent, 1999, Gereffi et al., 2001) and therefore it is important to briefly outline 
some of these notions and identify which definition is followed in this thesis. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) (UNDP, 1997) provides a broad definition of governance: 
 “ ?'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂŶĚ
groups articulate their interests, exercises their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate 
ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?(p. 3). This definition has a societal dimension to it where governance is 
conceptualized as the interaction among actors in society. 
 
Similarly, Marshall and Douglas (2005, 1997) define governance in terms of support at the local 
level; specifically service provision and representation. As defined by the authors, service 
provision is the transfer of goods and services to rural actors to assist in the accumulation of 
capital required to generate rural development, whereas representation is conceptualised as 
building relational blocs that give rural actors a larger voice in the rural development process as 
well as a way to coordinate actors to achieve shared objectives. This has some commonalities 
with the broader definition offered by the UNDP but is narrowed down to institutional 
structures at the rural level. Furthermore this definition is very much a supportive conception of 
governance which is more in line with the rural cluster literature that sees institutional 
structures as enabling entities (Porter, 1998, Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999, Bair and Gereffi, 2001) as 
opposed to dictating the terms of participation for agri-chain stakeholders that is associated with 
governance in the GVC literature. 
 
Focusing on governance in GVCs, we see a very different understanding of what constitutes 
 ‘governance ’ ?'sƐĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚŐŽďĞǇŽŶĚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďŽƌĚĞƌƐĂŶĚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ
local-global trade linkages between developing and developed territories and can be understood 
as a series of activities that generate particular economic rewards for actors, with a specific 
focus on the rewards for developing countries (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). 
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Consequently, governance in GVCs sees buyers as principal coordinators of farmers rather than 
institutions (Gereffi et al., 2005). 
 
Within the context of GVCs, Gereffi (1994) defines governance as the:  ‘ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƉŽǁĞƌ
relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and 
flow ǁŝƚŚŝŶ Ă ĐŚĂŝŶ ?(p. 97). In a similar fashion, Humphrey and Schmitz (2004) define 
governance as the notion that  “ƐŽŵĞ ĨŝƌŵƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŝŶ ƐĞƚ ĂŶĚ ?Žƌ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞ ƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ
ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŝŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?(p. 96). Reardon and Farina (2002) conceptualize this as 
 ‘ŵĞƚĂ-ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ’ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĨŝƌŵƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƚŚĞŝƌƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶ. 
Clearly this is a much more specific and narrowly defined understanding of governance 
compared to that of broader definitions of governance described earlier. It is also different in 
nature; where the UNDP definition and the Marshall and Douglas definition sees governance as 
supportive mechanisms, the GVC conception sees governance as dictating the terms of 
participation. Since the research here is specifically concerned with GVCs and borrows heavily 
from that strain in the literature, governance as defined in the GVC literature is followed. 
 
2.5.2 The Concept of Governance 
 
World systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974) and its subsequent unit of analysis, Global Commodity 
Chains (GCCs) (Gereffi, 1994, Bair and Gereffi, 2001, Gereffi, 1999), incorporate the context and 
histories of regions and refrains from the generalizations to the same extent as dependency 
theory (Barnett, 1988, Gwynne, 2008). GCCs evolved from world systems theory but with 
striking differences. 
 
Similar to its close cousin dependency theory, world systems theory has a highly structuralist 
view of trade linkages and development. It regards the world-system, rather than the nation, to 
be the unit of analysis when it comes to understanding development. GCCs likewise sees 
linkages across national borders to be important for understanding the processes of 
development, through the analysis of power structures in supply chains. However as Bair (2005) 
describes, the divorce between World Systems Theory and the GCC approach arose from a 
conflict between those who believed there was little scope for growth for developed countries 
without revolutionary change of trade links and those who saw an opportunity for improvement 
from those links, albeit under certain conditions - the most important condition being that of 
ĐŚĂŝŶ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ’ ?
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Although the GCC approach looks at power relations and governance structures in global chains 
which are arguably important aspects, there is little focus on elements that the business and 
economics literature contain such as transaction costs and trade economics  W a gap that the GVC 
approach addresses; as Bair (2005, p. 154) notes: 
 
 “tŚĂƚĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞ'sĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ from the GCC paradigm to which it is closely related is the 
greater influence of the international business literature on its analysis of global production 
networks, as opposed to the more sociological orientation of the earlier GCC framework, and a 
more pronounced interest in the policy implications of chain ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? 
 
The departure from GCCs to GVCs ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚǇ ’ ?
Commodity suggests limited value adding opportunities, whereby the GVC approach takes into 
the account that there are activities along the chain, such as processing and packaging, which 
convert materials into higher value products. This is an important distinction given that the 
location of such activities determine where gains are captured along the chain (Kaplinsky, 
2004b). Bair suggests that the widening scope of global chain analysis from various different 
disciplines led to the overarching term 'Global Value Chains' as a way to incorporate the diversity 
of growing global chain research. What ties all this literature together is the focus on the nature 
of relationships among various actors in the chain and its implications for development 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). 
 
The important governance construct in the GVC literature comes from the work carried out by 
Gereffi et al. (2005) and Humphrey and Schmitz (2002). These were the first serious attempts in 
the literature to develop a governance concept, describing levels of coordination and power 
asymmetry in chains, separating itself from the GCC literature. At the core of GVC governance is 
Ă  ‘ůĞĂĚ Ĩŝƌŵ ’ǁŚŽĚŝĐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŽŽƚŚĞƌĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐŚĂŝŶ  “ǁŚĂƚ ? ?  “ŚŽǁ ?ĂŶĚ ?Žƌ  “ŚŽǁŵƵĐŚ
and ǁŚĞŶ ? something should be made (Giuliani et al., 2005). Given that these lead firms are 
typically buyers in the buyer-supplier relationship and this trend towards buyer-driven chains is 
ever growing (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, Gereffi and Lee, 2012, Reardon and Farina, 2002), they 
ǁŝůůďĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ďƵǇĞƌƐ ’ henceforth. 
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The discussion above has laid out how governance differs in the GVC literature to how its 
defined elsewhere, followed by how the concept evolved from World System Theory and GCC 
research. Governance is a complex, multi-faceted concept and Schmitz (2005) advises that its 
study should begin by  ‘ƵŶƉĂĐŬŝŶŐ ’ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŝŶƚŽ ŝƚƐ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ? dŚĞ ƌĞƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ
section breaks down governance into its composite dimensions. 
 
2.5.3 Standards as a Governance Mechanism 
 
What is inherent within the  ‘'sĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ’proposed by Gereffi et al. (2005) is the role of 
standards. The existence of governance within a GVC context is dependent on standards  W 
without them, the rationale to govern the chain is lost: 
 
 “dŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂƌŝses when some firms in the chain work to parameters set by 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ǁŚĞŶŽŶĞĨŝƌŵĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂŶĚƐĐŚĞĚƵůŝŶŐ ?ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ
ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĨŝƌŵ ? ?(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004, p. 97) 
 
It therefore makes sense that, given its dominant role in the GVC discourse, a discussion of 
GVC governance addresses the role of standards. Humphrey and Schmitz (2004) distinguish 
between these three types of standard and how they translate into requirements for rural, 
agri-chain actors in GVCs: 
 
x What is to be produced: product design and specifications. Examples of specifications are 
appearance and quality (Reardon and Farina, 2002); 
x How it is to be produced. This involves the definition of production processes, which can 
include factors such as the technology to be used, quality systems, labour standards and 
environmental standards. An example of a process standard is Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points (HAACP) (Reardon et al., 2001b) or Fair Trade certification (Nadvi and 
Waltring, 2004); and 
x How much of something is produced and when: production scheduling and logistics. 
 
Although buyers coordinate other enterprises into meeting standards, they do not necessarily 
create them. Standards can be set by standard setters like the International Labor Organisation, 
private standards set by coalitions of buyers as is the case of Global.G.A.P. (previously 
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EUREPGAP) (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000) or a mixture of both where the lines between public 
and private are blurred, for example the Fair Trade certification (Raynolds, 2012). 
 
Although buyers are responsible for implementing their own private standards, they also co- 
construct public standards with standard setting organisations. A notable development in this 
regard is a major consortium of five food multinational corporations, named the European Chair 
in Food Safety Microbiology, that seeks to build an international public standard for food safety 
parameters (Wageningen University, 2012). This particular interaction between buyers and 
standard setting organisations has been addressed by other research (Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000, Mutersbaugh, 2005). It also does not relate to interactions with farmers specifically 
because it is an interaction that takes place between buyers and standard setting organisations, 
even if the interaction has an impact on farmers in the form of co-constructed public standards 
(Messner, 2004). 
 
The motives for privately set standards range from securing consumer confidence through 
identifiable accreditation, to reducing control and search costs when sourcing from suppliers 
(Messner, 2004). While the origin of standards may differ, they are all in essence a method for 
codifying the coordination of farmers along the chain which makes it an important talking point 
in a discussion of GVC governance. The governance framework reflects the role of standards in 
terms of the complexity and codifiability of information required for suppliers to meet them. 
 
The literature on GVC standards is separated by two concerns; one normative and the other 
descriptive. The first questions whether private standards, set almost always by agri-chain 
buyers (Reardon and Farina, 2002), are ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ‘ŐŽŽĚŽƌďĂĚ ’ĨŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?There is 
a generally negative judgment on the consequences of private standards for rural development 
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). It is argued that private retail standards increase inequality 
within developing countries; particularly between farmers that are able to comply and those 
that are not (Herzfeld et al., 2011), as Reardon and Farina (2002) note: 
 
 “dŚĞůƵĐŬǇ W a relatively small subset of the original set of suppliers  W tend to find that meeting 
the standards, with formal certification in hand, benefits their business, opens new opportunities. 
The excluded tend to find themselves relegated to waning and unprofitable ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ? 
There is a consensus that private standards are taking a larger role in determining the formation 
of GVCs in developing countries (Von Braun, 2003, Reardon and Farina, 2002), while conversely, 
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public standards are playing a diminishing role (Jia and Huang, 2011, Henson and Reardon, 
2005). GlobalG.A.P., established by private retail consortium of European food retailers, is the 
ideal example where power over global agri-chains by private enterprises manifests itself 
through the implementation of private standards (Herzfeld et al., 2011). Indeed it is GlobalG.A.P. 
certification that is so often the golden ticket for agri-chain firms in developing countries to 
generate regional economic development (Henson et al., 2011). 
 
Through survey data, Bai and Zhang (2010) find that public certifications in China do not signal 
quality or safety to Chinese consumers, suggesting that private certification is more significant in 
this regard. Henson and Humphrey (2010) review the impact of private retail standards on 
developing countries and conclude that private standards have undermined the legitimacy of 
global agri-chain standards such as those set by World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytotsanitary Measures (SPS) and Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT). We can observe a trajectory in the literature from normative questions over the 
rights and wrongs of private standards, towards the realization that private standards are here 
to stay and that understanding how rural regions can gain the most from tapping into them is 
where research should go. While smallholder farmers in developing countries face significant 
challenges in GVCs where private standards are evident, coordination among farmers represent 
a means to manage these challenges (Dethier and Effenberger, 2011), indicating that social 
capital among farmers within the framework of governance is a valuable topic to explore. 
 
Global or public standards, although undermined by the dominating effect of private food 
standards, still play an integral role in global agri-chains in developing couŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ZĂŶƐŽŵ ’Ɛ
(2011) study on Botswana beef GVC finds that European Union directives and the World Trade 
Organisation trading regime which guides the production of beef has a significant impact on the 
way the chain functions. International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) certification has 
been addressed in the literature and represents a wider global standard that applies not just to 
agri-food but also manufacturing and other sectors as well (Herzfeld et al., 2011, Turner et al., 
2000) ?tŚĂƚŝƐƚĞůůŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ/^KůĂďĞůŝƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ’ ?indicating that its purpose 
is to homogenize food standards across agri-chains. Messner (2004) and Reardon and Farina 
(2002) note that a rationale behind the use of private standards is differentiation between 
competitors as a source of competitive advantage. 
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Adoption of private and public standards in developing countries is a rich topic in the literature, 
namely because it is generally recognized that, compared to developed countries, the challenges 
facing developing regions in meeting agri-food standards are particularly acute and represent a 
major barrier to rural development (Henson and Caswell, 1999, Garcia Martinez and Poole, 
2004). Standards place large demands on local institutional structures and require a 
restructuring process if chains are able to integrate into these complex GVCs (Fischer and Qaim, 
2012). 
 
It is clear that standards in GVCs have significant implications for rural systems and that with the 
growing prevalence of private standards, these implications will only intensify. Limited research 
has been conducted on what standards, as a dimension of governance, mean for the cohesion of 
farmers and collective organisations (Messner, 2004), despite it being understood that farmers 
and collective organisations change their behaviour when faced with standards (Nadvi, 2004a). 
Indeed, as Neilson (2008) notes, an inevitable consequence of growing implementation of 
private standards will be structural changes in how farmers organise. 
 
As far as is known, only one empirical study, published after the present research had begun, has 
specifically touched upon the topic of standards and social capital. In a case study on Rwandan 
coffee producers and the impact of Fair Trade certification on social capital, Elder et al. (2012) 
encountered mixed findings, with Fair Trade certification having a negative association with 
ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƚƌƵƐƚŝŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉďƵƚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨwomen. 
With the authors advising that more research is needed to better understand the consequences 
of certification on social capital, the present research explores this topic within the context of 
the relationship between governance and social capital. 
 
2.5.4 Upgrading in Global Value Chains 
 
^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚƵƌĚůĞƐ ’ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ŵƵƐƚ ũƵŵƉ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ effectively participate in a 
governed GVC. Where suppliers can meet standards with a low risk of failure, the necessity for 
buyers to support suppliers in the GVC diminishes. However where the capabilities of suppliers 
are weak, putting into question whether standards can be met, the incentive for buyers to 
provide support to improve how suppliers make products (efficiencies) and what products they 
make (products with greater value) increases (Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, 
Wiegratz et al., 2007). Furthermore, governance also shapes the extent that suppliers can move 
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into different functions of the GVC (e.g. producers moving into the function of exportation). 
Upgrading could be an interesting aspect to explore with regard to a relationship between 
governance and social capital because if governance shapes process, product and functional 
upgrading, then it could also shape social capital formation given that all are unified by a change 
in capabilities and behaviour. 
 
The notion of upgrading in GVCs moved the debate away from simply describing how power 
relations based on economic trade are governed between developed and developing regions 
and towards the question of how these relationships can be changed to the benefit of 
developing countries and regions (Gibbon, 2001, Gibbon and Ponte, 2008). Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2002) developed an upgrading typology of the different ways firms can change their 
relationship in GVCs and as a result, change the structure of governance: 
 
1. Process upgrading: efficiencies in production; 
2. Product upgrading: moving into products which have greater value per unit; and 
3. Inter-chain or functional upgrading: applying competences in another stage of the chain. 
 
The ability of firms to upgrade within GVCs is influenced by governance structure of the chain 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). As information becomes more complex and difficult to 
disseminate to suppliers, and the capability of suppliers falls (risk of supplier failure rises), chains 
become more controlled by buyers and functional upgrading is obstructed because buyers seek 
to keep command of their core competencies. However, when this happens, buyers are more 
inclined to guide suppliers into process and product upgrading since it is in their interests to do 
so. When information concerning standards is simple and easy to communicate, chains become 
more arms-length, product and process upgrading is limited because buyers are less likely to 
support suppliers. However functional upgrading is more likely within these conditions since 
suppliers are not blocked from expanding into other stages of the chain. A number of studies 
support this association between GVC structure and upgrading (Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, 
Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007, Ponte et al., 2014). It is generally considered that a 
middle ground between an arms-length, spot market structure and a hierarchical (fully vertical 
integrated) GVC enables the best chance for upgrading such that quasi-hierarchical governance 
spurs production and process upgrading and network governance generally supports all 
dimensions of upgrading (Messner, 2004, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). 
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Theoretically, upgrading of suppliers and participation in more sophisticated GVCs should boost 
local wages in exchange for their contribution to greater local value creation (Palpacuer and 
Parisotto, 2003). On this basis, value chain development has become an advocated strategy for 
rural economic development and poverty alleviation (M4P, 2008, Campbell, 2008, Nadvi, 2004b). 
Studies which have attempted to address ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ŝƐ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ’ ĨŽƌ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐlargely 
conclude that it does not necessarily lead to higher wage rates for workers (Bair, 2009, Raworth 
and Kidder, 2009, Rossi, 2013) and that local specific -factors play a more integral role in 
improving conditions for rural stakeholders such as collective organisation and institutional 
support (Bair and Gereffi, 2001, Carrillo, 1998, Czaban and Henderson, 2003). Ponte and Ewert 
(2009) in a study on South African wine note that after functional upgrading, farmers 
experienced higher risks and fewer rewards, even though in theory such upgrading should have 
had the opposite effect. These studies suggest that  ‘ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ’ ĂƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ^ĐŚŵŝƚǌ(2002) 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚ ƚŽ  ‘ĂďĞƚƚĞƌĚĞĂů ’for farmers (Ponte and Ewert, 2009, 
Giuliani et al., 2005). 
 
tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ŚŽǁ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ƐŚĂƉĞƐ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ’
with regard to wage rates for workers, (Bair, 2009, Raworth and Kidder, 2009, Rossi, 2013), no 
known studies have been conducted that explores how governance shapes social capital. Within 
the context of the relationship between governance and social capital, there is a gap to explore 
whether upgrading can have positive and/or negative implications for social capital formation, or 
an absence of an implication at all. 
 
2.5.5 Relationships and Trust as Mechanisms of Governance 
 
Standards and upgrading play a dominant role in the GVC approach (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
However relationships and trust in GVCs have historically been overlooked as important 
mechanisms of governance (Riisgaard et al., 2010). Indeed shaping participation is not just about 
setting standards, but also the nature of the relationship and how buyers and suppliers interact 
(Bolwig et al. 2010). 
 
How power is exercised in GVC relationships refers to the extent that a fair distribution of rents 
and risk is distributed along the GVC, with particular interest on the impact on the rural poor 
(Kaplinsky, 2004b, Riisgaard et al., 2010, Lee et al., 2011, Gwynne, 2008, Frederick and Gereffi, 
2009). The  ‘ĐůŽƐĞness ’of these relationships also becomes an important component of GVC 
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governance. In arms-length, market based governing relationships, the buyer and suppliers do 
not need to develop close, long-term relationships because the product is easily standardized 
and switching costs are low. However, where the product is more complex and switching costs 
are higher, there is a necessity for stronger, long-term relationships between actors that match 
the complexity of the chain (Hornibrook et al., 2009, Schmitz, 2005). Repetition of transactions 
also reflects the relationship between actors such that, as more and more transactions take 
place, there is a higher likelihood that relationships between actors will be more trusting 
(Frederick and Gereffi, 2009). 
 
Riisgaard et al. (2010) argues that too much of the GVC literature downplays the role that power 
asymmetry has when suppliers deal with buyerƐ ? ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ 'ĞƌĞĨĨŝ ’Ɛ(1994) definition of 
governance explicitly refers to power relations and how they determine the allocation of 
resources and rewards. While the strength of the GVC framework is in its ability to describe and 
typologize structures of governance in GVCs, this is at the expense of the power relationships 
between actors and the way buyers use their power in the chain. 
 
Closely related to the concept of relationships is the role of trust between buyers and suppliers. 
Trust is referred to as the extent to which one believes that others will not act to exploit their 
vulnerabilities (Morrow et al., 2004, Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002). Trust is pertinent to the 
question of governance because, as Dekker (2003) notes, ƚƌƵƐƚŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ’ŐŽŽĚǁŝůůƐĞƌǀĞƐĂƐĂŶ
informal control mechanism for the chain. This dimension of a GVC parallels the importance of 
relationships in rural clusters in that it reduces transaction costs between actors and therefore 
should be included when analysing linkages with buyers (Vieira and Traill, 2008). It also mirrors 
the social capital concept that is so prevalent in the previously discussed territorial model for 
rural development. As Kaplinsky and Morris (2002) state:  “ĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ
importance of trust in inter-firm relationships within the value chain requires economists to also 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇ ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?(p. 48). 
However trust within the context of GVC governance is a vertical concept; meaning the linkages 
between actors with different functions, rather than one which relates to the locality of 
producers which is more common with social capital (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). 
 
In a high-trust GVC, the buyer gains legitimacy from suppliers in the chain and relationships 
become more sustainable, as opposed to a low trust GVC where turnover and exclusion of 
suppliers is high and short-term price advantages become the driving force for the chain (Sako 
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and Helper, 1998, Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002, Riisgaard et al., 2010). A more equitable share of 
rewards along the GVC is more likely when there is a higher level of trust between actors (Kula 
et al., 2006), although the direction of causality is difficult to determine and may be inter- 
dependent. Relationships that go beyond operating at arms-length and transactional are also 
more likely to induce learning (making better products and making them more efficiently) by 
suppliers from buyers (Zanfei and Saliola, 2009, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011). If there is a 
simple product that requires very little exchange of information between actors, then it would 
be expected that trust does not play an important role in how the GVC is governed. Likewise if 
the product is complex and requires a high degree of information exchange, then trust is more 
important to the functioning of the GVC. 
 
The literature makes the case that building trust is a long term process and therefore long term 
relationships become a facilitator for high levels of trust. Buyers are more likely to assist in 
learning processes if relationships with suppliers are long term and there is a high degree of 
trust, since the propensity of suppliers to switch (thereby using learnt capacities from one buyer 
with another) diminishes. The role of vertical trust (between actors of different segments, such 
as producers and processes) in GVCs is noted extensively in terms of its role as a governance 
mechanism (Neilson, 2008, Sturgeon, 2002, Wiegratz, 2008, Wiegratz et al., 2007,  
Lee et al., 2011). 
 
The following section begins with a discussion of the definitional and conceptual issues 
surrounding social capital and collective action more broadly. It then goes on to outline the main 
benefits of social capital for ID, from agricultural productivity to farmer incomes. The section 
finishes by identifying existing factors that influence social capital formation and concluding with 
how governance maybe a factor that deserves further exploration. 
 
2.6 Research Agenda: Bringing Together Social Capital and Governance in GVCs 
 
According to the GVC literature, the economic rents that actors are able to acquire in a value 
chain depend in part on the governance of the chain; meaning the mechanisms by which buyers 
shape the participation of farmers. Governance of GVCs is especially relevant to developing 
countries because: 1) governance is most explicit when buyers source from developing country 
producers (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004); 2) the scope for countries and regions to thrive 
depends in large part on their participation in GVCs (Lee et al., 2011, Gereffi and Lee, 2012, 
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Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002); and 3) there is evidence that suggests smallholder farmers in 
developing countries only have access to export markets if they are able to integrate into GVCs 
that are governed by buyers (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).  
 
Governance has become an ever more important concept in the literature (Gereffi and Lee, 
2012) and a rich account now exists on how it affects the ability of suppliers to develop their 
capabilities to make better products, to make them more efficiently and to move into different 
functions of the chain (Bazan and Navas- Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007). 
Yet this paradigm has not been applied to relationships between farmers on the ground and 
there are calls in the development literature to combine this framework with conditions at the 
rural rather than just the value chain level (Challies, 2008, Fold and Gough, 2008, Bolwig et al., 
2010, Neilson, 2008, Messner, 2004). 
 
A range of different factors that influences social capital formation has been studied in the 
literature. However there is still a poor understanding of how social capital develops when 
integrated into GVCs. Compared to the benefits of social capital which has been focused on 
extensively in the literature; how social capital is formed has been paid relatively less attention 
(Staber, 2007, Durlauf, 2002, Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, Miguel et al., 2006). The 
development literature has typically ignored the idea that the social capital of farmers is built or 
destroyed within the enabling and constraining environment of GVCs, opting instead to focus on 
factors which are exogenous to value chains and endogenous to groups (Coleman, 1990, Lyon, 
2000, Becker and Ostrom, 1995, Ostrom, 1992). Where discussions on the role of buyers have 
taken place, there has been a general sense of pessimism (Messner, 2004, Bingen et al., 2003, 
Rabellotti, 2004). Yet there have been limited attempts to effectively explore the relationship 
between how buyers govern farmers in GVCs and social capital, thereby warranting an in-depth 
study to address this gap in the literature. On a fundamental level, the argument for this 
combination of the horizontal construct of social capital with the vertical construct of 
governance boils down to a simple observation: farmers do not just operate in isolated groups 
and they do not exclusively operate in GVCs  W they operate in both, at the same time. 
 
As the review showed, there are different aspects that constitute governance, and social capital 
has two distinctions; cognitive and structure. Placed within a study context where governance 
and an existing stock of social capital are evident, and with a methodology that purposely looks 
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at these two concepts within a single study, this thesis may uncover a relationship that is absent 
from the present literature. The research question is as follows: 
 
How does the Governance of a Global Value Chain shape the formation of social capital among 
farmers? 
 
There are no known empirical studies in the literature which specifically addresses how 
governance, as an enabling or constraining structure, shapes social capital formation among 
farmers. This is despite calls in the literature for more focus on how governance impacts the 
immediate environments that farmers operate in (Challies, 2008, Fold and Gough, 2008, Bolwig 
et al., 2010, Neilson, 2008, Messner, 2004) and a consensus that more needs to be done to 
develop a framework for social capital formation (Staber, 2007, Durlauf, 2002, Durlauf and 
Fafchamps, 2005, Miguel et al., 2006). The next chapter lays out the conceptual framework to 
answer the above research question. 
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This chapter proposes the conceptual framework and propositions that have emerged from the 
literature review. How social capital forms within the parameters set by governed GVCs has 
been identified as an area that has received inadequate attention in the development literature. 
The over-arching research question that this thesis seeks to address is: 
 
How does the Governance of a Global Value Chain shape the formation of social capital among 
farmers? 
 
The literature review revealed a number of key concepts that warrant further investigation as 
part of this research. These concepts are presented in a framework that seeks to capture the 
relationships between the governance of GVCs, and dimensions of social capital (figure 3). 
 
Although some factors influencing social capital are known in the literature, there is less known 
about how social capital is formed within the context of a GVC. The conceptual framework here 
adopts concepts from the existing social capital literature while also introducing a new concept 
to explore; governance. This differentiates the conceptual framework because it recognises that 
the social capital of farmers function in governed GVCs, whereas the previous social capital 
literature has not taken this into account. The next section begins the discussion on the 
concĞƉƚƵĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬďǇ ‘ƵŶƉĂĐŬŝŶŐ ’ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨgovernance in relation to the literature. 
 
3.2 Social Capital Framework 
 
This section brings together the latest thinking on social capital formation in the literature. An 
aspect in which the framework presented here differs from much of the previous social capital 
literature is that it separates social capital into two distinct dimensions; structural and cognitive 
social capital. This goes some way in clarifying the concept which, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, has been the main criticism of social capital (Pender et al., 2012). 




Figure 3: Conceptual framework 
 
Robert Putnam defines social capital as the  “ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?
ŶŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƚƌƵƐƚƚŚĂƚĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵƵƚƵĂůďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?(1995, p. 
67). The present research narrows down the definition of social capital by following the 
conceptual distinction between structural and cognitive social capital as laid out by Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna (2000). Structural social capital comprises the roles for decision making, rules, 
procedures and precedents that supports mutually beneficial collective action, making it easier 
to resolve conflicts, reducing transaction costs, facilitate information flow and enabling social 
learning through a formal structure. Cognitive social capital is the norms, values, attitudes and 
beliefs that incline people to cooperate based on their inclination to trust one another. 
 
A range of factors that influence social capital formation were identified from the literature 
review. Enforceable rules and sanctions were highlighted as one important influencer, rooted in 
the New Institutional Economics strain in the literature (North, 1990). Rules enable social capital 
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formation because they constrain individualistic behaviour that is destructive to the group 
(Becker and Ostrom, 1995, Coleman, 1990, Pretty and Ward, 2001). Sanctions on opportunistic 
behaviour must be also be enforceable, especially where the rewards for cheating are high 
(Molinas, 1998, Woolcock, 1998) and these sanctions can be reputational and exclusionary, not 
just monetary in nature (Nooteboom, 2007). However, enforceable rules can also be a barrier to 
social capital formation where rules are seen as too restrictive by group members (Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2001, Nilsson et al., 2012). Associated with enforceable rules and sanctions is the 
role of leadership. It is generally agreed that strong leadership, that guides a group towards a 
collective goal, is an important factor in social capital formation (Serra, 2011, Vollan, 2012, Goetz 
and Rupasingha, 2006, Krishna, 2004, Kaganzi et al., 2009), although leadership is embedded 
within the wider concept of social capital and is therefore not necessarily seen as a distinct 
concept that enables it (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
Diversity (i.e. the qualitative differences among group members) is also a factor in social capital 
formation. In the development literature, this is typically related to ethnic or religious diversity, 
making the argument that the larger the differences between people, the less cohesion there 
will be between them (Woolcock, 1998, Beard, 2007, Klitgaard and Fedderke, 1995, Easterly and 
Levine, 1997, Castle, 1998, Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan, 2007, Mavridis, 2015). In this 
regard, ethnic and religious diversity is a barrier to social capital formation given that there is 
relatively little opposing evidence in the literature (Bhattacharyya et al., 2004). Following from 
ethnic and religious diversity is culture and historical factors. These are broadly understood to be 
an important influences of social capital formation both as an enabler and a barrier (Nilsson et 
al., 2012, Molyneux, 2002) since social capital is deeply embedded in a cultural and historical 
context (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
It was also highlighted in the literature review that time and maturity are elements to consider. 
There is less agreement on how important these factors are. There exists a divide between those 
who imply that social capital can be built within a short period of time (Grootaert and van 
Bastelaer, 2002, Kaganzi et al., 2009), thereby ultimately suggesting that time is not a significant 
factor, against other accounts that indicate due to its cultural and historical embeddedness, 
social capital cannot be created in the space of a few years (Maclean, 2010, Woolcock, 1998, 
Lyon, 2000). Linking with this latter view is also the role of group maturity (Barham and Chitemi, 
2009). Despite the conflict over the significance of time and group maturity among scholars, the 
wide discussion of the constructs in the literature justifies inclusion in the conceptual model. 
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The role of the state and institutional organisations is also a factor. Some authors see a 
complimentary role for the state (Hayami, 2009, Barham and Chitemi, 2009, Petro, 2001, Serra, 
2011, Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) within the context of a New Institutional Economics 
perspective (North, 1990). Institutions can guide the development of social capital through rules 
that foster trust among farmers, sharing a similar conceptual role to rules and sanctions. 
Likewise the role of institutional organisations such as NGOs and development agencies is also 
cited as an important element in social capital formation of farmers because of the material 
support they provide that facilitates trust among farmers (Khwaja, 2009, Grootaert and Narayan, 
2004, Janssens, 2010, Vasilaky, 2013). Within the institutional context there is a distinction made 
between institutioŶƐ ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞŚĂŶĚ ’ƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚ ŝĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚŐƵŝĚĞ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ W ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ  ‘ŵĂĚĞ ’ ĂŶĚ ŚĂǀĞ
particular roles and responsibilities, such as donor agencies (Uphoff, 1993). The institutional 
context is sometimes considered to be a barrier to social capital, reflecting the endogenous view 
of social capital formation (Coleman, 1990, Lyon, 2000). The institutional context around the 
GVC can be an enabler or a barrier in a conceptual framework for social capital formation. As a 
result, it is an important factor to consider. 
 
The final construct in the conceptual framework is the principal focus of the present research. 
While there has been no apt exploration of governance and social capital formation, discussions 
in the literature allude to a negative association (Messner, 2004, Bingen et al., 2003, Rabellotti, 
2004). Based on the discussion in the literature review, the present research argues that there 
could be a link between these two concepts because social capital among farmers operates 
within the enabling or constraining environment of GVCs governed by buyers. Governance has 
thus far not effectively entered the discourse on social capital theory. In line with the research 
question, the conceptual framework incorporates and consequently investigates governance as 
a concept into an overall theoretical model for social capital formation. 
 
A range of factors have been identified from the literature that influences social capital 
formation; rules and sanctioning, group diversity, culture/history, time/maturity and 
institutional context. Furthermore, governance is a concept that has not been discussed in the 
social capital literature within the GVC context. The following section brings together the 
governance framework with the social capital framework to include governance as a potential 
influencing factor. 
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3.3 Introducing Governance into the Social Capital Framework 
 
The first step in bringing governance into a social capital framework is to break it down into its 
various components and dimensions. Schmitz (2005 ) ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ  ‘ƵŶƉĂĐŬŝŶŐ ’governance before 
analysing it, since the definition of governance might be straightforward but the definitional 
components are not. 
 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2004) define governance as the notion that  “ƐŽŵĞĨŝƌŵƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŝŶƐĞƚ
ĂŶĚ ?ŽƌĞŶĨŽƌĐĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŝŶŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?(p. 96). Buyers in GVCs are 
the source of authority and the enforcer of contractual rules, that drive the allocation of 
resources and coordinate the activities of partners along the chain (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2011). These rules are reflected in the use of product (what), process (how), and scheduling 
(how much and when) standards (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). 
 
Information flow is also identified in the literature as a component of governance (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2004). The nature of information flow between buyers and suppliers shapes 
participation in the GVC. If information is unimportant to the functioning of the chain and is 
simple and easy to codify, then this would lean towards a low level of governance needed in the 
chain resonating with an arms-length spot market but if the opposite is true and information is 
important, complex and typically done face-to-face, then it suggests more explicit governance 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). 
 
Risk of supplier failure is a dimension of governance because if suppliers are unable to meet 
their obligations, then the propensity for buyers to intervene in their suƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐincreases 
 W especially where strict standards are prevalent (Gereffi et al., 2005). This intervention can 
ĐŽŵĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ’, defined as the acquisition of capabilities to access new markets 
for suppliers (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). It is widely stated in the GVC literature that 
upgrading is facilitated in governed GVCs, but less so in spot-markets where governance is 
absent (Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007). 
 
Relationships along the chain and the level of trust between actors are also components of GVC 
governance (Bolwig et al., 2010, Riisgaard et al., 2010, Vieira and Traill, 2008, Wiegratz, 2008, 
Wiegratz et al., 2007). These two constructs relate to the dynamics of participation in the chain 
(i.e. how agri-chain actors participate). This includes the way rewards and risks are distributed 
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along the GVC (Kaplinsky, 2004b, Gereffi and Lee, 2012), the extent that the voices of less 
powerful (often upstream) actors are listened to and whether buyers ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’
environment for themselves and farmers (Frederick and Gereffi, 2009). Given that relationships 
and trust is in most part overlooked in the original GVC framework (Riisgaard et al., 2010), even 
though governance not just describes but actively shapes the participation of agri-chain actors in 
GVCs (Gereffi and Lee, 2012, Frederick and Gereffi, 2009), the present research includes these to 
be additional dimensions of governance. 
 
A range of concepts that make up governance emerge from the literature: standards, 
information flow, risk of supplier failure, strength of relationships and trust. Exploring the 
relationship between these constructs of governance, and structural and cognitive social capital, 
is how the thesis will approach the research question. 
 
3.4 Bringing Together Governance and Social Capital into a Unified Conceptual Framework 
 
The purpose of the above discussion was to: 1) highlight existing concepts that may inform social 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƚŽ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ?)  ‘ƵŶƉĂĐŬ ’governance as a 
concept and propose an exploration of the relationship with social capital. As is suggested by 
Bolwig et al. (2010), the vertical aspects of governance is combined with the horizontal aspect of 
social capital such that governance becomes part of the wider social capital conceptual 
framework. 
 
The unified conceptual framework sets the basis for how the research question is approached. 
Governance may or may not have a role in shaping structural and/or cognitive social capital but 
if it does, then it may have an enabling or constraining role. Existing concepts identified in the 
literature as factors important in shaping social capital will also be explored as they may provide 
some explanatory value in understanding how governance shapes social capital, given that the 
relationship between governance and social capital, if indeed a relationship does exist, will likely 
to be complex and multi-faceted. 
 
Based on the overarching research question and the discussion of how the conceptual 
framework will guide the research, a set of resulting propositions are explored to frame how the 
research question is approached: 
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P1: Governance of a Global Value Chain has a role in structural social capital formation among 
farmers 
a. Governance has an enabling role in structural social capital formation 
b. Governance has a constraining role in structural social capital formation 
c. Governance has a negligible role in structural social capital formation 
 
 
P2: Governance of a Global Value Chain has a role in cognitive social capital formation among 
farmers 
a. Governance has an enabling role in cognitive social capital formation 
b. Governance has a constraining role in cognitive social capital formation 
c. Governance has a negligible role in cognitive social capital formation 
 
 
These propositions focus entirely on the relationship between governance and social capital. 
However as mentioned; given the exploratory, theory building purpose of the research, other 
factors included in the conceptual framework may have a role in this relationship and therefore 
will also be explored in relation to the propositions.  
 
Without pre-judging the findings, there are some indications in the literature on what an 
interaction between governance and social capital may look like. It is well understood in the 
governance literature that there is a high propensity for buyers to intervene and provide support 
to suppliers when they perceive there is a risk of supplier failure (Gereffi et al. 2005). One 
dimension that could represent an interaction between governance and social capital is the role 
of buyer support and upgrading  W the process of producing better, more efficient or new 
products or services. Given other types of capital are involved in this process, whether that is 
financial, physical or knowledge-based; and social capital facilitates the adoption of standards 
(Asfaw et al. 2009), there could be an enabling role of buyer support in the formation of social 
capital. In particular, there may be a strong impact on structural social capital, since there are 
conceptual similarities from an institutional point of view between standard setting, and internal 
rules and regulations. 
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The role of standard setting could be a dimension of governance that has important 
consequences for social capital. As Poole and de Frece (2010) note, intensifying requirements on 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĐŽŵĞ ǁŝƚŚ ŶĞǁ  ‘ƌƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐĂŵĞ ’ ƚŚĂƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?
However, as a number of scholars note, greater control can lead to negative sentiment among 
farmers (Nilsson et al. 2012, Cechin et al., 2013). It suggests that new and demanding standards 
imposed on collective organisations could have a constraining role in cognitive social capital 
formation if that negative sentiment extends to linkages within a collective organisation. 
 
As discussed, there could be different interactions between governance and structural social 
capital, and governance and cognitive social capital. Therefore, the interaction between 
governance and the two dimensions of social capital are studied separately. It is noted in the 
literature that structural and cognitive social capital are complimentary and reinforcing (Adhikari 
and Goldey, 2010, van Rijn et al., 2012). It is expected that without an increase in cognitive social 
capital, it is unlikely there will be an increase in structural social capital (and vice versa). 
 
The next chapter moves on from identifying the concepts and propositions towards how these 
concepts are explored in the methodology. 





This chapter describes the methodology adopted for this research, including philosophical 
considerations that set the foundations to the way the data collection is approached, the nature 
of the study, the research tools used to collect data and methodological issues such as validity 
and representation. 
 
From the literature review, it was argued that there is an unexplored gap in the literature. While 
the benefits of social capital have been studied extensively, the factors that influence social 
capital have not, leading to the notion that there is a poor theoretical understanding of how 
social capital is formed (Staber, 2007). Furthermore, the interaction between governance and 
social capital has not been effectively addressed in the literature, despite the fact that farmers 
can operate in value chains and collective groups. The previous chapters laid out the principal 
research question and the resulting propositions: 
 




P1: Governance of a Global Value Chain has a role in structural social capital formation among 
farmers 
a. Governance has an enabling role in structural social capital formation 
b. Governance has a constraining role in structural social capital formation 
c. Governance has a negligible role in structural social capital formation 
 
 
P2: Governance of a Global Value Chain has a role in cognitive social capital formation among 
farmers 
a. Governance has an enabling role in cognitive social capital formation 
b. Governance has a constraining role in cognitive social capital formation 
c. Governance has a negligible role in cognitive social capital formation 
 
 71  
The research seeks to be exploratory by nature; it does not seek to conclude the debate over the 
formation of social capital, but rather open the box and shed light on this issue to contribute 
towards this debate by identifying the formation of concepts that may inform a theoretical 
model for social capital in GVCs. 
 
From a pragmatist epistemological position (Yin, 2009), the research problem presented is one 
that is better suited to a qualitative approach because it requires in-depth phenomenon to be 
addressed and the formation of concepts within a conceptual model (the formation of social 
capital), rather than one which aims to test specific relationships between variables, that is 
suited to a quantitative approach (Brady and Collier, 2004). Although it is generally understood 
that social capital and collective action is context specific (Velez et al., 2010, Cardenas and 
Ostrom, 2004, Cardenas et al., 2011, Henrich et al., 2010, Prediger et al., 2011, Serra, 2011), this 
does not mean that the context followed in the present research prevents the creation of a 
general conceptual framework that can be tested empirically in different contexts. As Peters and 
Waterman (1982) note, the objective of building a conceptual framework is to create a context 
ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ůŽŽƐĞ ’ďƵƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ  ‘ƚŝŐŚƚ ’ ?
 
Carlile and Christensen (2005) put forward three different stages of theory building; observation, 
categorization and association (Figure 4). Observation refers to describing and measuring 
phenomena such that data is generated which can then be analysed. Categorization refers to 
organising these fragments of data (observations) into categories and putting the data into 
typologies based on particular attributes they possess. Association is where a relationship can be 
established between the category defining attributes and the observations. 
 
In addition to the broader argument that qualitative research is best suited to theory building, 
Serra (2011) argues that the use of quantitative surveys and econometric models has missed the 
qualitative and context-dependent aspects of social capital; leading to a call for more rich, case 
study specific research. The nature of the study follows a qualitative case study orientated 
approach. Such an approach looks to keep the number of cases low and the number of variables 
high to make the exploration deeper and richer (Porta, 2008), thereby matching the concept 
building purpose of the research (governance and social capital). Furthermore, the issue of 
separating context from theory means that a case study approach better suits a model that is 
made up of concepts which cannot be easily generalized, particularly when dealing with issues 
that this thesis tackles. 
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Figure 4: The process of theory building Source 
Source: Carlile and Christensen (2005) 
 
The chapter then describes how case studies were selected and the protocol that was 
followed to filter out cases that were inappropriate for the purposes of the research. 
Following a participatory research framework (Freire, 1970), the sources of data are laid out 
and the design strategy is described. 
 




The ontological and epistemological approaches in development theory are very much split 
between development economics as an objectivist, empiricist position and development 
sociology which is more subjectivist and social constructionist. This has led Woolock (2009) 
to claim that the conflict in development studies is based more on a contrast in philosophy 
than methodology. 
 
Within the context of social network research, to which this study is closely aligned 
(Granovetter, 1985, Granovetter, 1973), the research here ultimately seeks to map a social 
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environment and stands as post-objectivist; it is less extreme in its rejection of subjectivism 
than ƉƵƌĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƐŵďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚƐĞĞƐ ‘ŵĂŶ ’ĂƐĂŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽƌƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶpurely 
as a responder to a concrete structure of reality (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). This also 
reflects the direction of the research problem in that the phenomenon being studied is 
observable, as is the case of organisations, but also takes the form of social constructions in 
terms of social capital, in a sense mixing more concrete and less concrete objects of analysis 
(Yin, 2009). The philosophical approach taken here is also pragmatist in nature because it is 
the research question which dictates the approach rather than a single paradigm 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Combining the philosophical foundations and the qualitative 
methodological approach, the present research takes a post-positivist perspective where it 
is assumed the researcher represents the participants and their realities as an external 
authority and the ultimate aim is to collect findings, search for themes and treat analytical 
themes as objective (Charmaz, 2002). 
 
4.2.2 Qualitative, Two-Case Study Approach 
 
The gap identified in the literature review is one which is based on a poor conceptual 
understanding of the relationship between governance and social capital. The research is 
exploratory in nature because it is examining phenomena that cannot be easily simplified and its 
aim is to build constructs that describe a classification of these phenomena. These constructs 
can be used to inform a larger conceptual model for the development of ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂů
in GVCs, with the end goal of contributing to theory. 
 
In light of the above research conditions, coupled with a philosophical approach which 
understands that methodology should be dictated by the research problem, a case study 
approach has been chosen. Case studies, or more specifically, heuristic case study models 
(George and Bennett, 2005) are primarily used by researchers to develop or generate theory, or 
identify specific causal processes (Bennett, 2004). Although case study approaches can be very 
diverse from one another, Schramm (1971) argues that the central tendency among them all is 
that they try to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result. Yin (2009) expands on this definition by exchanging 
 ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ’ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ’Žƌ  ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ’ ? /ƚ ŝƐĂƐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ  ‘ǁŚǇ ’ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŚŽǁ ’ Ă ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĨƌŽŵ other research 
methods. 
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While case studies can be quantitatively driven (Yin, 2009), a purely qualitative approach was 
selected for this study for a number of reasons. Qualitative research tends to be inductive in that 
research informs theory rather than vice versa. This matches the nature of the study in that, as 
already stated, the contribution of the study is theory building rather than beginning with a 
hypothesis deduced from theory and then testing this hypothesis. It is argued that quantitative 
research cannot conceptualize processes that are as compůĞǆ ĂƐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ’Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐ(Cassell et al., 
2005, Bryman, 2008), contrasting with qualitative research which aims to generate an in-depth, 
personal and situational examination of pĞŽƉůĞ ’Ɛexperiences (Charmaz, 2002). Indeed this is 
particularly relevant to the concept of governance: 
 
 “/ƚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĂůů of the governance and services issues in a fixed-format questionnaire. 
Most of the data needed for analyzing governance is of qualitative and un- quantifiable nature. 
For this reason it is recommended to use open-format and intensive interviews with value chain 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂŶĚŬĞǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĂŶƚƐ ?(M4P, 2008: p. 49) 
 
Given that social capital development is examined within the context of GVCs, the constructs 
associated with the GVC framework, with particular reference to governance which represents 
the defining concept of a GVC (Ponte, 2002), is studied and related back to social capital where 
relevant. However since the main aim is to build a theoretical model for social capital formation, 
the identification of other factors needs to be explored (George and Bennett, 2005). The 
development of new concepts that may not have been considered prior to carrying out the 
research is a natural strength of qualitative research since it encapsulates an element of 
reflexivity which rigid, quantitative methods are less able to do (Cassell et al., 2005). To achieve 
this goal, there is simultaneous data collection and analysis to pursue emerging themes 
throughout the research process. This strategy enables an integration of variables into a wider 
theoretical framework which highlights specific causes, conditions and consequences of the 
studied process (Charmaz, 2002). 
Table 4 presents some common differences between quantitative and qualitative research. The 
research carried out here concerns itself with how people and organisations interact with each 
other and is exploratory in nature; therefore it is argued to be best suited to a qualitative design. 
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Table 4: Common differences between quantitative and qualitative research 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Numbers Words 
Point of view of researcher Points of view of participants 
Researcher is distant Researcher is close 
Theory testing Theory emergent 
Static Process 
Structured Unstructured 
Generalizations Contextual understanding 
Hard data Rich data 
Macro Micro 
Behaviour Meaning 
Artificial settings Natural settings 
 
Source: Bryman (2008) 
 
A two-case study design has been followed for a number of reasons. First of all, the case study 
selection process here does not seek to find an extreme or unique case to investigate because 
the research problem demands a grounded approach to theory building as opposed to 
investigating why one unique case does not fit a wider theoretical model; a common usage for 
single case study designs (George and Bennett, 2005). To avoid selection bias (Mahoney, 1999) 
i.e. a focus on cases where a relationship between social capital is evident a priori, the present 
research takes a selection process where cases are selected based on a general criteria rather 
than an extreme or unique case. Secondly, it is argued that evidence from more than a single 
case study is more robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983) and that two case studies rather than 
one adds considerably more value (Yin, 2009). Thirdly, replication is considered an important 
element of the methodology here because, as an exploratory piece of research, a broader study 
of cases may bring a more in-depth understanding of the research problem. 
 
To a limited extent, a two-case study model tackles some of the criticisms of qualitative research 
based on its poor ability to replicate studies (Bryman, 2008). It also opens up the opportunity to 
use a preceding case study to inform the subsequent case study which is considered an effective 
way to approach exploratory research (Yin, 2009). If case studies produce similar results, then 
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this will provide persuasive evidence on how social capital develops in governed GVCs. However, 
if case studies provide conflicting results from one case to the other, then this will present an 
opening to explore why this might be the case. This point refers to an important outcome of 
qualitative, case study research; the ability to show findings have case-to-case transferability, 
meaning that generalizations can be made from one case to a similar case (Yin, 2009). This is 
different to how we might conceive generalizations made in quantitative research that seeks to 
universalize findings beyond cases. Universalization of findings is not the main purpose for 
qualitative case study research; but rather thick description of individual cases that can be 
transferred to other cases with similar conditions. 
 
A significant issue with designing qualitative research is that, unlike quantitative research where 
there is greater standardization of methods, there are no universal rules that govern how many 
cases, interviews, questions or participants should be followed (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). The 
present research takes a pragmatic approach of selecting two cases centred on making the most 
of available opportunities within the time frame available (Cassell et al., 2005). While more than 
two case studies would have enhanced case-to-case transferability (Yin, 2009), the quality and 
richness of the data collected allowed for a more in-depth and comprehensive view of each case 
study. 
 
It must be again noted that the aim of the research is to contribute towards the theoretical 
debate over social capital formation, not to solve the debate in its entirety, since the gap in the 
literature demands exploration of this topic rather than a conclusion to it. With this in mind, the 
number of cases is driven by the desire to generate analytical themes rather than the production 
of empirical generalizations (Charmaz, 2002, Yin, 2009). The contribution of analytical 
generalizability is considered in completely different terms to statistical generalization, with the 
latter demanding large sample sizes. To regard each case as a method of enlarging the sample 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŝƐŐƵŝĚĞĚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌĞĂĐŚĐĂƐĞŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚĂƐĂŶ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ’ƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞanalytical 
themes that contribute towards a wider theoretical model (Yin, 2009). It is determined here that 
two cases allows for a reasonable scope to replicate experiments that extract desired analytical 
themes which can then be generalized to the theoretical level. 
 
In line with the various models of case study research proposed by Yin (2009), the present 
research follows a multiple case study approach embedded within the same national context of 
Peru. This allows for a controlled comparison of case studies with overlapping macro- 
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institutional contexts of the case study GVCs. It is argued that, where a specific aspect of a 
phenomenon is under study, a structured, focused comparison that standardizes methods 
between cases is best suited (George and Bennett, 2005). 
 
While a structured method is important to compare and contrast cases, this does not suggest 
that emerging lines of enquiry should not be followed, as George and Bennett (2005) note: 
 
 “dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŽŶůǇ ƚŽ ƐĂǇ  W and to insist  W that case researchers should follow a procedure of 
systematic data compilation... asking the same questions of each case does not prevent the case 
writer from addressing more specific aspects of the case or bring out idiosyncratic features of 
ĞĂĐŚĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚŵĂǇĂůƐŽďĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƌǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽƌĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?(p. 86). 
 
Case studies are represented as individual GVCs. To maximise the ability to compare and 
contrast cases, thereby driving towards a theoretical replication (Yin, 2009), two different 
agricultural product groups are explored; cacao and palm oil. Both of these product groups in 
Peru have a prevalence of powerful buyers and are positioned as high-value chains relative to 
other commodity products such as grains and cereals (FAO, 2011), the latter being a 
consideration given that these present greater opportunities for social capital to reduce 
transaction costs (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). A more detailed account of the selection protocol is 
presented later, however from the standpoint of the chosen case study type, it is believed that 
going beyond a single product will allow for the examination of nuanced differences between 
how GVCs are organised. 
 
Case study research does not follow a specific protocol, rather it involves asking questions and 
responding to answers to identify convergent ideas and/or paradoxes. Yin (2009) proposes six 
primary sources of qualitative case study evidence: documentation, archival records, interviews, 
direct observations, participant-observation and physical artefacts, with an emphasis on 
combining methods rather than selecting just one. Interviews and documentation (secondary 
data) are the primary tools used to answer the research problem, although some limited 
observations will also be made where appropriate. According to Davies (2007), interviews are 
particularly well suited to: 1) gauge specific experiences from individuals; 2) case studies where 
the sample of participants is small; and 3) the desire to follow up on new issues that may emerge 
as the interview process progresses. All of these three strengths of interviews as a 
methodological tool match the needs of the research question in that it aims to unearth 
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participant experiences (e.g. trust, power asymmetries), will have a relatively small number of 
participants to extract data from and may, as a theory building piece of research, have to adapt 
as new issues emerge. Although there is a degree of construct measurement in the data 
collection which would typically suit a survey design, open-ended interviews are valuable in 
allowing participants to respond with greater richness and spontaneity (Oppenheim, 1992). 
Where appropriate, observations were also to be made and recorded as they have the ability to 
provide context behind the interviewing data (Bryman, 2008). 
 
For the reasons laid out above, a collection of studies in the GVC and social capital literature 
follow qualitative interviews and secondary documentation as data collection methods (Tran et 
al., 2013, Giuliani et al., 2005, Contreras et al., 2012, Neilson, 2008, Vervisch et al., 2013, Khan 
and Khan, 2012, Vollan, 2012, Maclean, 2010, Lyon, 2000). Social capital is argued to be such a 
complex phenomenon that attempts to quantify it misses important underlying processes which 
influence its formation (Lyon, 2000, Serra, 2011). The present research is also concerned 
principally with understanding the barriers and enablers to the formation of social capital, which 
a survey design would not effectively address. As Grootaert and colleagues (2004) note in their 
methodology guide for measuring social capital for the World Bank:  “/ƚŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
of creation (and destruction) of social capital will be understood better by means of a variety of 
qualitative in-ĚĞƉƚŚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ?(p. 17). 
 
This provides a strong justification for using qualitative interviews supplemented with secondary 
sources (documentation) and where appropriate observational notes, as the main data 
collection tools in this study. Outside of the formal structure of interviews, less formal 
conversations in social environments is also utilized which can be a valuable way to cross-check 
data while exploring issues in a relaxed environment (Tran et al., 2013). Given that the 
researcher will be embedded in the case study context, the role of informal conversations could 
be an important tool to utilise, especially where respondents are uncomfortable with the 
formality of a recorded interview. 
 
There are two general approaches to carrying out exploratory interviews; unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews (Yin, 2009). In an unstructured interview the researcher typically has 
a number of prompts but no more, whereas a semi-structured interview has more specificity in 
the topics covered and interview guides are utilized to steer the conversation while still keeping 
a level of flexibility (Bryman, 2008). A semi-structured interview guide was used in this study. 
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Although the study is exploratory, there are particular concepts that are measured, so that an 
understanding of which factors impact on social capital can be effectively explored. If new issues 
arise, a semi-structured interview process will still allow for flexibility to change the direction of 
conversation while at the same time including enough structure to effectively measure the 
constructs in the research: 
 
 “dŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌ would usually use a standardised interview schedule with set questions which 
will be asked of all respondents. The questions tend to be asked in a similar order and format to 
make a form of comparison between answers possible. However, there is also scope for pursuing 
and probing for novel, relevant information, through additional questions often noted as 
prompts on the schedule. The interviewer frequently has to formulate impromptu questions in 
ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƵƉůĞĂĚƐƚŚĂƚĞŵĞƌŐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? ?(ESDS, 2011). 
 
One of the principal arguments against qualitative research is its subjectivity. As the argument 
goes, qualitative reseaƌĐŚ ƌĞůŝĞƐ ƚŽŽ ŚĞĂǀŝůǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ’Ɛ ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌůǇ ǀŝĞǁƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŚĂƚ
counts as significant or insignificant (Bryman, 2008). Qualitative research is sometimes 
considered to be unscientific because it does not follow the strict methodological processes 
associated with quantitative research (Cassell et al., 2005). In recognition of this criticism, the 
research methodology adopted for this study takes seriously the methodological principles of 
validity, reliability, participant sampling and generalizability and addresses how the 
methodology incorporates this into a rigorous framework. These issues are subsequently 
discussed below. 
 
4.2.3 Validity and Reliability 
 
Validity and reliability are two crucial concepts to take into account when carrying out any 
research. Validity is associated with connecting concepts with measurements. Qualitative 
research is sometimes considered to have less validity and reliability in its findings because of 
ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝƐ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ’ ? ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ Ă ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ǁŝƚŚ
quantitative research at the top and quantitative research below because of the subjective 
nature attached to the qualitative area (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). In qualitative research, it 
is important to acknowledge the role of the researcher and the potential for bias. 
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While qualitative research is subject to greater interpretation, Kvale (1996) argues that validity is 
achieved when the researcher can successfully argue that all other interpretations are invalid. 
According to Kvale, if the researcher is able to justify why their particular interpretation of the 
data is correct, then they may claim that the research has been validated. While the argument 
continues over which tools constitute a valid outcome, the qualitative research carried out here 
asked two important questions on validity: does the method capture what it is meant to; and is 
there a match between the method and the social reality, from the perspective of participants? 
A discussion on the interview guide design is in section 4.3.2. 
 
One way of validating qualitative research in case study research is to check data using negative 
case analysis (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). This is where, when a key relationship has emerged 
in the findings, negative instances in the data should be sought. Since the research here is very 
much concerned with construct building, analysing negative cases provides an ability to validate 
theoretical claims that could otherwise just be reinforced in the data if only positive cases are 
found. The aim is to fit the data within the conceptual framework and if it does not, then to 
explain why (Kvale, 1996). The analysis of the data in the present study incorporates the 
negative case analysis approach by presenting not just findinŐƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ’Ɛ
argument, but also noting the instances where the interpretation may differ. 
 
With regard to reliability, Neuman (2003) separates two categories; internal reliability and 
external reliability. Internal reliability is where data and theory development is consistent with 
each other in a way where a picture can be created. LeCompte and Goetz (1982) argue that 
qualitative research is especially strong when tested for internal reliability because the in-depth 
and lengthy participation of the researcher allows for more linkages between data and theory to 
be made. For the research carried out here, particular reference will be made throughout the 
data collection to link the data back to concepts. External reliability is where data is cross- 
checked with other data such that the researcher looks for other evidence that could support or 
conflict with the findings. This is difficult for qualitative research because of the way small-N 
nature of case study and small sample research. External reliability is associated with 
generalizability (Yin, 2009). Gay and Airasian (2003) provide a checklist for evaluating reliability 
in qualitative research, some of which are outlined here: 
 
x /ƐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ’ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĨƵůůǇ described? 
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x Is all documentation comprehensive and detailed? 
 
x Are key informants fully described, including their background and relationship with the 
group? 
 
x Are sampling techniques fully documented? 
 
As can be gathered, reliability is in large part about documenting how the research procedure 
has taken place (Yin, 2009). This allows for other researchers to replicate the procedure such 
that the results can be confirmed. The researcher is essentially providing a map from when the 
data was collected to the findings, as Yin (2009) notes P  “the general way of approaching the 
reliability problem is to make as many steps as operational as possible and to conduct research 
ĂƐ ŝĨ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ǁĞƌĞ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ŽǀĞƌ ǇŽƵƌ ƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌ ?(p. 45). In a similar fashion, Bryman 
(2008 ) ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ĚĞƉĞŶĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ’ ŽĨ ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĨŽůůŽǁ ĂŶ ĂƵĚŝƚŝŶŐ
approach where complete records of all phases of the research are kept, including problem 
formulation, case study selection, transcripts and data analysis. The thesis will therefore take 
this problem of reliability/dependability seriously by keeping records all the processes 
associated with carrying out qualitative, case study research. 
 
4.2.4 Sampling and Generalizability 
 
As already noted, the aim of qualitative research is to get an in-depth understanding of a 
problem. The technique followed here is purposive sampling (Patton, 2002). Purposive sampling 
is where participants are chosen based on the research question and the resources available. In 
the context of the research here, participants are specifically those that are associated with the 
GVC under study because they will be the most productive sample in terms of answering the 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ’ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŽƌǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ
development research (Freire, 1970). Although not always explicitly stated, the purposive 
sampling strategy has been used for data collection in the GVC literature (Tran et al., 2013, 
Giuliani et al., 2005, Contreras et al., 2012, Neilson, 2008). Key informants, typically project 
sponsors or gatekeepers, are also a good source of information in that they can direct the 
research towards the most relevant sources of information that may not be accessible when 
ƌĞůǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ  ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ’ ŝnformants (Bryman, 2008). The research here uses a project sponsor  W a 
research centre, to access appropriate stakeholders and gain a broad understanding of the 
research context. 
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Qualitative research lends itself to small samples where a given process can be investigated that 
contributes to theory, rather than making universal generalizations from findings. However even 
though it is typical for the sample size to be small, it should be sufficient such that valid 
inferences can be made about the population (Marshall, 1996). As Oppenheim (1992) notes, 
while the sample is not meant to reflect the exact representation that mirrors quantitative 
methods, a judgement sample is necessary which covers diversity of background in case this 
leads to a divergence in views and opinions within the population. 
 
A criticism of qualitative, case study research is that it offers a poor foundation for generalizing 
findings beyond the cases under analysis. However, this is typically because such critics attempt 
to compare the approach with survey research (Yin, 2009). Survey research looks for statistical 
generalizations whereas case studies are geared towards analytical generalizations, meaning 
that we are looking to generalize results to theory building as opposed to building the empirics 
of a subject. The aim of analytical generalization is to show how selected cases fit with 
theoretical constructs. Marshall (1996) notes the argument against small sample qualitative 
research fails to understand that the aim is to choose a sample size that adequately answers the 
research question, rather than generalizing the findings in the same way as quantitative 
methods seek to do so. Since the research problem is one that is associated with concept 
formation in a theoretical model, generalizing at the analytical level by using case studies to 
organise concepts is best suited to the research. Another problem, although difficult to negate 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů  “ƚĂďŽŽƐ ? ǁŚŝĐ ŝŶŚŝďŝƚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌƵƚŚĨƵůŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ
answers that participants provide during interviews. This is particularly pertinent to the present 
research given that it is set in a developing country context where the culture of the researcher 
may not correspond with that of the environment. This is a problem which cannot be necessarily 
solved, but can at least be recognised as a weakness of qualitative research (or even self- 
reported quantitative research) in different cultural contexts. 
 
4.2.5 Ethical Issues 
 
To meet ethical considerations, all participants were informed of the general topic for research 
prior to interviews, without inferring the specific nature as not to influence answers, and asked 
for their consent. Consent was tape recorded as part of the wider interview. Confidentiality of 
answers was also conveyed to participants. In the present thesis, unless otherwise agreed to, the 
original name of individuals, organisations or institutions are not reported and are instead 
replaced with pseudonyms. Since tape-recording is used throughout interviews to record 
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responses, it is important for respondents to be informed that the conversation will be recorded 
using a dictaphone (Oppenheim, 1992). Consent was recorded at the beginning of each formal 
interview rather than asking participants to sign a consent form because it was felt that the 
latter could scare some from taking part in the research. All participants were advised prior to 
data collection that informal conversations may be analysed and used in the findings. 
 
4.3 Research Method 
 
4.3.1 Sources of Data 
 
There are a number of sources of data available to case study research. The sources of data must 
reflect the specific research questions and the unit of analysis that these questions pertain to 
(Yin, 2009). The present research was based on the view of three types of stakeholder: 
 
x Stakeholders who participate in the cacao GVC, from two collective farmer organisations 
who supply cacao to an exporter, who then sells the beans to its parent company, an 
importer; 
 
x Stakeholders who participate in the palm oil GVC, from a producer group to its vertically 
integrated buyer; and 
 
x Key informants who have a close view of the GVC, from research consultants to the 
Chairman of a Palm Oil Stakeholder committee. 
 
The present research took a pragmatic approach to selection where the advice of key informants 
is highly valued because of the privileged position they have in gaining access to participants. 
The general advice that:  “ƚŽ get access often you have to be ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?(Cassell et al. 2005, 
p. 29), seems even more relevant granted that the research is taking place in an isolated rural 
region within a developing country where access could be an inhibiting issue. To begin with a list 
of institutional actors in the research design ultimately comes second to the ability to access 
these actors and therefore the gatekeepers (Bryman, 2008), in this case a research centre, which 
is itself an institutional actor, played an important role in engaging participants for the research. 
 
While access is critical, there also needs to be an awareness of selection bias, particularly if there 
is a tendency for the sponsor to direct selection towards participants that were not typical of the 
wider case study. Two measures were taken to avoid this potential problem. Firstly, it was 
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established from the beginning that the sponsor was also interested in avoiding this issue for 
their own research purposes with regard to research publication. Secondly, although this key 
informant facilitated access at the start of the data collection process, snowballing and free find 
sampling techniques, where participants would recommend other potential participants or the 
researcher would explore villages for new participants, were undertaken. This latter strategy 
ĂůƐŽŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ŚĂŶĚ-ƉŝĐŬĞĚ ’ďǇĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
risk of being fed a particular narrative. 
 
An important distinction to make that causes confusion in case study research is that the unit of 
analysis are organisations and not individuals, even though the unit of data collection are 
individuals within those organisations (Yin, 2009). This distinction means that we are asking 
individuals about how an organisation operates and why it operates in that particular way, as 
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĂƐŬŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ’ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ Žƌ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ŽŶůǇ ? Ɛ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
discussed, a purposive sampling technique is followed up such that individuals who know how 
the organisation works and why it works in a particular way will be viable data collection 
sources. 
 
The methodology utilized here is in line with a participatory research approach to data collection 
in development studies which treats the people and organisations on the ground as the arbiters 
of information on the environments and conditions that they live in (Freire, 1970). The 
participatory approach has received increased attention in recent years as a response to the top- 
down approach to data collection that ignores the views of precisely the people who are the 
subject of the research (Mohan, 2002). The theoretical underpinning advocated as a result of the 
literature review puts the rural environment as the dynamic force behind rural development. 
The data collection here begins with the premise that an investigation into a topic within the 
rural development subject area should include the perspectives of rural, agri-chain actors 
because they are the subjects of governance. Buyers, who are almost always the lead firm in a 
GVC (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, Gereffi and Lee, 2012, Reardon and Farina, 2002) were also 
interviewed. 
 
Subjects of interviews are not dogmatically restricted to the participants identified above since it 
is typical for agri-chain rural development research to snowball where more interviewees 
become available as data collection progresses and rural participants who were not considered 
at the beginning are then included in the final data set. It is especially common in research on 
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rural clusters to have a wide variety of local participants to generate a fuller picture of 
phenomena on tŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ,ĂƚĂŶĂŬĂ ’Ɛ(2010) study on institutions in the 
Indonesian shrimp chain includes key informant information from university specialists and local 
NGOs on top of field interviews with rural, agri-chain actors. Key informant information and a 
potential expansion of the participants under analysis are likely to be followed as the research 
progresses, thereby matchinŐ Ă  ‘ƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞ ƐĂŵƉůŝŶŐ ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ’(Marshall, 1996) because the 
criteria for participant selection is based entirely on the notion that they will have knowledge 
that gives answers to the research question. Snowballing is a common strategy in qualitative 
research, particularly where access to stakeholders is an issue (Cassell et al., 2005). 
 
In addition to GVC participants and key information, secondary data was also collected as a 
source of information. In particular, secondary data was collected to understand the macro- 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ WĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ĐĂĐĂŽ ĂŶĚ ƉĂůŵ Žŝl industry, including modernization 
initiatives and trade regulations set by national government or international organisations 
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). This is important as the context is likely to have 
consequences on participation for rural, agri-chain actors (Bolwig et al., 2010). Secondary data 
on the global and macro-institutional context was available in the academic and grey literature. 
 
4.3.2 Interview Guide Design and Data Collection 
 
Before creating an interview guide, Weiss (1994) suggests first laying out a substantive 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?dŚŝƐŚĞůƉƐƉƌĞƉĂƌĞ “ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůŝŶĞƐŽĨĞŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ
interview guide to build on (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). The topics laid out are derived from 
the topics identified in the literature review and conceptual framework. An interesting point put 
forward by Yin (2009) is that the general orientation of questions are posed to the researcher 
and not the interviewee, differing from the way survey instruments are constructed. 
 
While interview guides differed between stakeholder types: buyers, collective organisation 
management stakeholders and farmers; the structure of interview guides shared key elements. 
Table 5 lays out the lines of enquiry followed across interview guides and where appropriate, 
changes of time were probed as to understand how phenomena changed over time. Key 
informants were interviewed following a largely unstructured approach as they were useful in 
gathering contextual information or validating emergent accounts. The methodological work 
generated by Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011), Bolwig and colleagues (2010) and the UK 
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Department for International Development (M4P, 2008) was used here to aid in developing the 
interview guide. 
Table 5: Lines of enquiry in interview guides 
Theme Lines of Enquiry 
Background and 
context 
x Basic information on participant and organisation, including: history, size, nature 
of operations (from sourcing to selling) and management structure. 
x Plans over the next five years, both at the farm and organisational (collective and 
buyer) level. Perceived threats and opportunities in the future. 
x Mapping the GVC by identifying the flow of materials from farmers to buyers. 
Governance x Contractual relationship with and standards placed on collective organisations. 
Problems trying to enforce standards and weaknesses in supplier capabilities. 
x How standards requirements and information communicated to collective 
organisations/farmers (e.g. face-to-face, telephone, documentation) and why. 
Extent that method of communication and quantity of information meets needs of 
buyer and collective organisation. Changes over past five years. 
x Strongest and weakest collective organisation as perceived by the buyer. Support 
and investment mechanisms for collective organisations, prompting for technical 
support and social organisational support (relating to social capital). Institutional 
support compared to buyer support. Changes over past five years. 
x Number of collective organisations cacao/palm fruit buyer sources from and vice 
versa. Why these particular buyers/suppliers and not others. Changes over past 
five years. 
x Length of relationship between buyer and supplier and reasons for short/long 
relationships. Extent of cooperation with regard to planning for the future and 
conflict resolution. Consequences if collective organisations switched to a different 
buyer and vice versa. 
x Nature of relationship between farmers/management of collective organisations 
and buyers  W what works well and would not work well. 
Social Capital x Story behind initial creation of collective organisation. How and why farmers 
joined collective organisation, prompting for barriers to joining. Changes in 
associational membership. 
x Benefits to farmers of being in collective organisation and what benefits are 
missing but would be desirable. 
x hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ’ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƌƵůĞƐ ĂŶĚ
procedures to trust in leadership/other members. Changes over past five years. 
x Extent to which members trust one another and the leadership of collective 
organisations. Level of participation, such as organisational meetings and 
workshops. 
x Extent of trust and cooperation among farmers in villages and with farmers from 
other villages, probing for benefits of cooperation at the village level. 
 
Riessman (2004) suggests that, for narrative analysis, it is essential to ask follow up questions 
even when it appears the questions have been answered. For example, there may be specific 
stories that emerge from participants that illustrate how governance may have shaped social 
capital that require further questioning. Since the research method is thematic, the 
suggestion by Riessman is even more pertinent. George and Bennett (2005) note that a key 
part of qualitative, exploratory research is to always look for the link between concepts which 
require in-depth questioning that goes beyond the initial interview questions. This is a 
 87  
strategy followed in the research design where although the questions are closely followed, 
when a theme worthy of further investigation arises, the interviewer diverges from the guide 
to delve deeper. 
 
McNamara (2009) offers five general recommendations for effective interview questions in 
qualitative research: 1) wording should be open ended; 2) questions should be as neutral as 
possible; 3) questions should be asked one at a time; 4) there should be clear wording of the 
questions, particularly for differeŶƚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ? )ŵĂŬĞ “ǁŚǇ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂƐŽƉĞŶĂƐ
possible to avoid a loaded case-effect relationship. With exception to point 3 which is 
procedural, each point informs how the interview guide was constructed. Questions were as 
open-ended as possible and purposely avoided any leading inferences, with a focus on avoiding 
any technical language. FiŶĂůůǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ “ǁŚǇ ?was consistently asked in the interview guide to 
understand motives and justifications to answers, there is no presumption for what potential 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ Žƌ ĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ  “ǁŚǇ ? ĂƚƚĂŝŶƐ ƚŽ ? ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ůĞĨƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶǀĞǇ ĂŶĚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďe. 
These measures were taken to address concerns over bias as previously laid out. 
 
/ŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚ ? ‘ĨĂĐƚƐŚĞĞƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ’ǁĂƐƌĞĐŽƌded (name, age, position in 
the company, number of ǇĞĂƌƐ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ) ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ’Ɛresponses could be contextualized 
(Bryman, 2008). The introduction section also allowed for the broad topic of the interview to be 
introduced to participants, as recommended by Kvale (1996). 
 
To set the unit of analysis, the flow and structure of the chain entails a mapping process; an 
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ 's ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ĐŚĂŝŶ ’Ɛ  ‘ŝŶƉƵƚ-ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ’ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ (Gereffi, 
1994). This sets a descriptive foundation for the rest of the analysis in terms of understanding 
what inputs move downstream through the chain and which stakeholders along the chain are 
responsible for what activity. Without this knowledge, it is difficult to derive meaning from 
governance since we would not know what and who was being governed. To map the input- 
output structure, relevant participants were asked at the beginning of the interview to describe 
the nature of operations. In the cacao GVC, the furthest downstream interviewee was a Swiss 
importer and in the palm oil GVC, this was the refinery that sold to a manufacturer. To map 
where materials were likely to move from that point downstream, secondary data was sought 
from existing studies on cacao and palm oil as well as specific information on the palm oil 
manufacturer available on the internet. As suggested by Fernandez and Gereffi (2011), a 
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diagrammatic format was followed to present the input-output structure of case study GVCs in 
the main findings. 
A line of enquiry concerning governance is the nature of the contractual relationship between 
collective organisations and buyers, and the standards placed on collective organisations that 
oblige farmers to meet certain parameters (product, process or schedule related). How 
information, including standards, flows through the chain is answered by asking questions that 
determine the extent that the chain displays characteristics associated with different degrees of 
governance. If information is unimportant to the functioning of the chain, simple and easy to 
codify, then this would lean towards a low level of coordination needed in the chain. If the 
opposite is true and information is important, complex and typically done face-to-face 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002), then it suggests more explicit coordination is required. 
Essentially what the interview guide is trying to determine is the extent that firms engage with 
buying or selling only, or also interact in a way that involves intensive exchange of information 
and transfers of ideas (Schmitz, 2005). 
 
Concerning the capability of suppliers; a factor that determines the governance structure 
(Gereffi et al. 2005), the interview guide included questions designed to explore the extent that 
producers are able to effectively carry out the activities needed to participate in the chain in 
terms of meeting the standards that the GVC demands (Schmitz, 2005). If primary producers are 
not able to effectively carry out activities, then this would be reflected in heavy control and 
monitoring mechanisms by buyers which indicates a quasi-hierarchical governance structure 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, Gereffi et al., 2005), since buyers need to negate against the risk 
of supplier failure (Gereffi et al., 2001). There are likely to be particular elements that are 
important to the competitiveness of actors which are specific to the sector. If buyers have to 
intervene in the affairs of suppliers, then this would strongly indicate that there is a risk of 
supplier failure. 
 
Relationships shape the participation of rural, agri-chain actors in the chain in terms of the way 
rewards and risks are distributed along the GVC (Kaplinsky, 2004b, Gereffi and Lee, 2012), the 
extent that the voices of less powerful actors are listened to by buyers and whether buyers 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ  ?Frederick and Gereffi, 2009). The interview guide 
explores relationships by investigating how buyers interact with collective organisations and the 
extent that rewards and risks are considered as fair by farmers. 
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Closely linked with relationships along the chain is the extent that actors trust each other since 
long term relationships tend to foster a higher degree of trust through repeated transactions 
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). To investigate trust, the interview guide looks to explore 
whether actors have had experiences of or believe that other actors will exploit their 
vulnerabilities or the extent that others will mislead them. If identified characteristics indicate 
that trust is not important to the functioning of the chain, then this would suggest a more 
market-based governance structure. Of course, it is certainly conceivable that trust could be low 
yet be important to the functioning of the chain, which would indicate a high degree of 
governance but a level of dysfunction. If there is a high level of trust between participants 
exhibited in the qualitative data, then this would suggest a governance structure that exhibits a 
higher degree of coordination along the chain (Gereffi et al., 2005). 
 
Unlike other forms of capital in the economics literature, social capital in both its forms is highly 
context specific. Lessons taken from tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ’Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ĨŽƌ
measuring social capital demonstrate the difficulties in applying tools in different contexts 
(Grootaert et al., 2004, Grootaert and Narayan, 2004, Serra, 2011). Different geographical 
regions and contexts have different formations of social capital, for instance the social capital in 
ŽŶĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ĂƐ ǁŽŵĞŶ ’Ɛ ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ (Janssens, 2010), 
formalized local institutions in Russia (Petro, 2001), or even participation in North American 
bowling leagues (Putnam, 1995). As Krishna and Shrade (1999) note, social capital in one context 
can be unsocial in another, for example organised religion could be constructive in bringing 
people together, yet destructive if utilized as an armed militia against those who are not part of 
that religion. 
 
As a result, while social capital as a concept is universal in that networks and trust are evident 
everywhere, its manifestation is incredibly context specific and consequently, any 
methodological design must be tailored to the particular circumstances that it seeks to address 
(Grootaert et al., 2004). The final wording of the interview guide was informed by a native 
translator that accompanied the researcher. This translator was not just native to Peru, but 
native to the area of Peru under study. The benefit of this is that wording of questions, especially 
those relating to trust, were suitable for participants being interviewed. The interview guide was 
written in English and then translated for fieldwork, by the translator. During fieldwork, 
responses were verbally translated throughout the interview so that the researcher was able to 
understand the dialogue and give guidance on prompting and probing. 
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The questions in the interview guide examined structural social capital by looking at dynamics in 
membership numbers (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, Gotschi et al., 2009) and the extent that roles, 
rules, procedures and precedents support effective collective action (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 
2000). Evidence of structural social capital were sought, such as documentation that showed 
collective organisations had procedures in place or examples that demonstrated certain 
functions associated with how structural social capital is defined has been implemented (e.g. 
sanctioning of members). The story behind the creation of collective organisations was also 
explored in the guide to understand how structural social capital was initially formed to create 
collective organisations. Probing was used extensively to investigate how and why certain 
elements associated with structural social capital had been put in place so that factors enabling 
or constraining structural social capital formation could be explored. 
 
Cognitive social capital was explored by asking questions that investigated the extent that 
relationships within collective organisations were characterized by trust and participation (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997, Reyes and Lensink, 2011, Botelho, 2013). This included questions on the 
extent that organisations are characterised by cohesion or conflict. Advice from Botelho (2013) 
was followed when examining trust by beginning with the commonly used and straightforward 
question concerning the extent stakeholders trust each other and then proving for supplemental 
evidence to avoid simplification of the notion of trust (Serra, 2011). Where group events exist, 
such as organisational meetings and workshops, the level of participation and enthusiasm was 
also gauged through questioning. Probing was used extensively to identify enabling and 
constraining factors. 
 
To ensure that a full understanding of social capital was explored, the study investigated social 
capital at both the collective organisational level and the village level. This is based on the notion 
that social capital in one unit of analysis is embedded in a much wider social structure (Grootaert 
and Narayan, 2004). In the present research, the most obvious structure that farmers operate in 
outside of collective organisations is their villages. As a result, the interview guide also asked 
questions on structural and cognitive social capital at the village level as well as the organisation 
level. 
 
Two pilot interviews were conducted at the start of fieldwork to assess the suitability of the 
interview guide. It was identified in both of these pilot interviews that local cultures and 
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ethnicity played an important role in how social capital is formed, particularly between farmers 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĚĞƐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂǌŽŶŝĂŶĞĂƐƚŽĨWĞƌƵ ? “ƚŚĞũƵŶŐůĞ ?ĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚďǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ) ?
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ĐůĞĂƌ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ǀŝůůĂŐĞ ůĞǀĞů ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ŵŝŶŐĂ ’ where 
farmers got together and worked on ĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ’Ɛfarms was a manifestation of social capital and 
therefore this was also introduced as a formal line of enquiry after the pilot phase. In line with a 
heuristic research design (Bennett, 2004), an iteration was made to the interview guide to 
include an exploration of attitudes towards local cultures and minga as new lines of enquiry for 
social capital. The two pilot interviews were included in the analysis. 
 
Fieldwork was conducted between March and June 2013, over the course of 11 weeks. A total of 
30 individual in-depth interviews (formal and informal) and three group interviews were carried 
out for the cacao GVC and 17 individual in-depth interviews (formal and informal) and two group 
interviews were conducted for the palm oil GVC. Interviewing lasted between 45-120 minutes, 
depending on the scope for follow-up questions. In group interviews, the range of participants 
ranged from three to 15, depending on how many farmers wished to participate: it was common 
that when one or two farmers wished to participate, other farmers in the area would hear about 
this through word of mouth and then also wish to participate. For the purposes of anonymity 
and especially concerning a sensitive issue such as trust, the organisations and participants 
interviewed are given pseudonyms. 
 
4.3.3 Data Analysis Strategy 
 
On the basis of analysing a sequence of events that lead to particular outcomes (formation of 
social capital), a narrative analysis was carried out. Narrative analysis is put forward by Mahoney 
(1999) as a form of longitudinal analysis that studies sequential events which lead to a particular 
outcome without doing what would be considered as a formal quantitative longitudinal study 
where data is collected at different points of time. Likewise, Riessman (2008) sees narrative 
analysis as  “ĂĨĂŵŝůǇŽĨŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐƚĞǆƚƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŝŶĐŽŵŵŽŶĂƐƚŽƌŝĞĚĨŽƌŵ ?(p. 
11). A specific element of narrative analysis is that it does not just ask  “ǁŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ
ŚĞƌĞ ? ?, but also solicits  “ŚŽǁ ĚŽ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŵĂŬĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ǁŚĂƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ?
(Bryman, 2008). The main argument against the narrative analysis approach is that can be highly 
subjective because of the way both interviewer and respondent jointly construct narrative and 
meaning (Riessman, 2008). However as Bryman (2008) notes, although the narrative analysis 
approach does not capture underlying truths within a unit of analysis - this does not matter; it is 
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the perception of actors that are the valuable pieces of information when constructing 
narratives. 
 
Although a narrative analysis depicts the general approach to analysing the data, a content 
analysis describes the specific tool by which the qualitative data will be analysed. Content 
analysis can be as modest as organising answers to the structure of a questionnaire, or as 
complex as identifying attitudes in verbal transcripts. Historically, content analysis has been a 
tool in analysing media however it has also more recently become an important instrument for 
organising qualitative data in the social sciences (Bryman, 2008). Quantitative content analysis 
has been argued as being more rigorous, whereas qualitative content analysis makes the case 
that reflexivity is an important process which goes beyond just counting words and requires 
deriving implicit meaning from text (Davies, 2007). For the purposes of the research carried out 
here, it is argued that reflexivity is important given the exploratory nature of the research and 
the significance attached to follow up questions in narrative analysis (Riessman, 2008). 
Therefore, a qualitative content analysis has been chosen. 
 
A common way of organising qualitative data when doing a context analysis is to systematize 
and synthesize it through a thematic framework approach (Ritchie et al., 2003). The idea is to 
organise central themes and subthemes and then enter these into a matrix with corresponding 
cases of evidence. Since GVC governance and social capital are the principal constructs under 
investigation, the interaction between the two represent the central theme while lower level 
constructs represent the subthemes. This step of codifying qualitative data mirrors the theory 
building process as described by Carlile and Christensen (2005) such that qualitative associations 
can be made. 
 
Governance of GVCs and social capital represent the two main analytical constructs of the 
methodology. For GVC governance, although no comprehensive methodological guide could be 
found in the literature, interview questions used in the present research were manifestations of 
the various characteristics that determine the governance structure of a GVC (Gereffi et al., 
2005, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011) and as already noted, segments of methodology guides 
that include governance constructs were adopted. For social capital, the interview questions are 
partly adapted from the extensive methodological work carried out by the World Bank but as 
noted, moulded to reflect the context and culture of the research arena. 
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The previous discussion on operationalizing GVC governance and social capital indicated that 
their composite dimensions are to be compiled into an overall evaluation of each construct. The 
thematic framework will put together quotations, on occasions contradictory in nature in line 
with a negative case analysis, and then place actors along the spectrum. Based on the existing 
theoretical and methodological literature on social capital (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, Gotschi et 
al., 2009, Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000, Botelho, 2013), a number of qualitative indicators of 
high structural social capital were explored: 
 
x Has membership of the collective organisation grown in recent years? 
x Is there evidence that the collective organisation is open to new members? 
x Does the collective organisation provide the benefits that are desired by its members? 
x Are there procedures in place that enable effective information sharing and 
participation? 
x Are there rules in place to prevent members from cheating? 
x In the event that members are cheating, are there enforceable sanctions in place? 
x Is there clearly defined leadership in place? 
x Is the collective organisation facing problems that are a result of poor management? 
x At the village level, are there practises that facilitate cooperation and information 
sharing among farmers? 
 
As well as qualitative themes of high cognitive social capital: 
 
x Do members trust one another? 
x Do members and the management believe in the direction of the collective 
organisation? 
x Are the attitudes and behaviour of members conducive to cooperation? 
x Is there evidence that the norms and values held by members are homogenous and 
shared by the management? 
x Do members participate in the decision making of the collective organisation as much as 
they would like to? 
x At the village level, do farmers cooperate with one another for mutual benefit? 
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In the conceptual framework, there were some potential interactions discussed between 
governance and social capital derived from the literature. This provided some guidance on what 
types of interaction were explored: 
 
x How do standards (e.g. certification) shape the internal workings of a collective 
organisation? 
x Does the buyer intervene and support collective organisations? If so, what 
consequences, if any, does this have on the way in which a collective organisation 
operates? 
x What other evidence is there on how, if at all, information sharing and relationships 
between buyers and collective organisations shape the rules and roles in collective 
organisations and the way in which farmers interact with one another? 
x If there is an interaction between governance and social capital, what consequence does 
this have on the interaction between structural and cognitive social capital? 
 
Since the interviews are translated from Spanish to English, using qualitative content analysis 
software such as NVivo was judged to be inappropriate because the dialogue used by the 
participant are unlikely to be directly mirrored in the translated transcription word for word. A 
group of five translators, proven to be fluent in Spanish and English, were used to translate and 
transcribe recorded interviews with farmers and management of collective organisations, with 
guidance from the researcher on the format to be used. Interviews with some participants, 
typically those based in Lima such as the cacao importer and key informants, were conducted in 
English and transcribed by the researcher. The transcripts were then manually read through and 
thematically coded by the researcher. 
 
Bryman (2008) advises that coding should begin from the start of the data collection process 
such that linkages between concepts and data can be made immediately and new issues can be 
translated into further questioning. Codes reflect the constructs in the conceptual framework as 
well as new concepts that emerge during data collection. From this process, interconnections 
can be made between the concepts. A coding framework based on the work by Saldana (2013) 
was used to identify new variables and propositions for associations in the qualitative data. 
 
4.3.4 Context and Case Study Protocol 
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Ideally, case studies would ďĞƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ’ĂŶĚ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ’ĐĂƐĞƐof 
social capital formation in GVCs ? ƐƵĐŚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă  ‘ŵŽƐƚ-ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ’ ŵŽĚĞů ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ
followed (Porta, 2008). However because of the problem of identifying what constitutes a 
successful and failed case prior to selection and the issue of selection bias in case study research 
(Mahoney, 1999), the research here will instead use criteria that only filters out contexts and 
case studies that are specifically infeasible for exploring the research questions. Based on the 
following criteria, cases had to be: 
 
x Set within a developing country context, while at the same time avoiding subsistence 
farming because of the serious extra-institutional challenges that they face as shown in a 
number of development indicators (World Bank, 2011); 
x A globally exported product, thereby matching the concept of a Global Value Chain and the 
argument that export chains in developing countries are where governance is most 
observed (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002); 
x Set in a case study context where there has been a purposeful push towards forming social 
capital and there is already a stock of existing social capital; 
x A product established in the country for longer than 2 years so that a significant historical 
account of the attempt to form social capital can be gauged; 
x Not located in a country or local region which is unstable or where there is risk of personal 
danger; and 
x Inclusion of participants that are accessible and a supporting individual/organisation able to 
facilitate in the data collection process. Access is regarded as a crucial factor to consider for 
data collection (Cassell et al., 2005), particularly where stakeholders in developing countries 
are concerned. 
 
A wide range of development projects were put through the above procedure by the researcher, 
including 312 projects from the World Bank and 28 from USAID. However, although six World 
Bank and one USAID project were identified as being suitable case studies for the first five points 
above, the lack of available gatekeepers (Bryman, 2008) who could assist in accessing 
participants in the field made collaboration with these not viable. Other sources for case studies 
were followed up, in most part through building contacts with sponsors who had past 
experience with developing agri-chains. Out of these, cacao and palm oil in Peru, was selected as 
a strong candidate country that matched all the above conditions. 
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Cacao and palm oil GVCs in Peru met the criteria for case studies because: 1) Peru has an existing 
stock of social capital that can be fostered due to its rich culture and history of mutual 
cooperation (Munoz et al., 2007); 2) alternative development efforts in Peru explicitly aim to 
foster social capital among farmers using the cacao and palm oil sector (USAID, 2010); 3) GVCs 
are a critical element of alternative development in Peru (UNODC, 2013); 4) Peru is a middle 
income country (World Bank, 2011) and therefore agri-chain development is best suited 
compared to a subsistence based agricultural sector (Wilkinson and Rocha, 2009); and 5) the 
cacao and palm oil sector exhibit characteristics associated with governed GVCs (DEFRA, 2011, 
USAID, 2006, Kaplinsky, 2004a). 
 
This chapter presented the methodology followed in study. The next chapter presents the first 
case study - the PeruCacao GVC. 
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The preceding chapters detailed the conceptual and methodological approach used to tackle the 
gap in the research; namely how social capital is formed for farmers who participate in governed 
Global Value Chains (GVCs). This gap materialised from two observations in the literature: while 
the benefits of social capital in International Development (ID) has been studied extensively, the 
theoretical understanding of how it is formed is incomplete (Staber, 2007) and the relationship 
between governance of GVCs on the cohesion of farmers has not been sufficiently explored in 
the GVC literature (Neilson, 2008, Messner, 2004, Bolwig et al., 2010). The research is of value 
because of the growing shift from spot-markets to explicitly governed GVCs in developing 
countries (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). 
 
As part of the methodological discussion, the criteria for context and case study selection were 
presented. It was judged that the chosen context for case studies should be the Alternative 
Development Program (ADP) in Peru and cacao and palm oil GVCs. The justification for this is 
that: 1) rather than a developing country facing subsistence-orientated challenges (common to 
many regions such in as East, Central and Western Africa) where much of the development 
research has been focused upon, Peru is a middle-income developing country transitioning into 
an industrialised state where agribusiness has more relevance (World Bank, 2003, Wilkinson and 
Rocha, 2009); 2) ADP explicitly aims to build social capital in cacao and palm oil GVCs and 
therefore lends itself for analysis (USAID, 2010); and 3) ADP seeks to bring in a multitude of 
external stakeholders as part of its strategy to develop social capital in GVCs, including buyers 
(UNODC, 2013). 
 
The present chapter is structured in the following manner: Context of Global Cacao Sector and 
the Alternative Development Programme in Peru; Background of Organisations and Participants; 
Findings on Social Capital and The Role of Governance. 
 
5.2 Context of the Global Cacao Sector and the Alternative Development Program in Peru 
 
Cacao is a commodity that tends to be dominated by smallholders at the production level 
(Rueda and Lambin, 2012), in most part because there are few opportunities for economizing 
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scale upstream (Kaplinsky, 2004a). This suggests that there is a supporting role for institutions or 
buyers. If production relies on smallholders to deliver products downstream, then coordinative 
efforts would, in principle, be an important aspect in making these actors competitive because 
of the lack of large producers in the industry. Raynolds (2004) notes:  “ƐŵĂůů-scale producers of 
bulk commodities - such as coffee and cacao - typically sell to export companies that can fill large 
ŽƌĚĞƌƐďǇĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚŝŶŐƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ ?(p. 737). This point is further backed up in the literature (Fold 
and Ponte, 2008, Quarmine et al., 2012). For smallholders to be competitive, particularly those 
that are not in established cacao producing countries, there is a need to build up and coordinate 
smallholders in a way where buyers can consolidate supply. This is indeed a justification of 
facilitating collective organisation by ADP in the Peruvian context (USAID, 2010). 
 
In his overview of the global cacao value chain, Kaplinsky (2004a) identifies the processes 
involved in the production and processing of cacao (figure 5). A characteristic of cacao is that 
farmers not only produce, but are also responsible for post-harvest activities such as 
fermentation and drying, which tend to take place near farm as opposed to a separate processor 
(Kaplinsky, 2004a). This was reflected in the PeruCacao GVC, with farmers from Cacao Collective 
and Bean Committee producing, fermenting and drying near their farms. Cacao is also very much 
a labour intensive process that does not involve the kind of capital required for other commodity 
post-harvest processing (Bardham, 2006). This was supported from observations of the 
PeruCacao GVC where farmers would typically use rudimentary boxes and plastic mats to 
ferment and dry cacao. 
 
Cacao can be transformed into a number of end products, including cosmetics and 
pharmaceuticals from the use of cacao butter. However, food and drink are the most common 
from the use of cacao powder, divided into chocolate or confectionary and drinks. The line in 
figure 5 ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĞŶĚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵ ’ )ĂŶĚŐůŽďĂů
ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ďĞŐŝŶƐ  ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ’ ) ?dŚĞ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ 's ĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ
reflects this global structure. Cacao Collective and Bean Committee (the two case study 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ’ƐƐƵƉƉůǇďĂƐĞ )ĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ?
fermentation and drying while PeruCacao is responsible for exporting the cacao beans to 
chocolatiers for roasting and grinding. In the present case study, there was no indication that the 
cacao was used for cosmetic or pharmaceutical end products. 
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The cacao chain has a variety of different buying actors who have considerable power in the 
value chain. USAID (2006) identify four main categories of buyer who govern the cacao export 
chain in the global market: traders who sell cacao to processors and manufacturers; processors 
who are major producers of processed products made with cacao; manufacturers that are 
dedicated chocolate producers; and integrated processors and manufacturers who undertake 
multiple functions along the chain. Interviews with key stakeholders revealed there are a wide 
range of different governance structures in the Peruvian cacao sector, from independent 
smallholders who sell to traders in spot markets, to small collective groups that sell to exporters, 
and large cooperatives that export directly to processors and/or manufacturers. Based on the 
governance framework (Gereffi et al. 2005), governance would be most explicit where small 
collective groups sell to an exporter as it suggests a quasi-hierarchical structure and therefore 
this was a candidate GVC pursued as a case study. As such, PeruCacao was the sole buyer for a 
number of small cooperatives. 
 
Buyers have a high degree of power not just because they control the marketing function of the 
chain, which in the case of the agri-sector almost always translates into a buyer-driven GVC 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, Reardon and Farina, 2002), but because the distance (in terms of 
stages in the chain) between producers and consumer markets is large compared to other 
commodities like coffee (Talbot, 2008).The grinding stage appears to be the point where there is 
some crossover between producing countries and buying countries (Kaplinsky, 2004a), but from 
this point buyers rarely go upstream and producers downstream. This was certainly the case in 
the PeruCacao GVC where there was a clear distinction in geographic competencies, with the 
exporter located in Peru and the importer and chocolatiers located in developed markets. 
 
As with coffee and tea, the structure of the chain reflects heaviůǇŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů  ‘EŽƌƚŚ-^ŽƵƚŚ ’
development divide. Cacao is a product that is defined by its locality of production in developing 
countries (Gilbert and Varangis, 2003) and the PeruCacao GVC typifies this global view of the 
cacao industry. PeruCacao exports all its purchased cacao beans to markets in developed 
countries, most notably to North American and European markets. 




Figure 5: The Global Cacao Value Chain  
Source: Kaplinsky (2004a) 
 
Cacao in Peru is in the position of being inferior in total value compared to other exports, yet is 
of growing importance to rural development, both economically and socially. In Peru, cacao 
butter is the 16th most exported good (in value) and Peru is the 18th largest global exporter for 
cacao beans and 15th for cacao butter (FAO, 2011). Although cacao exports are low relative to 
other exported products, the growth in the national industry has been impressive over recent 
years. In 2001, 17.9 million USD of cacao was exported whereas in 2011, this value was 64.6 
million USD (FAO, 2011). With the global price of cacao surging over recent years (ICCO, 2010), 
the ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌWĞƌƵ ’ƐƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂƐ ?dŚĞƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇŽĨŐƌŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů
and national level suggests that Peruvian cacao has significant potential in the future. Although 
cacao is not a dominant export crop for Peru, it is grown in 10 regions that run through down the 
backbone of the country: around 40,000 cacao hectares (Peru Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Tourism, 2007), as presented in figure 6. 
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Out of the top 20 highest exported goods from Peru, cacao is the second highest valued 
agricultural product per tonne after animal hair (FAO, 2011). Cacao in Peru finds itself in a 
position where value addition is vital to its continued success. The country cannot compete on 
quantity (compared to West Africa which alone produces two thirds of global supply), but it does 
have the opportunity to exploit speciality markets. In the case study GVC, there was a clear 
strategic importance attached to sourcing cacao that was certified (organic or Fair Trade) and of 
a high quality grade. Indeed on a macro-level, Peru has already made inroads into speciality 
markets; Zurich-based Barry Callebaut ? ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ’Ɛ ůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ĐŚŽĐŽůĂƚĞ ŵĂŬĞƌ ĂůƌĞĂĚy uses 
Peruvian cacao in a high end chocolate product that targets elite consumers in Europe (Reuters, 
2010). 
 
Because of the similarity in growing conditions with coca  W the base plant for cocaine; cacao has 
more recently been used as a method to bring farmers away coca production. This strategy has 
had some success, with national government, foreign development agencies and community 
organisations investing resources into alternative crops for Peruvian farmers. Cooperatives in 
particular have played an important role in this regard; one USAID funded cooperative alone in 
the Huánuco region serves 5000 family farms and has led to significant returns for the local area 
(Likins, 2012). This cooperative was utilized as a key informant in the research. 
 
The standards for cacao are orientated towards quality concerns, mirroring the increasing 
prominence of standards as tools for quality control in GVCs (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). 
International cacao buyers will typically request that no more than a certain percentage of cacao 
beans (usually 4-8%) will be subject to defects (Quarmine et al., 2012). An international grading 
system is used for cacao where Grade I has a maximum of 3% defection, Grade II maximum of 4- 
8% and anything above that classified as sub-standard that can only be marketed under a special 
contract (Wood and Lass, 1985). These defects can be anything, from broken beans and 
fragmentation to the invasion of foreign matter and contamination of smoke within the bean 
itself. While no studies could be found that investigated the Peruvian cacao GVC on this topic, 
YƵĂƌŵŝŶĞĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ’(2012) study in Ghana found a significant fracture between standards 
set by global cacao bean buyers based on the international grading system and the knowledge of 
these standards within the local farm cluster. In addition to the grading system based on quality, 
cacao is also subject to international public standards on pesticide residue set by the Joint 
Meeting on Pesticide Residues (Wood and Lass, 1985, FAO, 2012). 




Figure 6: Cacao growing regions of Peru 
Source: Peru Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (2007) 
 
What we can take from the discussion so far is that there are two principal public standards. One 
is a measure of quality adopted by international buyers and the second is to ensure the global 
harmonization of food safety. There are also likely to be other standards that are specific to the 
characteristic of the market, for instance European buyers that use Peruvian cacao for speciality 
product lines (Reuters, 2010), the Fairtrade brand that sets its own voluntary standards 
(Fairtrade Foundation, 2012) and organic certification that can be specific to national contexts 
(ICCO, 2011). Within the Peruvian context, certification is becoming a key part of sustainable 
value chain development, reflected in development projects that seek to catalyse certification 
conversion of cacao (Bamber and Fernandez-Stark 2012). 
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This section outlined the contextual and historical characteristics of the cacao GVC; at the global 
level and within the Peruvian context. In the literature review it was identified that governance 
could be an important concept when considering social capital formation which sets the 
justification for the present research. The next section moves onto the primary analysis of the 
case studies and is organised under the main findings on social capital and governance, sub- 
categorised under their respective dimensions. 
 




As noted in the methodology, the organisations and participants in the present analysis are 
given pseudonyms to ensure that they were able to speak as freely as possible about sensitive 
topics such as buyer-supplier relationships and trust within organisations. Tables 6-7 and Figure 
7 provides an overview of participants who were interviewed as part of the research and their 
connectedness to one another. While all concepts were touched upon, some participants were 
better placed to answer some questions than others. Cacao International and PeruCacao were 
interviewed primarily on governance ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂƐƚŚĞǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐ ’
of the GVC because they shape participation and coordination of farmers. Farmers of Cacao 
Collective and Bean Committee were interviewed mainly on social capital (both at the 
organisational and village level) as these actors were best placed to discuss relationships among 
their fellow farmers. HelpCacao and senior members of Cacao Collective and Bean Committee 
were interviewed on both governance and social capital as the actors were close to both 
aspects. 
 
In addition to the main participants, other key informants were informally interviewed including 
the  ‘directive ’ (participants typically used the term  ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ’, referring to the management of 
collective organisations) ŽĨ WĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ĐĂĐĂŽ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? Ă ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŽƌ ǁŚŽ
ŚĂĚ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ĨŽƌ WĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚƌƵŐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ  ?s/ ) ĂŶĚ Ă ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
centre involved with ADP, who was also the gatekeeper. These informants were utilised because 
of their broad experience in the cacao sector. Rather than addressing governance and social 
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capital specifically, these participants were used primarily for context  W a valuable contribution 
when conducting case study research (Yin, 2009). 
 
 
Table 6: Overview of Case Study One participants 
Organisation Name Role Main contribution 
Cacao International 
(Importer) 
Steven Owner Governance 




HelpCacao (NGO) Dina Administrator Governance/Social capital 
 






Dario President Governance/Social capital 
Members 31 Farmers Social capital 
 
Bean Committee (Collective 
Organisation) 
Coyotl Manager Governance/Social capital 
Ordell President Governance/Social Capital 
Eva Treasurer Governance/Social Capital 
Fabián Social Technician Governance/Social Capital 
Members 21 Farmers Social capital 
 
Table 7: Overview of Case Study One key informants 
Organisation Name Role Main contribution 
Naranjillo (Cooperative) Jose Manager Key informant - context 
Agri-Research (Research 
centre) 
John Consultant Key informant - context 
- Andrea Consultant Key informant - context 
 
The next section details the background of the main organisation and their respective research 
participants. While HelpCacao is in principle a separate organisation to PeruCacao, it is 
summarised under the same heading due to its embeddedness within PeruCacao  W reflected in 
its sharing of offices and describing itself as a  “ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?of PeruCacao. Key informants are not 
described as information collected from these was based on informal discussions and they are 
not stakeholders within the case study itself. 
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Figure 7: The PeruCacao Global Value Chain 
 
5.3.2 The European Importer  W  ‘ĂĐĂŽ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? 
 
The participant representing Cacao International in the research was Steven, the owner. Cacao 
International is an importer of cacao, located in Switzerland, that sources cacao globally; from 
South America to West Africa. The company has been operating since 2010 and was created by 
Steven when he left his position as a senior purchasing manager at another large importer. 
Currently an estimated 5000 megatonnes is purchased by Cacao International annually, which 
represents 12% of SwitzerlĂŶĚ ’Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů ĐĂĐĂŽ ŝŵƉŽƌƚƐ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ &K ĚĂƚĂ(2013). As an 
importer, Cacao International previously dealt only with cooperatives that could export directly 
and therefore have little need to govern the GVC. However when the potential for growth of 
small cooperative suppliers in Peru was understood, the role of an exporter such as PeruCacao 




small groups that are emerging ŝŶŵĂŶǇƉůĂĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĂƚ
ƚŚĞƉĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŽĨĐĂĐĂŽŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŽǀĞƌĂůů ?ƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĐĂŶŽŶůǇƚĂŬĞĂ
part of that so working with only these cooperatives that can export themselves would have 
meant ŶŽƚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂůůƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞ ?(Steven, Owner, Cacao International) 
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tŝƚŚĂŶŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶWĞƌƵ ’ƐƐŵĂůůĞƌĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂĐĂŽ
International followed an alternative governance model for these smaller collective 
organisations that went beyond the spot-market relationships that Cacao International had with 
the larger cacao cooperative exporters. 
 
5.3.3 The Exporter  W  ‘WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘,ĞůƉĂĐĂŽ ? 
 
The two participants representing PeruCacao is its General Manager - Eduardo, and Dina who is 
the administrator of HelpCacao and acts as PerƵĂĐĂŽ ’Ɛ ĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ Ăƌŵ ? ĚƵĂƌĚŽ ǁĂƐ
previously the manager of a cacao cooperative. In 2010, he was hired by Steven to set-up and 
manage PeruCacao as a subsidiaƌǇĞǆƉŽƌƚĞƌŽĨ^ƚĞǀĞŶ ’ƐĨŽƌŵĞƌĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƵƚǁŚĞŶ^ƚĞǀĞŶ left 
his previous employer to create Cacao International, he bought PeruCacao and since 2012 
PeruCacao has been the subsidiary exporter of Cacao International. The company has 16 
employees and works with small cooperatives around Peru, from the Apelina River Valley to 
Ucayali. 
 
As some authors have noted, it is common for an exporter to take the principal role of 
coordinating the GVC on behalf of actors further downstream (Lee et al., 2012, Tran et al., 2013). 
The PeruCacao GVC reflects such a model where the exporter, PeruCacao, coordinates its 
collective suppliers on behalf of its parent company Cacao International. Since being acquired by 
Cacao International, PeruCacao has expanded its customer base to a range of different sized 
importers, wholesalers and chocolatiers that are based mainly in Europe, although around 10% 
of the cacao beans go to North America where they are reshipped to other countries. The offices 
of PeruCacao are based in the capital, Lima (Figure 8). 
 
PeruCacao has a NGO called HelpCacao which shares the same offices in Lima and, although is 
legally a separate organisation, acts as a dedicated support arm to the company. The NGO was 
first created in 2011 as a  “ƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂƌĞĂ ?to facilitate the inflow of development funding from the 
outside so that PeruCacao does not bear all the costs of developing its supply base. During 
informal discussions with key informants, it was suggested that this structure of a dedicated 
NGO, coordinated by a buyer and in essence part of the GVC itself, was mirrored across Peru in 
the cacao industry. 
 
 107  
Typically projects that HelpCacao organises are through co-investments whereby PeruCacao 
provides 30-40% of the total cost and the remainder is funded by international NGOs or the 
Government of Peru through ADP. At the time of the interviews, HelpCacao was currently 
implementing three projects, the most recent being a six month project working with two of 
WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ’Ɛ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŽ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ
currently being implemented is with the international research centre who is served as a 
gatekeeper (Bryman, 2008) or in other words the actor who facilitated access to the subjects in 
the present research. 
 
5.3.4 Collective Organisation 1  W  ‘ĂĐĂŽ ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? 
 
While a number of participants were involved in the research on Cacao Collective, the broader 
contextual information around the cooperative was in most part gathered from semi-structured 
interviews with managerial and administrative members of the organisations, as well as insights 
from PeruCacao and HelpCacao. During interviews, some farmers were revealed to be founding 
members of Cacao Collective which then served as an opportunity to drill deeper into the history 
of the organisations. A group interview was held with administrators of Cacao Collective 
followed by individual interviews with the Technical Coordinator and President. 
 
Emilio is the technical coordinator of Cacao Collective who, in effect, acts as the manager of the 
organisation. While he has been in a technical role within the cooperative for three years, he 
only took over the managerial role six months ago. Prior to both positions, Emilio was working 
for the local municipality and is a cacao farmer himself. Dario is the President of the cooperative. 
His role is to support and manage projects and he has been in this position for six months and, 
like Emilio, is also a cacao farmer. Both participants joined the directive at a time when there 
was a change in leadership after the two year term of the previous directive expired. 
 
Cacao Collective was first created by a group of farmers in 2008 who decided to begin organising 
so that they could receive support from a project, initiated by the Government of Peru as part of 
ADP, called  ‘tŝŶƌŽǁ ’ P
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Figure 8: Geographical location of PeruCacao, Cacao Collective and Bean Committee 
Source: University of Colorado (2000) 
 PeruCacao 
 Cacao Collective 
 Bean Committee 
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 “dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂ ůŽƚŽĨďƵǇĞƌƐ ?ĐŚĞĂƉŽŶĞƐ ?ďƵƚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐǁĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽ ůŽŽŬĂƚ ƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƐ
ĂŶĚǀŽůƵŵĞ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐƐ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞǁĞƌĞƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ?/ǁĂƐĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ
the first people to work with Cacao Collective. Before there was just a committee of producers, not 
working with cacao. Then an association was formed for those who work with cacao and we looked 
for support for cacao growers.... We needed to get money and support from Winrow. That is why we 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂĐĂŽŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?(Farmer, Founding Member, Cacao Collective). 
 
Winrow was also cited by farmers as being the main driver behind switching to cacao from coca 
production, indicating that it catalysed both the initial creation of PeruCacao and the growth of its 
membership. Before 2010, Cacao Collective sold at the local level to a range of buyers  W mainly other 
cooperatives, including those that were mentioned by Steven as Cacao /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ’Ɛ ůĂƌŐĞ-scale 
suppliers. However in 2010 the cooperative signed a contract to begin exclusively supplying cacao to 
PeruCacao. This led to a significant change in the way the cooperative had to operate and manage 
itself, in part coming from the demands driven from organic certification - an issue that is explored 
later in this chapter. 
 
In 2000 the cooperative had 30 members, but associational membership has since tripled to over 
300 members, becoming the largest cacao cooperative in the region. This is in contrast to its 
neighbouring region of Huanaco where the largest cooperative has 5000 members. Due to this there 
is a mix of old members, mostly those that were founders of Cacao Collective and therefore have 
been members for five years, and new members - some of which joined as recently as within the last 
12 months. 
 
5.3.5 Collective Organisation 2  W  ‘ĞĂŶ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? 
 
Coyotl has been the manager of the organisation since 2011 and is responsible primarily for reaching 
agreements with buyers and setting up projects for farmers. Ordell has been the President since 
2008 with exception to resigning in 2011 and then being reinstated the following year after a dispute 
with some of the members. Ordell is mainly responsible for liaising with the directive and chairing 
assembly meetings. Eva has been the treasurer of Bean Committee for two years. As treasurer, her 
main role is to organise the finances of the organisation and to pay the members when they bring in 
their cacao. Fabián is the social technician, co-funded by PeruCacao and a Swiss international 
development organisation, whose role is to support Bean ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ’Ɛ development. 
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Bean Committee was created in 2009 resulting from an assembly meeting between the mayor of the 
local town and a group of cacao farmers who saw this as the best path to improve the quality and 
therefore price of cacao through linking with a buyer: 
 
 “tĞǁĞƌĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚŝŶĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂǇŽƌ ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞǁ ƐŽŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶƚŚĞƚŽǁŶŚĂůůǁŚŽ
had cacao and we started talking about the quality of the cacao that is bought and so on, we wanted 
to get a better price... After a third year of not knowing how to progress, we thought this would be 
the way forward. We did it little by little and from there we put someone in charge to buy so we 
could see if it was done well - like a directive, organised with admin, to be able to fƵŶĐƚŝŽŶǁĞůů ?(Eva, 
Treasurer, Bean Committee) 
 
 “tĞǁĞƌĞƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚŽƌŐĂŶŝĐĐĂĐĂŽǁŽƵůĚŐĞƚĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉƌŝĐĞ ?tĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽĨŽƌŵĂĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƚŽƚƌǇ
ĂŶĚĨŝŶĚĂďƵǇĞƌ ?(Farmer, Bean Committee) 
 
While not strictly a cooperative in the sense that it has that legal status with the government of 
Peru, Coyotl noted that Bean Committee functions like a cooperative in that there is a manager, 
President, administrative support and an assembly of members, with the same decision making 
structure as Cacao Collective. There is a mix of small and large farmers, with 80% growing around 2-
2.5 hectares of cacao and the remaining 20% who grow more than 5 hectares. There is also a mix of 
old and new members, with 15-20 new members joining in 2012. While there are currently 100-125 
members, two years ago there were up to 400 members in the committee (an issue which is 
explored later). In 2010 Bean Committee entered into an agreement with PeruCacao to become an 
exclusive supplier. 
 




This section presents the evidence of social capital of farmer members in two case study collective 
organisations; Cacao Collective and Bean Committee. Two dimensions of social capital identified in 
the literature are addressed: structural social capital, defined as the roles for decision making, rules, 
procedures and precedents that supports mutually beneficial collective action and associated with 
increased associational membership (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, Gotschi et al., 2009); and cognitive 
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social capital, defined as the norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that incline people to cooperate 
based on their inclination to trust one another (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
Given that social capital is deeply embedded in wider social structures (Grootaert and Narayan, 
2004) and Peru has a heritage of informal farmer groups at the village level (Munoz et al., 2007), 
farmer members of Cacao Collective and Bean Committee were also questioned on social capital 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ǀŝůůĂŐĞƐ ?  ‘DŝŶŐĂ ’  W 500 year old farmer working groups identified in the 
analysis, have characteristics associated with formalised rules, procedures and precedents and 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƐĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ ‘^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů^ŽĐŝĂůĂƉŝƚĂů ’ ?/ŶĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐ
ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ ‘ŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ^ŽĐŝĂůĂƉŝƚĂů ’ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞŝŶĐŽŵŵŽŶwith everyday 
norms, values, attitudes and beliefs at the village level. 
 
5.4.2 Structural Social Capital 
 
One way of measuring structural social capital is to track changes in associational membership 
(Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, Gotschi et al., 2009). For Cacao Collective, the evidence strongly 
suggested that based on this indicator, structural social capital had risen exponentially (Figure 9). 
Beginning with 30 members in 2000, by 2011 associational membership in Cacao Collective grew to 
231 members. In addition, looking at network openness as an indicator (Eisingerich et al., 2010), all 
the farmers interviewed in Cacao Collective and Bean Committee stated that there were no 
identifiable barriers to joining the organisation. 
 
 
Figure 9: Membership growth of Cacao Collective, from 2000-2011 
Source: Cacao Collective and PeruCacao 
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The exponential rise in associational membership between 2009-2011 coincides with entering the 
PeruCacao GVC  W ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘dŚĞ ZŽůĞ ŽĨGovernance ’ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐan 
exponential rise in membership after integrating into the GVC, another rise was experienced 
between 2000-2004. During this period, membership rose from 30 to 80 members but then fell back 
to 30 members soon afterwards  W a phenomenon that demanded further inquiry as it brings into 
question the nature of structural social capital. This dynamic was explained by a founding member 
to be the result of new members that did not grow cacao at all and had only joined to receive credit; 
a consequence of poor control and monitoring mechanisms that are considered dimensions of 
structural social capital: 
 
 “/ƚ ŝƐ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚ ŶŽǁ ? /Ŷ the past others wanted to be members who did not have cacao 
plantations. Now we are addressing this and now there are only active members... They weren't 
aware that these people were not cacao growers... Now they check - ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ŐŽ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĞ ?
(Farmer, Founding Member, Cacao Collective). 
 
Building on this point, at the time of interviews was an assessment currently in process to evaluate 
current members and, if deemed to be breaking the rules (e.g. side-selling), they would also be 
sanctioned through exclusion from Cacao Collective  W corresponding with sanctioning as an enabler 
of social capital formation (Molinas, 1998, Woolcock, 1998). The expectation by the technical 
coordinator was that up to 50 could be removed. Interestingly Bean Committee experienced almost 
the identical phenomenon with a spike in early membership growth. When Bean Committee was 
first created in 2009, 200-250 members joined the organisation. However this soon fell to 125 from 
 ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ŽŶůǇ  ? ? ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ  ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ’ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŝŶƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĂƚ these tend to be the ones 
involved directly with the decision making process of the organisation. The remaining 90 members 
only come to Bean Committee to sell their beans rather than socially participate: 
 
 “tĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌǁĞŚĂǀĞĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?ǁŚŽĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇǁŝƚŚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
organisation... The rest do not get involved in the organisation itself. They are more like commercial 
associates, they are only interested in being capable of selling their products... they sell and they go 
ĂǁĂǇ ? ?(Coyotl, Manager, Bean Committee) 
 
Mirroring Cacao Collective, many of those who initially joined Bean Committee did not grow cacao, 
seeking only to receive credit and fertilizer which they would then sell on. This was solved through 
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field visits by the technicians provided by PeruCacao. The experiences of both case study collective 
organisations show that, as Serra (2011) argues, the use of associational membership as a proxy of 
social capital is not always a true reflection because it misses deeper qualitative dimensions of social 
capital  W dimensions that are covered in the present research. Ironically, for both organisations, the 
problem was solved through an improved monitoring system and more stringent rules - qualitative 
dimensions of structural social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). Even though Serra questions 
the issue, this case study represents the first known empirical account of the conflict between 
associational membership as a proxy indicator and the nature of social capital as a construct. 
 
From interviews and observations, there was strong evidence to suggest that procedures had 
developed in organisations. New control systems were put in place within the organisations in terms 
of recording various aspects of organisational activities. According to the social technician at Bean 
Committee, the control card system that recorded a number of different aspects of membeƌƐ ’
interaction with the committee was having a positive impact on both the management of activities 
and the interest that members showed in the organisation, as reflected in a gradual increase in 
contributions  W a component that enables social capital development (Narayan, 1997): 
 
 “tĞĐĂůůƚŚĞŵĐŽŶƚƌŽůĐĂƌĚƐ ?ŽŶĞŝƐĨŽƌĐŚĞĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶĚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ?ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ?ŽŶĞĨŽƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ
ĐŚĞĐŬƐĂŶĚŽŶĞĨŽƌĐŚĞĐŬƐŽŶƌĞŵŝƚƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ǁŚĂƚŚĞůƉƐĂůŽƚŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞŝƚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ
nothing and what we are seeing is that gradually they are contributing little by little and they are 
ŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇƐŚŽǁŝŶŐŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?(Fabián, Social Technician, Bean Committee) 
 
 “/ƚŝƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ǁĞƐĞůůŵŽƌĞĂŶĚĐĂŶŬĞĞƉĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨŚŽǁƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞĚŽŶĞ ?tĞ can follow the 
member more closely and what he is doing. Each month we can see what has been produced. We've 
ŐĂŝŶĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂ ?(Eva, Treasurer, Bean Committee) 
 
 “tĞƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ƚŽŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚƐĞƚŽƵƚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ŐŽĂůƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐ ŝƚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ
ŶŽǁ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĞǆŝƐƚďĞĨŽƌĞ ?(Coyotl, Manager, Bean Committee) 
 
These control cards  W ƐŝŵƉůĞďŽŽŬůĞƚƐ ?ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ’ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶwith the 
committee such as attendance to meetings, member contributions and transactions. According to 
the social technician, the introduction of the control cards had a positive impact on the functioning 
of the organisations. In particular, it encouraged members to contribute more and show more 
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interest in the organisation. The findings reinforces the role of low cost monitoring mechanisms as 
an enabler of social capital in a developing country context (Ostrom, 1992, Becker and Ostrom, 
1995). 
 
While better monitoring systems had been put in place, procedures associated with the financial 
health of collective organisations had proven to be less successful and had a negative bearing on the 
scope for mutually beneficial collective action. The ability of collective groups to meet their financial 
obligations was a serious problem identified in the case study. Dina noted that some of the collective 
groups had taken out loans from banks but were unable to pay these loans back on time. During 
fieldwork it was observed that the manager of PeruCacao was deeply concerned about an unpaid 
loan of 60,000 soles (£13,300) provided to Cacao Collective  W his concern was reflected in an 
emergency call for advice to the research centre which facilitated the present research. 
 
The broad problem of unpaid debt was the result of loans provided to groups that had not been 
used for the intended purpose of building certification capabilities, instead being given out as cheap 
credit to farmers, as well as a lack of contributions from members to pay back their ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ’
debts. This was not just confined to the loans provided by PeruCacao but also financial institutions 
where according to Dina, the groups would take out credit from financial institutions but "after that 
ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƉĂǇŽŶƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞďƚŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ?. Based on the notion that 
dimensions of structural social capital include effective rules and procedures that supports collective 
action, the evidence suggests this was an aspect that the two case study collective organisations 
historically struggled with. 
 
Despite this, there was also the acknowledgement that progress was being made in solving these 
problems through more effective control and monitoring mechanisms and better leadership. The 
control cards introduced at Bean Committee recorded individual contributions of members, whereas 
in the past there had been no mechanism for recording contributions in place and an accountant 
had been funded by PeruCacao to organise the finances of the group. In addition, Bean Committee 
also tackled the problem of farmers missing assembly meetings  W an important arena for the group 
to discuss issues of finance, by sanctioning them: 
 
 “^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ǁĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ^ŽŵĞ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŐŽ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ? ƐŽ ƚŚĞ
committee introduced a payment of 20 soles [for not attending], which is like a fee, and this money 
ŐŽĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚĞůƉŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞŝůů ? ?(Farmer, Bean Committee) 
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Cacao Collective had also begun to sanction members who did not pay the basic contribution of 30kg 
of cacao per year and Emilio, acknowledging that  “ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ƚŽƉŝĐƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŽ ĚŽ ǁŝƚŚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?, still appeared to be driving the importance of this in assembly meetings as 
corroborated by interviews with farmer members. The evidence suggested that that while some 
aspects of structural social capital was poor in the past, it was in the process of being improved. 
 
Defined roles is regarded as a key dimension of structural social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 
2000) and in the wider development literature, it is generally agreed that leadership is essential in 
shaping effective collective action (Serra, 2011, Vollan, 2012, Goetz and Rupasingha, 2006, Krishna, 
2004, Kaganzi et al., 2009). While better procedures and enforceable rules had been implemented 
despite problems in the past, the evidence of defined leadership roles was more complex. From the 
perspective of Dina and Eduardo, a barrier to developing suppliers was that managers of collective 
organisations did not act as strong leaders or that the role of the manager and others functions were 
not well defined: 
 
 “/Ĩ /ǁĂƐƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůDĂŶĂŐĞƌĂŶĚ/ƐĂǇ  ‘ǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚŝƐ ? ?ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƐĂǇ  ‘ŶŽŶŽŶŽŶŽ ? ?/
ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŚĞŵƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƉĞƌŵŝƚƚŚĞƐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌƐ  ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ? ƚŽǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
General Manager and the DirectivĞ ?(Dina, Administrator, HelpCacao) 
 
 “^ŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂƌŵĞƌƐƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůDĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂďŝŐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? 
(Eduardo, General Manager, PeruCacao) 
 
The General Manager of PeruCacao judged that out of the 10 organisations that they source cacao 
from, three continued to have serious internal problems and this was linked to weakness in 
leadership. ĚƵĂƌĚŽůŝŶŬĞĚƉŽŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƉŽŽƌƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨĐĂĐĂŽ P “if there is no transparency 
and there are bad people working in the cooperative, the beans will be bad ? ?Indeed in Cacao 
Collective, the barriers to establishing leadership was eŵďŽĚŝĞĚďǇŵŝůŝŽ ’Ɛdecision to be called a 
technical coordinator rather than a manager, with Dina stating that Cacao Collective did not want to 
give someone the name of  ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ’ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝŶĚƵĐĞĚũĞĂůŽƵƐǇĂŶĚŵŝůŝŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶ P
 “/ĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƐĂǇŝŶŐ/ĂŵƚŚĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?. 
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There was evidence that more defined leadership roles were emerging in Cacao Collective and Bean 
Committee despite problems in the past, indicating improved structural social capital. Both case 
study collective organisations had gone through dramatic changes in its leadership, with members of 
both directives being replaced due to the perception of managerial incompetence by its members - 
in particular poor financial management and in some cases suspicion of corruption by some of the 
farmers interviewed. Although not wishing to officially call himself a manager, Emilio regarded his 
role to be managerial and was driving to establish more  “ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂů ?leadership within Cacao 
Collective: 
 
 “ŵŝůŝŽ  ?ƐĂǇƐ ) ŚĞ ŝƐ ŵƵĐŚ ŵŽƌĞ ůŝŬĞ Ă ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ? dŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ůŝŬĞ
ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŽŶůǇƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨĐĂĐĂŽĂŶĚŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?(Field 
Translation: Emilio, Technical Coordinator, Cacao Collective) 
 
Further to this point, in 2011 Bean Committee employed individuals to fill defined roles within the 
organisation which traditionally had been carried out by other members of the group. An accountant 
had beeŶŝŶƐƚĂůůĞĚƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉ ’ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚŽǇŽƚůŚĂĚĂůƐŽďĞĞŶemployed to fulfil the 
ƌŽůĞŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ ‘dŚĞZŽůĞŽĨGovernance ’ ) ?dŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
suggested that defined roles for decision making as a dimension of structural social capital was in the 
process of development in the case study collective organisations. 
 
As noted, social capital within a group is typically embedded in wider social structures and therefore 
farmer members were also interviewed on social capital at the village level. In particular, a ritual 
ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘DŝŶŐĂ ’ ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞanalysis - farmer working groups with roots in the Inca period and 
entrenched in Andean culture. Minga can be viewed as a form of structural social capital since it is a 
collective activity that follows established procedures and precedents and is a framework, with rules 
and regulations, for farmers to cooperate (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000). 
 
These farmer worker groups were organised by village leaders and farmers who did not participate 
in the village were fined 50 soles, suggesting that leadership and sanctions were mechanisms for 
Minga to operate in and maintain itself as a custom. Even when studying a 500 year old tradition, 
the findings support the literature on leadership and sanctions as factors in social capital formation 
(Serra, 2011, Vollan, 2012, Goetz and Rupasingha, 2006, Krishna, 2004, Molinas, 1998). It was stated 
in a group interview held in a village with members of Cacao Collective and the interview with the 
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President of Bean Committee that Minga was no longer conducted in their respective villages, 
because the diversity of cultures and backgrounds meant that this custom had been lost: 
 
 “EŽ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚĚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚŝƐůŝƚƚůĞƚŽǁŶ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞůůŬŝŶĚƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞũƵŶŐůĞ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
highlands, from the coast, rice growers and others, there is a different tŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?(Farmer Group 
Interview, Cacao Collective) 
 
 “tŚĞƌĞ / Ăŵ ĨƌŽŵ ?ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĚŽ DŝŶŐĂ ŝŶ Ă ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĨĨŽƌƚ ƐŽ ŝƚ  ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ĐĂĐĂŽ ? ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ
ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?(Farmer, Cacao Collective). 
 
 “dŚĞ ŶŽŶ-participation [in Minga] arose when our food regimes were different, for example I am 
ǀĞŐĞƚĂƌŝĂŶ ?dŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶǁĞĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĚŽŝƚ ? ?(Ordell, President, Bean Committee) 
 
The first quote refers to the migratory paths in Peru which has led to ethnic and cultural 
diversification in villages of the Amazonian and this was supported by the interview data - every 
farmer questioned noted that there was a mixture of indigenous Amazonian families and families 
who had migrated from the Andes, as well as some households which had come from the Northern 
coast of Peru. The second farmer originally came from the Andes but had migrated to the 
ŵĂǌŽŶŝĂŶ ? KƌĚĞůů ’Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐt that as a 7th Day Adventist, he and others who 
followed that religion could not eat meat, whereas Evangelicals, Catholics, Pentecostals and Baptists 
could. As was revealed in interviews with other stakeholders, the ceremony of cooking a large meal 
for the village to eat was an essential part of the Minga custom and therefore the diversity of 
religion represented a barrier to establishing the ritual that held together these farmer working 
groups. The evidence also suggested that Minga farmer groups were culturally embedded - with the 
majority of farmers interviewed stating that they conducted and participated in Minga in their 
respective villages because this was the traditional norm - as one farmer from Bean Committee 
noted:  “/ƚŝƐŽůĚ ?tĞ ?ǀĞĂůǁĂǇƐĚŽŶĞƚŚŝƐ ?and another from Cacao Collective stating:  “/ƚŝƐĂĚƵƚǇ ?ĂŶ 
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?. 
 
The benefits of Minga were stated within the context of efficiency and productivity; with 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚďǇĨĂƌŵĞƌƐŚĂƌǀĞƐƚŝŶŐĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ’ƐƉůŽƚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞprocess could 
be completed quicker than if each cacao farmer harvested their own land individually. This links 
with the relationship between social capital and productivity in the literature (Uphoff and 
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Wijayaratna, 2000, Vasilaky, 2013, Binam et al., 2004). There was also evidence from one 
interview where a farmer from Cacao Collective noted that as a direct result of village group 
meetings, a road was now being built which would mean that farmers would no longer have to 
transport cacao by boat, supporting the notion that social capital is lined with the creation of 
public goods (Janssens, 2010). 
 
The evidence suggested that while there was structural social capital at the village level in the 
form of Minga, this ritual was diminishing, with the key link being culturally diverse sets of 
farmers coming together from different parts of Peru. These findings support the literature 
arguing that ethnic or religious diversity can have a negative relationship with social capital 
formation (Woolcock, 1998, Beard, 2007, Klitgaard and Fedderke, 1995, Easterly and Levine, 
1997, Castle, 1998, Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan, 2007), contradicting evidence which 
suggests otherwise (Bhattacharyya et al., 2004). 
 
Table 8 summarises the main findings on structural social capital. The next section moves onto 
the main findings on cognitive social capital. 
 
Table 8: Summary of Case Study One findings on structural social capital 
Features of structural social 
capital 
Main findings 
Associational membership Membership of collective organisations base grew significantly 
since creation, however the use of associational membership as a 
proxy of structured social capital was brought into question in the 
case study due to conflict with qualitative aspects of structural 
social capital prior to 2009. Despite this, associational membership 
growth from 2009 onwards was supplemented with 
improvements in qualitative aspects of structural social capital. 
Defined roles for leadership Both Cacao Collective and Bean Committee showed evidence of 
more defined leadership roles, with Emilio taking a more 
entrepreneurial role and a dedicated manager being introduced at 
Bean Committee for the first time since its creation. 
Effective rules, procedures 
and precedents 
Evidence indicated more effective rules and procedures put in 
place. Control cards introduced at Bean Committee and 
sanctioning of members who side-sell at Cacao Collective. 
However while strong at the organisational level, the precedent of 
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ  ‘DŝŶŐĂ ’ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ǀŝůůĂŐĞ ůĞǀĞů ǁĂƐ ĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ
perceived cultural and ethnic diversification. 
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5.4.3 Cognitive Social Capital 
 
Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) define cognitive social capital as norms, values, attitudes and 
beliefs that incline people to cooperate based on their inclination to trust one another. While 
structural social capital is more concrete in that it can be measured through observable artefacts 
(control cards, for example) and quantitative measures such as associational membership, 
cognitive social capital is less tangible as it is associated with qualitative dimensions such as trust 
and participation (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Reyes and Lensink, 2011, Botelho, 2013). The previous 
section presented evidence that structural social capital had increased, however the evidence on 
cognitive social capital in this section presents a more mixed picture. 
 
The previous section laid out how Emilio saw his role as more  “ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂů ? ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ “the 
ŽƚŚĞƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ŚĂĚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐůŝŬĞĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?, matching a more defined role in decision 
making. However this conflicted with how farmers believed the nature of a manager should be, 
ǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĨĂƌŵĞƌŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞĂƐĂŶƚƐƉŝƌŝƚ ’ P
 
 “/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽďĞĂŐŽŽĚDĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂǁŽƌŬing spirit for peasants. How can I say? A 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ŚĞ ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂƐĂŶƚ ? dŚĞǇ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉĞĂƐĂŶƚ ƐƉŝƌŝƚ ? ? ?(Farmer Group 
Interview, Cacao Collective) 
 
The case study pointed towards conflict, not just recognised by farmers but also other members in 
the directive, with the way that Emilio had taken a more defined role as leader. The way that price 
was negotiated was a particular barrier to cognitive social capital within Cacao Collective. Several 
farmers interviewed were discontented with the price set by PeruCacao, seeing this as unfair and a 
consequence of the personal relationship between Emilio and PeruCacao and there was similar 
discontent on the role of the manager in Bean Committee: 
 
dŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌƚĞůůƐƵƐ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŶŽƚƚŽŐĞƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶǁŚĂƚŝƐŶ ?ƚŽƵƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ
ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƐ ?(Dario, President, Cacao Collective) 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƐŽŵĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ whole situation. If they 
(PeruCacao) talked to me, it was seen as a matter of going above their heads. It was more a kind of 
ĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚũĞĂůŽƵƐǇ ?(Emilio, Technical Coordinator, Cacao Collective) 
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 “/ŶƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐƐŽŵĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?. some argue about the administration, the 
ƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?(Farmer, Bean Committee) 
 
The findings suggested that this new managerial role established in both collective organisations 
created tension, not just between farmers and the directive but within the directive itself. 
Structural social capital had risen as manifest in more defined leadership roles within 
organisations; however this was accompanied by mistrust in these new leadership roles because 
members felt they were less included in the decision making process  W as Eduardo noted:  “ƐŽŵĞŽĨ
the farmers think they are General ManagerƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂďŝŐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?. Given that trust is a proxy 
of cognitive social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Reyes and Lensink, 2011, Botelho, 2013), the 
findings suggest that cognitive social capital deteriorated after more defined leadership roles 
emerged within the cooperative where none had existed in the past, suggesting that the high rise 
in structural social capital driven by PeruCacao corresponded with a fall in cognitive social capital. 
 
Cognitive social capital includes the attitudes that incline people to cooperate (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna 2000). The managers from Cacao Collective and Bean Committee noted that operating 
costs of running their organisations meant that when external traders offered a slightly higher 
price, some farmers would cheat on their agreement and sell elsewhere. Taking a quote from 
Coyotl: 
 
 “KŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŝƐƉƌŝĐŝŶŐ ?ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐation has to cover operational 
expenses. Sometimes the competitors or middle men may offer 1 point more than us for cacao, so 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐŐŽƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?(Coyotl, Manager, Bean Committee) 
 
This was also corroborated by Dina who stated that a lack of commitment to organisations was 
signalled by a propensity to side-sell. According to Ordell, this was a problem especially acute for 
Bean Committee, where they could not sanction members because the small group size meant that 
excluding members threatened the existence of the organisation all together. Cacao Collective 
could however sanction members and even had plans to cut off members who regularly cheated  W 
for Cacao Collective; losing members did not mean losing the organisation. This finding goes 
against the notion that small group size necessarily enables effective collective action (Becker and 
Ostrom, 1995). The issue of members cheating links with diminished cognitive social capital 
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because a lack of norms conducive to cooperation hampered the scope to attain mutual benefits 
(Kaganzi et al., 2009). 
 
Although there had been investment into structural social capital, evidenced from better 
monitoring mechanisms and a change in attitude of leadership, the propensity of members to 
financially support their respective organisations remained a significant barrier for both Cacao 
Collective and Bean Committee. Emilio noted that the issue of contributions was the  “ƐŝŶŐůĞŵŽƐƚ
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞ ?facing Cacao Collective, not least of all because of the debt and administration 
costs. This was despite workshops set up by HelpCacao which aimed to encourage members to not 
just contribute more to their respective collective organisations but more broadly educate 
members on the importance of working towards a collective goal:  “ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?, as 
Dina described it, noting how challenging it was to create this commitment by members. The 
propensity to contribute was linked to the notion of trust  W a dimension of cognitive social capital 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997, Reyes and Lensink, 2011, Botelho, 2013): 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽ
ŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞŽƌĂƌĞŶŽƚƵƉƚŽĚĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐ ?ŝƚŝƐĂďŽƵƚŵŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ ?ŵŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? (Farmer Group Interview, Bean Committee) 
 
The findings from the case study suggested that while there were rises in structural social capital, 
the process of cognitive social formation was less successful as evidenced by mistrust, a lack of 
contributions and an internal conflict over a more defined role for management. This was in spite 
of efforts by PeruCacao to develop both structural and cognitive social capital  W a dynamic 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘DĂŝŶ &ŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ŽŶGovernance ’ ? dŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ Ă ƌĞĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚthe scope for 
improving cognŝƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂŶĚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ  ‘ďƵǇ-ŝŶ ’ ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůsocial capital 
depended very much on cultural embeddedness and that developing norms of cooperation would 
be a slow process: 
 
 “tĞĐĂŶŽŶůǇŐŝǀĞ ƚŚĞŵƚŚĞ ƚŽols to improve some aspects and if they learn and they make it  W 
ŐŽŽĚ ? ďƵƚ ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ? ^ĂŶ DĂƌƚŝŶ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ůĞĂƌŶ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƚĂůŬĂƚŝǀĞ ? ŵŽƌĞ
ŽƵƚŐŽŝŶŐ ? WĞŽƉůĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƐŽƵƚŚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚƌƵƐƚ ? ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ EŽƌƚŚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ
farmers ŝŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚ ?(Dina, Administrator, HelpCacao) 
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 “/ƚ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƚŚŝŶŐ ?ŽŶĞƚŚĂƚǁŝůůƐůŽǁůǇĂŶĚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?
(Coyotl, Manager, Bean Committee) 
 
It is generally considered in the literature that culture and historical context influences social 
capital formation (Coleman, 1990, Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997, Molyneux, 2002, Nilsson et al., 2012). It 
was regularly cited in interviews with a variety of stakeholders that the cultural difference between 
farmer groups originating from the Andean region compared to the Amazonian region impacted 
the propensity to work together. The analysis suggested that there was an association between 
cognitive social capital and cultural and historical elements, supporting the literature. This was 
even more evident when shifting focus from the organisational to the village level. 
 
Informal relationships among farmers at the village level has more in common with cognitive social 
capital than structural social capital due to a lack of formalization and embeddedness within norms 
of behaviour (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000). Most farmers interviewed did trust their neighbours, 
although there were some exceptions. The analysis showed that farmers who did trust others in 
their community noted how important it was for relationships to be built over time and through 
repeated interactions, supporting the literature on this aspect of social capital formation (Lyon, 
2000, Ostrom, 2000). Where mistrust occurred, this was typically due to single events such as 
suspected theft by a neighbour or a broader judgement that they did not share the same values. 
Some farmers noted that they felt closer to other farmers who were from the same cultural and 
ethnic background, with a distinction between those from the Andes and ƚŚŽƐĞĨƌŽŵ ‘ƚŚĞũƵŶŐůĞ ’ ?
This was also reflected in the religious diversity in KƌĚĞůů ’Ɛ ǀŝůůĂŐĞ ĂƐ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ  ‘^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů
^ŽĐŝĂůĂƉŝƚĂů ’ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞvariety of different religious beliefs 
that villagers held. 
 
A key benefit that resulted from relationships at the village level was the sharing of information 
and learning, noted by several farmers but summarised effectively by one: 
 
 “tĞ ƚĂůŬ ĂďŽƵƚ ĐĂĐĂŽ ? ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐĞĐƚƐ ? ĨĞƌƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚƌŝŵŵŝŶŐ ? ŚĂƌǀĞƐƚ ? ĨĞƌŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďŽǆĞƐ ?
drying process... the positive thing is that at times you might do something wrong, they will advise 
ŵĞĂŶĚ/ĐĂŶŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŽƌĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?(Farmer, Bean Committee) 
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Farmers interviewed noted that they gain information about new production techniques from their 
social relationships with other farmers, in particular the use of better fertilizers. It is argued in the 
literature that social capital enables farmers to adopt new agricultural innovations (van Rijn et al., 
2012, Lambrecht et al., 2014) and the findings here suggest that this holds true. 
 
This section laid out the evidence on cognitive social capital formation of the two collective 
organisations and at the village level where members are embedded. Table 9 summarises the 
main findings. The next section addresses the role of governance in the present case study. 
 
Table 9: Summary of Case Study One findings on cognitive social capital 
Features of cognitive 
social capital 
Main findings 
Norms and values At the organisational level, norms and values not congruent to 
cooperation. Resistance from farmers to increase member 
contributions. Some farmers cheating by side-selling to other buyers. 
Although limited cases, contrasting norms and values at the village 
level shown to be a barrier to cooperation. 
Attitudes and beliefs Evidence of mistrust in management by farmers and among the 
directive itself. At the village level, evidence of broadly trusting 
relationships. 
 




Governance is the notion that in some value chains, buyers have authority and power 
relationships that shape the participation of suppliers in the chain (Gereffi, 1994, Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2004). Where social capital can be regarded as a horizontal concept (Putnam, 1995), 
governance is a vertical construct where actors interact with each other from beyond their local 
systems (Bolwig et al., 2010). Based on the literature, the findings on governance are organised 
within the following dimensions: Certification Standards; Risk of Supplier Failure and Buyer 
Support; Information Flow and Relationships and Trust. 
 
This section begins with presenting evidence of individual dimensions of governance from the 
case study and then presents the case on the role of each dimension on social capital formation. 
References to the previous section on social capital are interwoven into the discussion to 
demonstrate where and when governance did (or did not) coincide with the process of social 
capital formation. 
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5.5.2 Standards 
 
Certification standards represent a significant mechanism of governance in GVCs because they 
place specific parameters on the participation of suppliers (Bolwig et al., 2010). In particular, 
ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĚƌŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ’ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚŽǁ ’ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ'sƐ (Reardon 
and Farina, 2002, Reardon et al., 2001b). When strict standards cannot be met due to suppliers 
not having the require capabilities, then the incentive for governance over the chain from buyers 
grows (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
 
Within the present case study, the dominant standard being driven by PeruCacao through its 
supply chain is organic certification. The two case study collective organisations are in different 
stages of the three year conversion process; 71 farmers in Collective Cacao are in the final year of 
certification while Bean Committee has only started its first year of the process. Increased price 
for cacao was the stated motivator behind seeking certification by farmers and the management 
of the collective organisations, summed up by the President of Collective Cacao when asked why 
farmers adopted organic certification:  “&ŽƌĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ŝƚŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂďŽƵƚŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ ƉƌŝĐĞ ? ? 
 
Prior to beginning the organic conversion process, the cooperatives acquired UTZ certification 
which according to the technical coordinator of Cacao Collective was a relatively easy process - to 
the extent that while initially it gave them a price advantage, this advantage dissipated as all the 
other cooperatives in the local area acquired it: 
 
 “/ƚŝƐƌĞĂůůǇĞĂƐǇƚŽŐĞƚƚŚŝƐ[UTZ] ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞ to avoid slash and burn, for 
example they only had to clean up all of this [the cooperative building]. But at the beginning they 
had an added price to cacao because of UTZ but after three years all of the cooperatives also had 
hdƐŽŝƚǁĂƐĞǀĞŶ ?(Field Translation: Emilio, Technical Coordinator, Cacao Collective). 
 
Slash and burn, while allowed under UTZ, is prohibited under organic certification. This process, 
where old crops are burnt to fertilize the soil while production moves to a different plot of land 
(essentially creating a cycle of growing, burning and moving), was cited as a particular problem 
because it is a practice deep rooted in the agricultural culture of Peruvian farmers. There was also 
evidence from interviews with farmers to suggest that not being able to use chemicals and the 
broader change in methods were also barriers, although competing accounts suggested that for 
some farmers the process was not especially difficult. Clearly the barriers of organic certification 
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were higher than UTZ and the price advantage of UTZ had dissipated as a result, matching the 
notion that while such barriers create temporary advantages in GVCs, they are eventually eroded 
by competition (Kaplinsky, 2004b). 
 
In addition to the technical challenges of organic certification was the associated monetary cost, 
with stakeholders from both organisations noting that they could not afford it on their own (an 
issue discussed in more detail later). The evidence suggested that the move to acquire organic 
certification created significant challenges for Cacao Collective and Bean Committee due to the 
stricter rules and requirements, reflecting a high degree of governance over the GVC since as 
standards intensify and the capabilities are not sufficient (in this case monetary), the incentive for 
a buyer to manage its suppliers increases (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
 
From the interviews with Steven and Eduardo, it emerged that the strategic importance of 
certified cacao is a major driver for governance over the PeruCacao GVC. Having PeruCacao as an 
organiser of small collective organisations allowed Cacao International to control certification and 
meet traceability standards back to the individual farmers. Because of the growing end market for 
certified cacao (ICCO, 2013), supporting organic certification back to the farmer level is also a way 
for Cacao International to organise the GVC such that it can ensure the supply of traceable organic 
cacao. When asking Steven why Cacao International had adopted this particular governing model: 
 
 “tĞŚĂǀĞŽƵƌŽǁŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌĂůůƚŚĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚƌĂĐĞĂďŝůŝƚǇďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĨĂƌŵĞƌ ?
tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽũƵƐƚďƵǇĐĂĐĂŽŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƚŽĞĂƌŶƐŽŵĞŵŽŶĞǇ ?dƌĂĐĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĞŬĞǇǁŽƌĚ ?
(Steven, Owner, Cacao International) 
 
Humphrey (2006) suggests traceability in credence goods such as organic certified agricultural 
produce has a particularly strong impact on governance because it necessitates control from 
buyers over the GVC and the rationale provided by Steven supports this view. Tran et al. ’Ɛ(2013) 
research on the impact of certified shrimp in Vietnam also mirrors that of certified cacao in the 
present research  W certification is a motivating factor for buyers to manage and govern farmers in 
GVCs. However it is also important to highlight the wider strategic context behind this. As Steven 
noted, the latent growth of certified cacao in Peru lay with small collective organisations rather 
than established cooperatives and ultimately this was the incentive to create and use PeruCacao 
as a governing mechanism in the chain. Without this overarching strategic driver, the rationale for 
governance of small collective organisations appears to be lost in the present case study. 
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In addition to the standards manifest from organic certification, PeruCacao also demanded the 
quantity of cacao to be produced by collective organisations  W ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽǁŵƵĐŚ ’element 
of standard setting in governed GVCs (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). As part of the contractual 
agreement between PeruCacao and its supply base, collective organisations were obligated to 
produce a set quantity of cacao. Both collective organisations needed technical support to meet 
these quantities and this support came from PeruCacao (a dynamic discussed in the following 
section). 
 
There was no evidence in the case study that suggested that organic certification as a dimension 
of governance had a direct correspondence with social capital. However organic certification, 
combined with a wider strategic view that the latent growth of Peruvian cacao lay with small 
collective organisations and the technical and monetary barriers associated with organic 
certification, set a strong rationale for Cacao IŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?
Eduardo stated that if collective organisations required support in meeting their obligations, then 
they had to enter into agreements with PeruCacao that meant PeruCacao had control over the 
way they participated. Therefore while organic certification did not directly correspond with social 
capital formation, it was a catalyst for implementing governance over the chain by PeruCacao. 
 
5.5.3 Risk of Supplier Failure and Buyer Support 
 
The risk of suppliers failing to meet the competencies necessary to compete in a GVC is a 
dimension of governance because, when combined with standards such as those posed by 
certification, it affects the propensity of buyers to govern the GVC (Gereffi et al. 2005). One aspect 
of thiƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ’ ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ƚŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĨŶĞǁĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽĂĐĐĞƐƐ new 
markets for suppliers (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). It is widely stated in the GVC literature that 
upgrading is facilitated in governed GVCs compared to spot-markets where governance is absent 
(Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007). 
 
This section drills deeper into this topic by desĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ’Ɛ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŽ
upgrade its supply base through its NGO support arm HelpCacao and the role of the wider 
institutional environment. The insights on the upgrading journey followed by Collective Cacao, 
Bean Committee and PeruCacao ’Ɛ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ďĂƐĞŵŽƌĞ ďƌŽĂĚůǇ  ?ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ďĞŝŶŐĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
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interviews with PeruCacao and HelpCacao) creates a basis for understanding how this particular 
dimension of governance plays a role in social capital formation of farmers. 
 
As noted in the previous section, a significant barrier for case study cooperatives in gaining organic 
certification was the cost of certification itself which neither collective organisation could pay for 
individually, indicating that supplier capabilities, in this case financial, were not up to the level that 
PeruCacao and Cacao International required for its GVC: 
 
 “dŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞŽƌŐĂŶŝĐǁĂƐŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞĂůŽŶŐƚŝŵĞĂŐŽďƵƚƚŚĞǇŶĞǀĞƌƌĞĂůůǇ
got into it because of the costs. They had a plan for every farmer to put in some money, but it 
never really worked. PeruCacao told them they can get some funds for that. So it was their idea, 
ďƵƚ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞƐ ǁŚŽ ŵĂĚĞ ŝƚ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?(Field Translation: Emilio, Technical 
Coordinator, Cacao Collective) 
 
In exchange for exclusively supplying PeruCacao, cooperatives receive financial and technical 
support to product upgrade, in that they are moving into products which have a greater value per 
unit, from conventional to organic cacao (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). The secondary data 
supports this high price of organic cacao compared to conventional cacao (ICCO, 2013). The 
dynamic of a buyer supporting the product upgrading of suppliers, especially in a traditional 
agricultural sector such as cacao, is reflected in other findings in the literature (Pietrobelli and 
Rabellotti, 2011). 
 
dŽƵƉŐƌĂĚĞƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ĨƌŽŵĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝĐ ĐĂĐĂŽ ?WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽĞŵƉůŽǇƐ ŝƚƐŽǁŶ
team of 15 technicians to support its supply base of 10 collective organisations. Alongside this, 
HelpCacao represents an important mechanism by which PeruCacao upgrades its supply base. By 
creating HelpCacao, Cacao International has been able to capitalise on a uniquely rich institutional 
environment in Peru to draw external support from, while at the same time having more control 
over the implementation process: 
 
 “tĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ůŝǀĞ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ,ĞůƉĂĐĂŽ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚ ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ ǀŝƚĂů ? ďƵƚ ǁĞ ůŝǀĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ ,ĞůƉĂĐĂŽ
because we would have to work with other NGOs to implement projects ? tĞ ůŝǀĞ ŝŶ ĂŶ
environment where there are probably too many projects available and everybody is benefitting 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƚŽŶŽƚǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞŬŝŶĚŽĨƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ? /ƚ ?Ɛ 
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different in Peru compared to other countries. I do not know another country which has so many 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ?(Steven, Owner, Cacao International) 
 
PeruCacao is able to directly tap into projects from international development agencies such as 
USAID and national government agencies like the national drug control commission of Peru 
(DEVIDA) through HelpCacao. This model of buyers creating an NGO to become a dedicated 
support arm reached beyond the PeruCacao GVC. Interviews with other NGOs stakeholders 
outside of the case study GVC revealed that another large cacao importer in Peru (3rd largest cacao 
supplier in the world) has a similar model in Peru, with a subsidiary exporter and an NGO 
dedicated to upgrading a supply base of small collective organisations alongside a second supply 
channel composed of cacao cooperatives capable of direct exportation. Interestingly, interviews 
with the largest cacao cooperative in Peru revealed that a department and a team of five 
employees within the cooperative is dedicated to funnelling projects from the wider institutional 
support provided by ADP. Steven suggested that the projects available in Peru meant that to not 
utilise these effectively would be  “ĂĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?. All of the evidence indicated that 
the investment required to set up and run a private NGO to govern the chain (and in the case of 
the largest cacao cooperative, a dedicated department) was justified by the importance that the 
institutional environment has to cacao in Peru. 
 
Continuing this point on the interaction between the institutional environment and governance, 
an important role that PeruCacao plays is that of a facilitator of institutional support for its supply 
base. Without PeruCacao as a partner, much of the support that the institutional context has to 
offer would otherwise be out of reach for these small cooperatives. Using the example of a project 
ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŐƌŽŝĚĞĂƐ ’ ?ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ explained: 
 
 “ŶŽƚŚĞƌďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ŽĨƉĂƌƚŶĞƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚǁŝƚŚ
Agroideas... in this project we are focusing on fertilisation and also a drip irrigation system for the 
farmers... that is precisely an example of what we are working on with PeruCacao. At the moment 
ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚ ?^ŝŶĐĞǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĂĨĨŽƌĚĂĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚ ?WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽtake on 
ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐŽƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶƌĞĨƵŶĚŝƚůĂƚĞƌ ? ?(Ordell, President, Bean Committee). 
Likewise the project with a Swiss development organisation that Cacao Collective was involved in 
was entirely facilitated by its relationship with HelpCacao and PeruCacao. This notion of buyers 
being facilitators to the external institutional environment was reinforced from an interview with 
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an NGO representative who indicated that the preference of his organisation was to support 
collective farmers that had existing relationships with buyers because they already had a secure 
export market. This suggests that, in the present case study, not only do buyers bring institutional 
support from the external environment, but the propensity of NGOs to offer their support can also 
be shaped by the existence of buyers, indicating both a pull and push dynamic between the GVC 
and the institutional environment. 
 
How governance in the PeruCacao GVC operates appears to be very much informed by the ADP 
context in terms of the incentives provided by international development agencies and the 
government of Peru for buyers to develop their supply base. This has theoretical implications for 
governance and represents a contribution of the present case study. Contrary to the idea that GVC 
governance ŝƐ  ‘ĚĞ-ůŝŶŬĞĚ ’ ĂŶĚ  ‘ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŝƐĞĚ ’ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ(Gibbon, 2001, 
Petkova, 2006); the present case study presents a clear interaction between the institutional 
environment and governance. 
 
Through a co-investment with the Swiss development organisation, HelpCacao provided support 
through the provision of technicians. In Cacao Collective, three technicians were in place at the 
time of the fieldwork, with two being responsible for technical aspects such as improving yields 
and meeting certification standards while the third was responsible for the social organisation of 
the cooperative as well as supporting technical aspects too. Through the same project, Bean 
Committee was provided with one social technician. While the technical development of 
WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ’Ɛ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ďĂƐĞ ǁĂƐ ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƚŽ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů
organisation of collective organisations were identified as a particular area for improvement in the 
PeruCacao GVC: 
 
 “ůů ƚŚĞ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĂƌĞ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƌƚ ? ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉĂƌƚ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ / ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŝƐĞĂƐǇ ?ĞĂƐŝĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚ ?(Dina, Administrator, HelpCacao) 
 
This change was catalysed by the buyer through its partial funding of and facilitation of support for 
the social technician. The social technician had also put in place more stringent accounting 
mechanisms. The data suggested that the social technician played a role in managing and 
improving the performance of collective organisations: 
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 “DǇ ƌŽůĞ ŝƐ ƚǁŽ-fold, social and production. The social side is to make sure members of the 
directive are fulfilling their roles, implementing their strategy to increase the number of members 
who are contributing, both their monthly contributions as well as the grains quota. I have to check 
that they have been certified in some way, the number of certifications, anything to do with 
payments, controls; that the directive is working well, meetings, strengthening the organisatioŶ ?
(Fabián, Social Technician, Bean Committee). 
 
The findings suggest that structural social capital formation that evidently took place was enabled 
by the governance model, or more specifically the risk of supplier failure and the drive to upgrade, 
given that more effective rules and regulations were now being put in place. Another form of 
support that PeruCacao provided was to financially support the management of collective 
organisations to go to international agricultural fairs and meet European chocolatiers. This was 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐĂǁĂǇƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ’ůĞĂĚĞƌƐǁŚŽƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇhad not had 
the opportunity to visit the markets that they supply to, as well as driving home the importance of 
quality in the PeruCacao GVC: 
 
 “dŚĞǇ ŐŽ ƚŽ know more about how the market is, how the organic cacao market is working, to 
ŽƉĞŶĂǀŝƐŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƐŵĂůůĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞŵĂŶǇŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐƚŽŐŽĂďƌŽĂĚ ?Ăůso they went to 
visit some chocolatier enterprises to know how the cacao beans are working, to prepare good 
chocolate. From this point we want the farmer to know how important it is to make quality in the 
ĨŝĞůĚ ?(Dina, Administrator, HelpCacao) 
 
This notioŶŽĨƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ‘ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ’ĨƌŽŵŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ'sƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŝƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ
(Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011). In conjunction with the Swiss development project, PeruCacao 
also paid for an accountant and a manager to be employed at Bean Committee to help organise 
the finances of the organisation. All the evidence captured in the interviews point towards very 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ďǇ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚŝƐ ŬŝŶĚ ŽĨ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĂŶĚ
direct involvement from a buyer indicates a high degree of governance indicative of a quasi- 
hierarchical GVC. However this could also be linked to the development of structural social capital 
in the form of more effective leadership. To bring suppliers up to the standard required to 
compete in a high quality, organic cacao GVC, PeruCacao saw the need to improve the leadership 
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and organisational capabilities of collective organisations  W as Eduardo noted:  “If there is no 
transparency and there are bad people working in the cooperative, the beans will be bad ? ?
 
According to the administrator of HelpCacao, collective organisations in the PeruCacao GVC that 
had successfully improved their capabilities were those where the members: 1) had been 
convinced that they should allow the directive to manage, rather than getting involved in that 
function of collective organisation; and 2) were willing to provide higher contributions to support 
the development of the collective organisations. These factors identified as important 
characteristics to upgrade are associated with dimensions of social capital in terms of the former 
manifest in effective roles for decision making and the latter reflected in the propensity to 
contribute towards mutually beneficial collective action (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
The wider push to upgrade suppliers by PeruCacao ultimately led to the development of structural 
social capital. New processes had been implemented, namely by the social technicians and 
personnel funded by PeruCacao and its supporting institutional actors, which gave greater 
accountability within Cacao Collective and Bean Committee. The control cards described 
previously were initiated by the social technician and the accountant and manager employed by 
Bean Committee were both dependent on support by PeruCacao. In this respect, governance is 
very much an enabler of structural social capital. However the relationship with cognitive social 
capital was more complex due to its deep entrenchment in the historical and cultural context. 
 
Historically, the terrorist activities of the Shining Path group which engulfed the country in the 
 ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ- ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĚĞĞƉ ŵŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ ĂŵŽŶŐ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĂǌŽŶŝĂŶ ? dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚ ŝŶ
several stakeholder interviews and corresponĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶĂ ’Ɛ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ’Ɛ
suppliers in San Martin (Andean region) compared to those in Cusco (Southern Amazonian). In our 
case study, these factors had repercussions on the ability of PeruCacao to develop cognitive social 
capital of suppliers in its GVC. Culture and history either enabled cognitive social capital formation 
and organisations were open to workshops, or were barriers to cognitive social capital formation 
in terms of an unwillingness to participate in workshops and entrenchment in current social 
norms. 
 
There was evidence that the rise in structural social capital (as described in section 5.3) could be 
attributed to the upgrading process to bring suppliers from conventional to organic cacao, 
indicating that this particular dimension of governance is an enabler of structural social capital. 
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However there was no evidence to indicate that cognitive social capital was enabled in the 
upgrading process, despite workshops being set up to teach farmers the importance of solidarity 
and trust. The interview with Dina suggested that this was a result of social capital being deeply 
entrenched in culture and history. This corresponds with the wider findings laid out on cognitive 
social capital 
 
Farmers in a quasi-hierarchical structured GVC go on to build better products in a more efficient 
manner compared to those who operate in a market governance structure (Bazan and Navas- 
Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007). In this case study on a cacao GVC, this holds 
true. In the past, Cacao Collective grew conventional cacao with limited technical support, but 
after integrating into the PeruCacao GVC the organisation had acquired UTZ certification, was on 
the threshold of selling organic certified cacao and had technicians dedicated to improving the 
productivity of the organisation. Likewise since integrating into the PeruCacao GVC, Bean 
Committee acquired UTZ certification, was in the early stages of organic conversion and had also 
been provided with technical assistance. Social capital was a clear means to this end. Through the 
social technician implementing new rules and regimes, to workshops teaching  “farmers how to be 
ŝŶ Ă ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?, a concerted effort was in place to drive both structural and cognitive social 
capital. The incentive for PeruCacao to invest in social capital corresponds with the notion that 
social capital is an important factor in farmers meeting certification standards in GVCs (Asfaw et 
al., 2009, Melo and Wolf, 2007). 
 
5.5.4 Information Flow 
 
Information flow along the value chain represents a dimension of governance because as the 
knowledge required to carry out a particular process becomes more complex and necessitates 
face-to-face communication, governance over the chain intensifies (Gereffi et al. 2005). There was 
evidence from interviews to suggest that that communication channels between PeruCacao and 
the case study collective organisations were open. Both Cacao Collective and Bean Committee 
stated that they use the internet and regular telephone calls to communicate with PeruCacao, 
although poor connectivity to the internet was highlighted as an issue by the technical coordinator 
of Cacao Collective. PeruCacao also had representatives in all of the regions where its suppliers 
operate which gave the collective organisations a point of contact. Interviews with the President 
of Bean Committee indicated that he had regular communication with the representative from 
PeruCacao: 
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 “ŝŶĂ ŝƐ ŽƵƌ ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ^Ž ƐŚĞ ƚĂŬĞƐ ĐĂƌĞ ŽĨ  ?ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ) ? ƐŽ
anything we need, we mention it to Dina and she gets in touch with them... Sometimes we talk 
once in a month or maybe every two weeks, depends on whether there is something we need to 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ?ƐŚĞǁŽƵůĚĐĂůůŵĞŽƌ /ǁŝůůĐĂůůŚĞƌ ? ? ?ƐŽǁĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞŽĨƚĞŶ ?(Ordell, President, Bean 
Committee) 
 
In addition to regional representatives, the manager of PeruCacao - Eduardo, visited suppliers 
three to five times a year. From the interview with Eduardo, there was a clear sense that coming 
out and meeting suppliers face-to-face was regarded as important to the overall business 
relationship:  “ŝƚǲƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐĞĞŵĞĂŶĚ/ƐĞĞƚŚĞŵ ?. In these meetings, Eduardo would 
ŚŽůĚĂĚŝŶŶĞƌǁŝƚŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ’ŵĞŵďĞƌƐĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐstrategy. At the time 
of the fieldwork, Steven had arrived from Switzerland and was visiting individual collective 
organisations. Given that Cacao International sourced cacao from around the world both from 
small and large collective organisations, the owner of Cacao International coming to Peru to meet 
suppliers showed how importance face-to-face interaction was viewed. 
 
While the evidence showed that the information flow was strong between PeruCacao and the 
leaders of Cacao Collective and Bean Committee; some interviews with members of the case study 
collective organisations presented a contrasting view, suggesting either they did not know much 
information about PeruCacao or felt that they did not have access to the information they desired, 
leading in some cases to a breakdown in trust: 
 
 “WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽŝƐĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƚŚĂƚŝƐƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?ŶŽ ?/ĂŵŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇĂǁĂƌĞŽĨŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚ ?
tŚĞŶǁĞŚĂǀĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐƚŚĞǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŽƵƐƚŚĂƚWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽŝƐƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐďƵƚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ŬŶŽǁ ?(Farmer, Cacao Collective) 
 
 “tĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĨŽƌ three years. They never say how much they earn, or how much the 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ? zŽƵ ŶĞǀĞƌ ŬŶŽǁ ŚŽǁ ŵƵĐŚ ǇŽƵ ǁŝůů ŚĂǀĞ ŝŶ ǇŽƵƌ ƉŽĐŬĞƚ ? ?(Farmer B, Cacao 
Collective) 
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 “WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽĚŽŶ ?ƚƚĞůůƵƐŚŽǁŵƵĐŚƚŚĞǇƐĞůůŝƚĨŽƌ ? ? ?dŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌƚĞůůƐƵƐ ?ƚhe directive] 
ŶŽƚƚŽŐĞƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶǁŚĂƚŝƐŶ ?ƚŽƵƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?(Dario, President, Cacao Collective) 
 
It is important to note that this negative view of PeruCacao was not shared by all farmers that 
were interviewed. While there was evidence that some farmers felt they did not have the 
necessary information about the exporter, representatives from PeruCacao had come to the 
group to explain how the price was calculated from the world market price and this had helped 
some members to understand why the price had fallen over recent years: 
 
 “dŚĞǇǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŐŝǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞƐƚŽĐŬĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ? ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĐŚĞĂƚŝŶŐŵĞ ?ĨƚĞƌ
all they come and buy from us according to the price given by the stock exchange... the European 
ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?(Farmer, Cacao Collective) 
 
 “KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŚŝŐŚĂŶĚůŽǁƉƌŝĐĞƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇƚĞůůƵƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐǁŚǇƚŚĞǇƉĂǇůĞƐƐ
ǁŚĞŶǁĞĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶ ? ?(Farmer, Bean Committee) 
 
 “dŚĞǇ  ?WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ? ŝŶĨŽƌŵ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝĐĞ ? >ĂƐƚ ǇĞĂƌ ? / ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ďƵƚ
somewhere like Switzerland, where a lot of cacao was being sent, they had a slow production so a 
ůŽǁĞƌ ƉƌŝĐĞ ? / ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ǁŚĂƚ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ǁĂƐ ĚŽŝŶŐ ? /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽrtant, otherwise us 
ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĨŝŐŚƚŽǀĞƌƉƌŝĐĞ ?ƐŽŝƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ? ?[Farmer, Bean Committee] 
 
Indeed the fall in global market prices referred to above is corroborated by secondary data (ICCO, 
2013). The evidence suggested that when information was not disseminated beyond the 
relationship between managers and PeruCacao, then cognitive social capital formation suffered 
because it represented an issue that drove conflict among members. However when information 
was shared to the wider organisational level  W in this case how the selling price was determined by 
global market prices for cacao, farmers were more understanding of the situation which the 
interviews suggested led to a more cohesive organisation. The takeaway message is that cognitive 
social capital in case study collective organisations is more likely to develop where information 
flow from the buyer and seller is inclusive of group members. 
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5.5.5 Relationships and Trust 
 
It is widely understood in the literature that relationships and the nature of trust along the value 
chain are important mechanisms of governance in GVCs (Bolwig et al., 2010, Gereffi, 1994, 
Frederick and Gereffi, 2009, Morrow et al., 2004, Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002). More specifically, 
long-term relationships where a high degree of inter-firm trust exists enables governance to 
function because it deters against the kind of opportunism that characterises arms-length market 
relationships (Sako and Helper, 1998, Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002, Riisgaard et al., 2010). In the 
present case study, while there was data showing that the relationship between the two collective 
organisations and PeruCacao was strong, the findings reflected that of the information flow 
whereby relationships were strongest at the personal level rather than organisational level and in 
ĨĂĐƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƐŽŵĞĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĚŝĚŶŽƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’situation. 
 
To understand the type of governance, it is valuable to look at the structure of relationships in the 
GVC. If there are few buyers with a large number of suppliers, then this typically points towards a 
quasi-hierarchical GVC structure because the buyer has a significant degree of power over its 
supply base whereas in a network governance structure, there is limited dominance of the buyer 
over the supplier because power is more evenly distributed (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). In the 
PeruCacao GVC, the structure of relationships pointed towards quasi-hierarchical governance 
because Cacao Collective was the one and only buyer (due to exclusive supply contracts) for a 
number of cooperatives, including Cacao Collective and Bean Committee. Figure 10 displays the 
likeness between the PeruCacao GVC and quasi-hierarchy compared to other types of governance. 
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Figure 10: Quasi-hierarchical governance structure of the PalmPeru GVC 
 
There was strong evidence to suggest that PeruCacao regarded its relationships with suppliers to 
be important to its own success, reflecting a justification for governance (Frederick and Gereffi, 
2009). Eduardo noted that there was a level of interdependency between PeruCacao and its 
supply base and this notion was supported by Steven who linked strength of supply chain 
relationships with the notion of a sustainable business: 
 
 “/Ĩ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ŐŽŽĚ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŐŽŽĚ ? /Ĩ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ďĂĚ ? ǁĞ Ăƌ  ďĂĚ ?(Eduardo, General Manager, 
PeruCacao) 
 
 “tŚĂƚ/ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůůǇďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶŝƐǁŝŶ-win situations. You can only have a sustainable business if your 
suppliers are happy with the way you behave and vice versa... Trust is a big issue and friendship at 
ƚŚĞĞŶĚ ?>ŽŶŐůĂƐƚŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƐǁŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌ ?(Steven, Owner, Cacao International) 
 
Relationships based on mutual dependence are a fundamental element of governance because it 
reduces the threat of opportunism where high switching costs exist (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002). The cost of opportunism to PeruCacao was high due to the level of asset specific 
investment in supporting the certification of its suppliers. If after the end of the three year 
exclusivity contract, collective organisations made the decision to not continue supplying cacao to 
PeruCacao, then its investments into its suppliers would be lost since those developed capabilities 
would then be capitalised on by other buyers. This confirmed the role that value chain 
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relationships have as a mechanism of governance ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ  ‘ǁŝŶ- ǁŝŶ ’
situations that enable structured governance models to work without the threat of opportunism 
(Frederick and Gereffi, 2009). Consistent with a GVC perspective on governance, the introduction 
of standards (certification) and a risk of supplier failure that necessitates buyer support have 
strengthened the vertical aspects of the chain towards a quasi-hierarchical governance structure 
(Gereffi et al. 2005). Based on investment by PeruCacao developing ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ ĐŽmpetencies to 
meet certification, there was a strong sense of ownership over the certification itself, even though 
it is an investment in a different function to that of its own as an exporter: 
 
 “ĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĂĐŽƐƚ ?tŚŽŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƉĂǇĨŽƌƚŚĂƚĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/Ĩ/ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚ ?Ɛ
ŵǇĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Eduardo, General Manager, PeruCacao) 
 
The supply contracts that collective organisations signed were a deliberative effort by PeruCacao 
to capture suppliers because of its investments into itƐƐƵƉƉůǇďĂƐĞ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶĚƵĂƌĚŽ ’ƐƐĞŶƐĞ
ŽĨ ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŽǀĞƌ ŚŝƐ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ P “/ƚ ?Ɛ ŵǇ ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?This arrangement is 
characteristic of a quasi-hierarchical governance structure where a buyer protects itself from 
opportunistic behaviour (Gereff et al. 2005). Since entering into this relationship with PeruCacao, 
the social capital of collective organisations changed significantly. 
 
The institutional environment was the driving force for the creation of Cacao Collective in 2000 
through the incentives provided by Winrow. Despite this, membership numbers between 2000 
to2008 experienced timid growth. The exclusivity contract between Cacao Collective and 
PeruCacao in 2009, thereby the entering into a highly governed GVC rather than a market-based 
one, led to a large increase in Cacao Collective associational membership. Between 2009 and 
2011, membership rose 344% from 52 to 231 and, according to Eduardo, the output of cacao rose 
from 15 to 250 metric tonnes per annum within three years. Taking associational members as a 
ƉƌŽǆǇ ŽĨ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů ƐŽĐŝĂů ĂŶĚ ? ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ  ‘ƵŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ’ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ initially, 
increases from 2009 onwards were supported by qualitative improvements in structural social 
capital; it would suggest an association between governance and structural social capital. 
 
There was also evidence to suggest a more direct link between the GVC relationship and structural 
social capital: 
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 “WĞŽƉůĞĨƌŽŵWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ?ƚŚĞǇalso told me that unless the association was managed in a coherent 
ǁĂǇ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚƐƚŽƉǁŽƌŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƵƐ ?(Emilio, Technical Coordinator, Cacao Collective). 
 
 “WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽǁĂŶƚƐƚŽǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƐŽůǀĞĚ ?WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽŝƐŶŽƚĂ
chĂƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŽŶůǇƐŽŵĞŵƵĐŚǁĞĐĂŶĚŽ ?(Dina, Administrator, HelpCacao) 
 
The theme was also supported by the interview with Eduardo, the manager of PeruCacao, who 
recited an instance where a collective organisation had failed to improve its management capacity 
and subsequently PeruCacao ended the contract and broke off the relationship. The findings 
suggested that it was not just through upgrading that structural social capital grew, but also the 
way that PeruCacao wielded its power in the relationship preceded the formation of structural 
social capital. If suppliers did not change their internal governing structures  W or in other words 
their structural social capital, then there was the real threat that the upgrading process that 
PeruCacao invested in would come to an end. 
 
While there was the acknowledgement that trust was important to the functioning of the chain, 
there was a clear separation in the trust that was placed in Emilio than with Cacao Collective as a 
whole, as the administrator of HelpCacao stated:  “WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽƚƌusts in Emilio more than the Cacao 
ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?. Emilio confirmed this to be the case: 
 
 “/ĂŵĂƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĂƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ? ? ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?/ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽďƵŝůĚĂĚŝƌĞĐƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ
with PeruCacao, in particular with regards to the business partnership. They trust me because I 
have always fulfilled my commitments... I gained their confidence by the way I managed the funds 
ƚŚĞǇŐĂǀĞƵƐ ?(Emilio, Technical Coordinator, Cacao Collective) 
 
It was perceived by PeruCacao that the technical coordinator was implementing the correct 
procedures which had failed in the past, especially in terms of improving the financial position of 
Cacao Collective by stopping the advancement of credit to farmers until previous credit had been 
paid back. There was also evidence that the President of Bean Committee had a historically 
stronger relationship with PeruCacao than other members and Coyotl, the manager of Bean 
Committee, considered PeruCacao to be  “ĂĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůĂůůǇ ?ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐĂďƵǇĞƌŽƌĂƐĞůůĞƌ ?, 
suggesting that the relationship between the leadership was strong. Interviews with members of 
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the directive revealed that from their perspective, the contract with PeruCacao represented a 
long-term commitment based on the support that they had received: 
 
 “DĞŵďĞƌƐŵƵƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞĂĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ?ƚŚĂƚďŝŶĚƐƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽĂŶĚĂĐĂŽŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?(Dario, President, Cacao Collective) 
 
 “tĞǁŽŶ ?ƚĐŚĂŶŐĞďƵǇĞƌ ?ŶŽŶŽŶŽ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞǇĂre a great 
ŚĞůƉĂŶĚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ŝĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐǁĞǁŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚďĞŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƌŝĚŽĨƚŚĞŵ ?ǁĞ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŵŽƌĞďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ?(Emilio, Technical Coordinator, Cacao Collective) 
 
 “WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƵƐ ?tĞŶĞĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? ? ?ǁĞĂƌĞŝŶĂŶĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ?(Eva, Treasurer, Bean Committee) 
 
 “/ƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ?ŚĂƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƵƐƚŽŐƌŽǁ ?ĨƌŽŵŶŽƚŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĂƚĂůůĂƚƚŚĞ
beginning, the only one that helped us when we had no commercial ties at all... It has given us 
support for our own growth. So for us, it is a commercial ally, more than being a buyer or a 
seller... We have a solid working relationship, from both sides. They help us with the development 
ŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Coyotl, Manager, Bean Committee) 
 
Although PeruCacao provided its suppliers with support to upgrade which, from the perspective of 
the managers from Cacao Collective and Bean Committee, brought value to the relationship; 
several farmers we interviewed were unhappy with the dependency on PeruCacao as a sole buyer 
of its cacao and this had repercussions on the cognitive social capital within collective 
organisations: 
 
 “/ ?Ě ůŝŬĞ ƚŽďĞĂĚŝƌĞĐƚĞǆƉŽƌƚĞƌ  ?ŶŽƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƌǇ ?ǁĞĂƌĞƵŶŚĂƉƉǇǁĞ ũƵƐƚĂƌĞŶ ?ƚ
being told the price that PeruCacao sells for. So / ƐĂǇ ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ŶŽǁ ? WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞĂƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐŽƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƚĞůůƵƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?(Farmer, Cacao Collective) 
 
 “tĞ ĂƌĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ƉĂŝĚ ůĞƐƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƌŝĞƐ ? &ĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŚĞƌĞ ? ǁĞ ƐĞůů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
cooperative sells to the exporter and if we could sell directly, it would be better, instead of selling 
ĂŶĚƐĞůůŝŶŐƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?(Farmer Group Interview, Cacao Collective) 
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 “tĞ ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ůŽŽŬ ĨŽƌ Ă ďƵǇĞƌ ƐŽ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ƐĞůů ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ?  ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌ P ƌĞŶ ?ƚ ǇŽƵ ĚŽŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ
already?] ?zĞƐ ?ďƵƚǁĞǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ? ?[Farmer, Bean Committee] 
 
 “dŚĞ ďŝŐŐĞƐƚ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝĐĞ ? dŚĞ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ďůĂŵĞ ƚŚĞ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ƚŚĞ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ũƵƐƚ ƐĂǇ P ǁŚǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ǇŽƵ ƐĞůů ƚŽ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ǁŚǇ ĚŽ ǇŽƵ ƐƚĂǇ ǁith 
WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?(Emilio, Technical Coordinator, Cacao Collective) 
 
A buyer who makes significant investments naturally wishes to negate against other buyers from 
benefitting from those private investments and as a result, an exclusivity contract is a necessary 
component in the PeruCacao GVC to avoid opportunistic behaviour (Gereffi et al., 2005), as 
ĚƵĂƌĚŽ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ P  “/Ĩ / ŝŶǀĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ŵǇ ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?. This ultimately entails a high 
degree of dependency on the buyer and asymmetric power and information exchanges. The 
findings showed that many farmers interviewed were not content being in a captive relationship 
with an intermediary that has significant power and information advantages over it, especially 
when the subject of price arose, yet these characteristics are coherent with a quasi-hierarchical 
structure as a means for buyers to ensure that their asset specific investments are not capitalised 
on by others (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). 
 
A captured relationship had consequences for cognitive social capital. Conflict arose between 
managers who regarded the relationship with PeruCacao to be integral to the development of 
their organisations, desiring a long-term buyer-supplier relationship, and some farmers and other 
members of the directive who desired to either sell to other buyers (therefore shifting back to a 
spot-market mechanism and opting out of governance all together) or functionally upgrade and 
become a direct exporter. Clearly from the perspective of some farmers, the nature of the 
relationship with PeruCacao was one that felt subservient with a high degree of mistrust and 
ůĂĐŬŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? dŚŝƐ ŝŶƐƚŝůůĞĚ ĂŶ ĂƌĞĂ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
because there were fundamental disagreements over direction in terms of the future relationship 
with PeruCacao. 
 
Section 5.5 laid out the main features of governance in the PeruCacao GVC and the role on social 
capital formation. Table 10 summarises these main findings. 
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Organic certification represents the principal standard in the PeruCacao GVC. High 
technical and monetary barriers for Cacao Collective and Bean Committee. No 
evidence of a relationship between standards and social capital formation, 
however the strategic importance of organic certification to PeruCacao incentivises 





Risk of supplier 
failure and buyer 
support 
To negate against supplier failure, PeruCacao both invests in collective 
organisations and facilitates institutional funding through its private NGO, 
HelpCacao, to product upgrade suppliers. Social capital is an explicit part of this 
process, with a dedicaƚĞĚ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶ ’ ƚŽ “ƚĞĂĐŚ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ďĞ ŝŶ Ă
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?. 
 
Evidence that features of structural social capital (defined roles for decision making 
and more effective rules and procedures) enabled by the upgrading process. 
However despite efforts to encourage cooperation among farmers through 
workshops, no evidence that cognitive social capital generated, with cultural and 





Evidence pointed towards regular information flow and face-to-face 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ?ĂŶĚĂĐĂŽ ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĞĂŶ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ’Ɛ
leadership. When information flow not accessible to farmers, mistrust grew in 
collective organisations; however farmers who felt they were receiving sufficient 





Strong, trusting relationships between PeruCacao, and Cacao Collective and Bean 
ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ’Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌ-ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ĂŶĚ Ă  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’
situation. Relationship characteristic of a captive governance structure (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2004), reflected in exclusive supply contracts between PeruCacao and 
its suppliers. 
 
Since entering the exclusive relationship with PeruCacao, strong evidence of 
structural social capital formation. However a disconnect between attitudes of 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ’ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
relationship by management but a desire of farmers to not be in a captured 
relationship with PeruCacao. The nature of the governing relationship identified as 
a source of conflict within collective organisations 
 
 
This chapter outlined the main findings from the first case study, the PeruCacao GVC. The results 
show that while structural social capital increased within the context of a governed GVC, 
cognitive social capital did not and furthermore, showed signs for deterioration. The next 
chapter presents the main findings on the second case study  W the PalmPeru GVC. 
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This chapter presents the main findings from the second case study  W the PalmPeru GVC. Coming 
back to the research question that sets the focus of the case study: 
 
How does the governance of a Global Value Chain shape the formation of social capital among 
farmers? 
 
To review, the research question was deemed important to explore because there is: 1) a poor 
theoretical understanding of social capital formation despite an extensive account of the benefits 
that result from it (Staber, 2007); and 2) governance could be a factor on the cohesion of farmers 
(Neilson, 2008, Messner, 2004). The influence of governance is important because of its ever 
growing prominence in GVCs, especially in developing countries (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). Alongside 
cacao, palm fruit in Peru was deemed to be a well-placed product to address the research question 
because it represents an arena where there is a concerted effort to build social capital and a 
product where powerful buyers play a significant role in the GVC (UNODC, 2013, USAID, 2010). 
 
In a similar fashion to the previous chapter, the present chapter is structured in the following 
manner: Context of Global Palm Oil Sector; Background of Organisations and Participants; Findings 
on Social Capital; and The Role of governance. 
 
6.2 Context of the Global Palm Oil Sector 
 
The growth of palm oil for consumption is not a new phenomenon. For thousands of years, it was 
grown in areas of Africa and production and export was dominated by Nigeria and Zaire in the first 
half of the 20th Century. However as continents adopted the palm fruit and oil production, 
Indonesia and Malaysia overtook Africa's producing countries and overwhelmingly dominate global 
production (Poku, 2002). 
 
Palm oil is grown in tropical environments with high rainfall (Stickler et al., 2007) and consequently 
where these environments exist, palm oil is typically grown. The palm fruit has two main elements 
of value. The pulp (mesocarp) produces palm oil used in the food sector whereas the kernel which 
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produces kernel oil, very different from palm oil, is used for industrial purposes. The variety of the 
palm fruit which is used has a significant impact on its productive worth such that the traditional 
variety of the Dura has a much lower content of palm oil than its shell-less counterpart the Pisifera 
and the hybrid version of both called the Tenera (Poku, 2002). Interviews with stakeholders 
revealed that the hybrid variety, Tenera, was adopted by farmers in the present case study. 
 
There is a diverse range of products that palm oil can be transformed into (figure 11), divided 
between food and non-food products (Hai, 2002). The Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2011) note that 67% of palm oil imports for the UK market is for the purpose 
of the food sector and specifically for the production of biscuits, frying fats, snacks, confectionery 
and dairy, while another 23% goes into animal feed. The remaining 10% is for cleaning, personal 
care, cosmetics products and industrial uses. Of imported palm kernel meal, 80% is used for animal 
feed and the remaining 20% goes into electricity generation. The food and catering sector 
overwhelmingly dominates consumption of palm oil (DEFRA, 2011). In the PalmPeru GVC, the 
Peruvian manufacturer used palm oil and kernels for products ranging from domestic cooking oil 
and jarred sauces to animal feed. Global demand for edible oil has risen nine fold over the past 
four decades (Ismail, 2011). Relative to other crops, palm oil has a high value attached to it per unit 
(FAO, 2011). 
 
The milling of the contents of the palm fruit into crude palm oil and kernel oil is typically done close 
to or on the farm to prevent the rise of rapid free fatty acids that have a negative impact on the 
quality of the oil (Hai, 2002). Preservation plays a key role in the palm oil GVC. The elimination of 
enzymes, micro-organisms and water, as well as effective storage and packaging, has a 
fundamental impact on the final quality of crude palm oil (Poku, 2002). Upstream producers are 
responsible for the cultivation of palm oil and production of Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) whereas 
further downstream is the milling of FFBs to generate crude palm oil and kernel, then further 
refinement of the palm oil and crushing of the kernels (Hai, 2002). In the present study, the 
Association for Palm Fruit Producers (APFP)  W a collective group of palm fruit farmers, was 
responsible for production of FFBs and PalmPeru was responsible for the milling process. 
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Figure 11: The Global Palm Oil Value Chain 
Adapted: Wakker et al. (2005) and Geibler (2012) 
 
Refinery of exported palm oil is typically located in countries close to the export market (DEFRA, 
2011); however in the Peruvian context, refineries are located in-country and then the consumer 
products are consumed domestically or exported globally. In the PalmPeru GVC case study, the in-
country refinery downstream from PalmPeru is the largest consumer goods manufacturer in Peru 
with operations across South America. However interviews revealed that there was a spot- market 
relationship between PalmPeru and the manufacturer, with no indication that the manufacturer 
ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ that PalmPeru would begin selling to a wider 
range of refineries in the near future. 
 
During the milling process, a number of activities are carried out, including sterilising the fruit, 
breaking apart the oil cells in the pulp (mesocarp), extraction and finally clarification and storage of 
the oil. The kernels are dried and stored for transportation. The process by which the above takes 
place can vary, from very traditional means where rudimentary machinery and a higher 
degree of labour are required (Poku, 2002), to more complex methods where the process is 
streamlined and mechanized (Hai, 2002). Unlike many other edible oil plants, small-scale milling of 
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palm fruit is viable because of its high oil content (56%) (Poku, 2002). In the PalmPeru GVC, since 
WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ŵŽƌĞ ǁŝƚŚĂ ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚ milling 
method with a dedicated factory rather than rudimentary machinery. However prior to the 
creation of PalmPeru, farmers in APFP had used these basic palm oil extraction methods. 
 
For high yield production of palm oil, significant capital, technology and input investments are 
required whereas low yield farming is more associated with poorer smallholders who do not have 
the required capital to modernize plantations (Gutierrez-Velez et al., 2011). However compared to 
the rest of South America, and even leading producer countries in East Asia, Peru has a relatively 
high rate of yield for palm oil (Pacheco, 2012). It infers that, at least at the present moment, there 
is not a critical lack of capital in the capabilities of Peruvian farmers that inhibits the ability for high 
yield production at the national level, even though 60% of production in Peru is carried out by 
smallholders (Jeffreys, 2012). Based on the findings by USAID (2010), palm oil value chains in Peru 
ĂƌĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ capabilities due to the set-up 
investment provided through ADP. 
 
Palm oil production in Peru is concentrated in two regions; San Martin and Ucayali, with the latter 
being where the PalmPeru GVC is located both in terms of farming and milling. In line with global 
figures, palm oil production in these two regions has grown dramatically, with almost no 
production at all in 1970 compared to nearly 200km² in 2010 (Gutierrez-Velez et al., 2011) and an 
annual growth rate of 3.4% between 2000-2010, compared to the annual growth rate for South 
America of 2.7% over the same period (FAO, 2011). However compared to Indonesia and Malaysia, 
and even regional producers such as Columbia, Ecuador and Brazil, Peru is still a relatively small 
producer of palm oil (Pacheco, 2012). 
 
There has been a significant backlash against the palm oil industry with regard to the 
environmental impact production has in developing countries. Rapid expansion, particularly in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, has come at the expense of conserving land for forestry and green- house 
gas emissions (DEFRA, 2011) as well as soil erosion, water pollution and loss of critical habitats for 
endangered species (WWF, 2013). Although Indonesia and Malaysia have been the focus of 
environmental concerns, likely because these two countries dominate world production, the 
infringement of palm oil farming on the Peruvian Amazon does not escape similar criticisms. 
Gutierrez-Velez and colleagues (2011) note that between 2000-2010, 72% of new Peruvian palm oil 
plantations expanded into the Amazon Rainforest. 
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While there have been serious negative perceptions over the environmental impact of palm oil 
production, new sustainable initiatives have emerged as a way to counteract this. Roundtable for 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) accreditation has led to a growing uptake by importers for sustainable 
palm oil (DEFRA, 2011). RSPO certification was co-developed by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
and private firms such as Unilever and Migros, and is a requirement set by some refineries and 
manufacturers of palm oil (RSPO, 2004). RSPO represents the most comprehensive multi-
stakeholder initiative for the palm oil industry (Geibler, 2012) and has experienced growing 
adoption rates over recent years, although still only 12% of total global production is RSPO certified 
as of 2012 (RSPO, 2012). RSPO was not a certification adopted in the PalmPeru GVC, however 
interviews with stakeholders revealed that adoption was a goal of PalmPeru, supported by 
documentation shown to the researcher which showed that PalmPeru was looking to begin the 
RSPO application process. 
 
Palm oil has become a critical part of Peru's rural economic development strategy. The Peruvian 
government has placed legal and tax incentives to promote production of palm oil (Gutierrez- Velez 
et al., 2011). As with cacao, palm oil is regarded as a clear alternative to coca production (the base 
plant for cocaine) and has been the focus for institutional support by outside organisations such as 
USAID (Jeffreys, 2012), the United Nations (United Nations, 2009) and a number of NGOs working 
with the sector as a whole (Hai, 2002). While there was no indication of specific NGO involvement 
in the PalmPeru GVC, the role of the United Nations and ADP was critical at the beginning. Both 
W&W  ?ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ĂŶĚ supplier of PalmPeru) and 
PalmPeru (the miller and buyer of APFP) depended on the United Nations heavily during the 
embryonic stage of both organisations. Since then, both organisations had ceased receiving this 
institutional support due to the perception by the United Nations that the PalmPeru GVC was 
commercially sustainable which, as documentation from USAID suggested, it was. 
 
Peru has the second largest forest area suitable for oil palm plantations among Amazonian 
countries (Stickler et al., 2007). Existing producers of palm oil such as Indonesia and Malaysia are 
considered as experiencing falling production capacity because of aggressive planting practices in 
the past, leading to a strategy of replanting rather than expansion (Hai, 2002). This has opened up 
opportunities for Peru given that there is significant potential for it to grow its own palm oil 
industry (Ismail, 2011). For major producing countries such as Malaysia, the collective 
organisational structure in the palm oil industry is relatively sophisticated with representative 
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organisations throughout the chain (Hai, 2002). Within the Peruvian milieu, ADP is trying to 
collectively organise palm fruit farmers in a similar way as a mechanism to deter coca production. 
This sets a strong rationale to investigate social capital formation within the context of governance. 
 




An important element of data collection was to promise anonymity for participants as a means 
to encourage genuine contributions and insight during interviews. Therefore participants are 
provided with pseudonyms in the present chapter. Tables 11-12 presents an overview of the 
main participants and key informants involved in the data collection. Compared to the 
PeruCacao GVC, the PalmPeru GVC is vertically integrated with one mill and one palm fruit 
farmer association, which represents the governor and governed relationship (Figure 12). 
Therefore the variety of different organisations involved in the case study was limited, justifying 
a narrower analysis of the two principal organisations in the GVC  W PalmPeru and APFP. 
 
Table 11: Overview of Case Study Two main participants 
Organisation Name Role Main contribution 
PalmPeru (Mill) Diego Senior technician Governance/Social capital 
Association of Palm Fruit 
Producers (Collective 
Organisation) 
Pedro President Governance 
Maria Social Secretary Governance/Social capital 
Members 29 Farmers Social capital 
 
Table 12: Overview of Case Study Two key informants 
Organisation Name Role Main contribution 







Key informant - context 
Independent Andrea Consultant Key informant - context 
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Figure 12: The PalmPeru Global Value Chain 
 
The following sections go into the background of the main organisations and participants in the 
research. As with the previous case study chapter, key informants are not described as 
information collected from these were based on informal interviews and are not stakeholders 
within the case study. 
 
6.3.2 The Palm Oil Mill  W  ‘WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? 
 
The senior technician of PalmPeru - Diego, who had insight on both the workings of PalmPeru 
and the social capital of farmers, was available and a longer and more in-depth interview was 
conducted. Diego has been with PalmPeru since 2003, working first as a technician and then, in 
2010, taking the role of managing the technical support team of PalmPeru which consists of six 
engineers and 18 technicians. 
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PalmPeru was created through ADP in 1998 as a result of funding provided by the Government 
of Peru and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Since 2002, PalmPeru has 
acted as an enterprise independent from outside institutional control, with USAID (2010) noting 
that the company is sustainable and would only need external assistance under exceptional 
circumstances. This notion was also reiterated by Deigo:  “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƵƐ ?ďƵƚ
ƚŚĞŶǁĞŚĂĚƚŚĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ?. The mill has experienced significant growth in 
its sales of crude palm oil since creation, from $1.9 million in 2003 to over $12 million in 2013 to 
become the largest palm oil mill in Peru. It currently sells 95% of all its palm oil to a large 
Peruvian food manufacturer that exports agri-food products globally, however the relationship 
was characterized as highly transactional with no evidence of buyer interference and therefore 
was not followed up as a unit of analysis during data collection. 
 
Despite being an independent and legally separate company, a unique characteristic of 
PalmPeru is the degree of vertical integration it has with its supply base: its only supplier is APFP; 
farmer members of APFP are allowed to buy shares in PalmPeru and both organisations 
coordinate closely with one another, to the extent that their offices are located in the same 
building. This level of vertical integration is a result of WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ĂƐ Ă
dedicated milling function for APFP as conceived by ADP and the United Nations because of a 
lack of milling facilities in the Ucayali region: 
 
 “tĞĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂĨĂĐƚŽƌǇŽƌĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂƉůĂĐĞƚŽƐĞůůƚŚĞƉƌŽduction, that was 
the first barrier we had. So the United Nations made it possible to create an extractive plant 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞW&WŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƐǁŚĞŶWĂůŵWĞƌƵǁĂƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
The organisational structure of PalmPeru reflects that of a typical corporate organisation, with a 
manager, chairman and board of directors; however the notable difference is that the board 
includes representaƚŝǀĞƐ ŽĨ W&W ’Ɛ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ ǀŽƚĞ  ? ? ?A? ) ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ
majority vote (51%) held by APFP as the organisation. This sets the rather unique situation of 
farmers and executives of APFP holding different shares in PalmPeru. The level of vertical 
integration between APFP and PalmPeru creates the likelihood of explicit governance between 
the two organisations and the opportunity to explore the association with social capital 
formation. 
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The milling plant of PalmPeru has steadily grown its capacity to process palm fruit into crude 
palm oil, originally beginning with 6 TM/hr to 23 TM/hr at the time of data collection. However 
due to ever expanding areas of production coming from APFP, a second plant is currently being 
built by PalmPeru. Unlike its beginnings where the Government of Peru and the United Nations 
provided significant funding, PalmPeru as a company is now commercially independent from 
external support and has had to find its own avenues of finance to invest in this second plant. 
 
6.3.3 Palm Fruit Association  W  ‘ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWĂůŵ&ƌƵŝƚWƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ  ?W&W ) ? 
 
Two senior stakeholders from APFP were interviewed as part of the research. Pedro has been 
the President of APFP for just over a month after being elected by the members (through their 
respective delegates) and prior to this he worked as a secretary when the association was first 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ?WĞĚƌŽ ’ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƌŽůĞŝƐƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƚŚĞŶŝŶĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐŽĨW&WĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ’ƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?DĂƌŝĂŝƐƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĂŶĚŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŶƚŚŝƐrole for three years, 
although she has been working in the association for 10 years. As social secretary, Maria is the 
main contact between APFP and its farmer members. In addition to interviews with these senior 
stakeholders, individual interviews were conducted with farmers and two group interviews held 
across two different villages. 
 
Located in Pucallpa (Figure 13), APFP was created in 1993 through the support of the United 
Nations and ADP as a means to move farmers away from coca to palm fruit production. Unlike 
cacao where land, seeds and basic tools represent the main set-up costs; the fixed costs of palm 
fruit are more significant and as a result the United Nations built nurseries and installed 
plantations during the initial set-up of APFP. The structure of the association in many ways 
reflects that of a cooperative, with two year terms for positions within the directive and an 
assembly of farmer members with a one member - one vote system. There are nine different 
 ‘ĨĂƌŵĞƌĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ’ƚŚĂƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĚifferent districts where members are based, each with an 
elected delegate who votes on behalf of their respective village. 
 
Where APFP departs from a cooperative is the decision making process. While farmers are able 
to vote for members of the directive, members do not vote for significant decisions; rather the 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŽŶĐĞĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ?ŝƐĂďůĞƚŽŵĂŬĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ’ƐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?
This issue is tackled in more detail later in the chapter due to its implications for social capital. 
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All the farmers that were interviewed hired permanent farm workers, ranging from 4-10. In 
addition, farmers typically owned between 4-20 hectares of palm fruit and although some grew 
other crops, these were minor in comparison to the planting of palm fruit and used for 
consumption rather than commercial purposes: 
 
 “ƉĂƌƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƉĂůŵ ? ǁĞ ĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞ ƚĂƉŝŽĐĂ ? ƌŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ ďĂŶĂŶĂ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ĨŽƌ ƐĂůĞ
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƉƌŝĐĞ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
ADP uses palm fruit as a means to incentivise farmers away from coca production and the 
evidence in the case study suggested that this was the primary motivation for members 
interviewed in the research. Most of those interviewed had chosen to begin growing palm fruit 
because of its appeal as a legal crop with a more secure livelihood: 
 
 “tĞĚŝĚƚŚĂƚďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂlot of us cultivating coca, but we now have switched to a legal 
crop. We look to have a legal production, so we noticed some people were doing it and they were 
having results, perhaps not in large amounts but they would not worry about their livelihood like 
ǁĞĚŝĚďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “WĂůŵĨĂƌŵŝŶŐŚĂƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞǁĂǇǁĞůŝǀĞŝŶŽƵƌǀŝůůĂŐĞ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ
people grew coca. With coca farming we lived very disorganised; there was violence, lots of 
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ?/ŵĞĂŶ ?WĞŽƉůĞ who made money would squander it buying silly things. It 
ǁĂƐĂǀĞƌǇĚŝƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚǁĂǇŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
Prior to the creation of PalmPeru, the production of palm fruit in APFP was relatively 
unsophisticated. Most farmers typically either sold palm fruit to APFP which was then sold on 
the open market, or farmers used palm fruit for their own consumption; making low grade palm 
oil for cooking. However it was when the factory of PalmPeru was created that palm fruit 
became a more commercialized operation, with APFP supplying exclusively to PalmPeru and 
farmers transitioning palm fruit from self-consumption to a commercially lucrative product. 
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This section provided an overview of the main participants and their respective organisations in 
the PalmPeru GVC case study. The next section presents the main findings on social capital 
formation among farmers. 
 
 
Figure 13: Geographical location of PalmPeru and APFP 
Source: University of Colorado (2000) 
PalmPeru and APFP 
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The following section presents evidence of social capital of farmers in APFP in the PalmPeru 
GVC. As was identified in the literature, two dimensions of social capital are explored. Structural 
social capital is defined as the roles for decision making, rules, procedures and precedents that 
supports mutually beneficial collective action and cognitive social capital, defined as the norms, 
values, attitudes and beliefs that provides the propensity for cooperation and typically 
associated with trust and participation (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
Social capital is embedded in social structures that can go beyond a direct unit of analysis 
(Grootaert and Narayan, 2004) ĂŶĚWĞƌƵŚĂƐĂĚĞĞƉŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞŽĨ ‘DŝŶŐĂ ’ĨĂƌŵĞƌǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŐƌŽƵƉƐ
(Munoz et al., 2007), thereby justifying the exploration of social capital at the village level. The 
previous chapter found no relationship between social capital at the village level and 
governance; however this chapter provides evidence that may suggest a link and therefore the 
ŵĂŝŶĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĂƚƚŚĞǀŝůůĂŐĞůĞǀĞůĂƌĞĂůƐŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ? ‘DŝŶŐĂ ’ Wthe 500 year old farmer working 
groups, have more in common with structural social capital due to its connection with rules, 
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ  ‘ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ’ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ
 ‘ŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ^ŽĐŝĂůĂƉŝƚĂů ’ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů nature. 
 
6.4.2 Structural Social Capital 
 
DŽƐƚ ‘ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐĨĂƚŚĞƌ ’ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨW&WŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚ in encouraging 
them to join the association. The initial creation of APFP and the wider development of palm 
fruit in the Ucayali region was enabled by financial support provided by the United Nations, 
reflecting the role of institutional support in territorial development and social capital 
highlighted in the literature (Lee et al., 2005, Bebbington et al., 2007, Abramovay et al., 2008, 
Chase, 2010, Marquardt et al., 2011, Bosworth and Willett, 2011). Taking associational 
membership growth as a proxy for measuring structural social capital (Adhikari and Goldey, 
2010, Gotschi et al., 2009), the evidence showed that structural social capital grew for APFP after 
its initial creation. According to Pedro, the President of APFP, the association started in 1992 
with 120 farmers and by 2000, this had grown to 250 members. However by 2005, membership 
had more than doubled over a period of five years to 550 members. Figure 14 shows the 
trajectory of membership growth in APDP between 1992-2013. 
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According to Pedro, the rise in membership of APFP oĐĐƵƌƌĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶŽĨWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ
factory and with it, significant economic benefits that encouraged other farmers to join APFP: 
 
 “ ?dŚĞ ƌŝƐĞ ? ǁĂƐ ŵĂŝŶůǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞĐŽŵĞ Ă
ŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨW&W ? ?(Pedro, President, APFP) 
 
The idea that the economic benefits to members incentivised others to join the association was 
ĂůƐŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇĂŶĞǁŵĞŵďĞƌǁŚŽũŽŝŶĞĚĂĨƚĞƌW&W ’Ɛ conception: 
 
 “dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉĂůŵŐƌŽǁĞƌƐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚŚĞůƉĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhE ?tĞůů ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƵƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƚĂŬĞƉĂƌƚŽŶ
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƌŽƵŶĚ ?ƐĂǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚǇŵŽƐƚŽĨƵƐ
ũŽŝŶĞĚ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
The evidence from interviews indicated that as some farmers improved their economic position 
by joining APFP, neighbouring farmers who previously were not members were incentivised to 
join. The propensity of farmers to make similar decisions as their neighbours corresponds with 
Holloway and LaƉĂƌ ’s (2007) concept of the neighbourhood effect, also described as a correlation 
of behaviour. This phenomenon emerged in interviews whereby associational membership 
created a network effect in the local area  W in villages where interviews were conducted, nearly 
all palm fruit farmers in the local area were also members of APFP. 
 
Furthermore, APFP had managed to experience associational membership growth that was 
sustainable in that there was no evidence to show this had been built on poor monitoring 
systems in place (i.e. members joining APFP who were not palm fruit growers). For farmers to be 
ĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨW&W ?ƚŚĞǇĨŝƌƐƚŚĂĚƚŽƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌůŽĐĂůǀŝůůĂŐĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ŽƌǀŝůůĂŐĞ ‘ďĂƐĞ ’ )
as a palm fruit producer, in essence making sure that they were genuine palm fruit producers 
and were not free-riding to receive cheap fertilizers or credit.












Figure 14: Membership growth of APFP, from 1992-2013 
Source: APFP 
 
As an association, the decision making structure of APFP differs to that of a cooperative. At 
APFP, members vote for a delegate in their respective village to represent them who then vote 
for members of the directive every two years. This directive has executive powers to make 
decisions that means other than during election periods, members have limited influence on the 
decision making process. Pedro, the President of APFP, described why this model was selected: 
 
 “ƚĂĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞǁĂŶƚƐƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶ ?ǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĂƌĞŽǁŶĞƌƐĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞǁĂŶƚƐƚŽďĞŝŶ
charge. There could be big groups wanting to do things, for example something economical, and 
another group might say no that it is bad and conflicts begin. Most cooperatives are going down 
because when it gets more power, groups of people rise and want to change things to benefit 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ ŵŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐǁŚǇ ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ Ă ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?
(Pedro, President, APFP) 
 
Likewise Diego, the Senior Technician at PalmPeru, mirrored the same sentiment: 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽŽŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞŵĂŬŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? /ŶĂĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞ  ? ?Žƌ  ? ? ?
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associations there are some people leading but the power comes from the members ? ?  ?ŝĞŐŽ ?
Senior Technician, PalmPeru) 
 
Linking this with social capital, the above arguments put forward by Pedro and Diego reflect an 
argument for strong structural social capital in terms of clearly defined roles for decision making 
(Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000) ? dŚŝƐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ŝŶ ƉůĂĐĞ ƐŝŶĐĞ W&W ’Ɛ ďĞŐŝŶŶings  W it 
was the only collective organisation structure that farmers had experienced. 
 
The association had put in place individuals who were responsible for particular functions, from 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂŶĐǇƚŽƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐǀŽƚŝŶŐ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ’ŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ
had developed over recent years, contrasting with the early period after its creation where there 
were no specific functions or roles other than the senior management. The evidence suggests 
that for the particular dimension of defined roles for decision making, APFP had developed 
strong structural social capital. There was no indication in the case study of blurred 
responsibilities when it came to the decision making process. Leadership, closely associated with 
defined roles for decision making, was also an aspect that APFP sought to professionalise: 
 
 “/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞW&WƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐĂƐŬĨŽƌŝƐƚŽŚĂǀĞůĞĚĂŐƌŽƵƉďĞĨŽƌĞ ?
dŚĂƚŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶW&WƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ŝĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚĨƵůĨŝůthese you cannot 
ďĞĐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?zŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽĨƵůĨŝůƚŚŽƐĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƐƚĂŐĞƐ ? ?(Farmer, Group Interview, APFP) 
 
To become a leader of the association, individuals had to have been a successful president of a 
village committee, as one farmer noted:  “KƵƌůĞĂĚĞƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚŬŶŽǁŚŽǁƚŽůĞĂĚ ?. Interviews with 
ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ŶŽ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ W&W ’Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ǁĂƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƋƵestion. 
Leadership is an important aspect of forming social capital (Serra, 2011, Vollan, 2012, Goetz and 
Rupasingha, 2006, Krishna, 2004, Kaganzi et al., 2009) and the evidence indicated that this 
dimension of structural social capital was strong. 
 
Another dimension of structural social capital is the role of rules, procedures and precedents in 
facilitating mutually beneficial collective action (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). The findings 
suggested that, in most part, APFP had effective rules, procedures and precedents; reflecting 
high structural social capital among farmers in the association. Assembly meetings  W an 
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important arena to facilitate information sharing, learning and voting for delegates, was 
obligatory for members and for those that did not attend, a sanction was applied: 
 
 “/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ǇŽƵ ŐĞƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ǇŽƵ ĐĂŶ ĚŽ ĂƐ Ă
member. The workshops are there for you to learn more about business and your business... It 
was through the assemblies that they inform us of these. In the workshops too they teach how to 
ďĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “zŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽƉĂǇŝĨǇŽƵĚŽŶŽƚĂƚƚĞŶĚĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůǇŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?/ƚǀĂƌŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽƉĂǇ ? ?Žƌ
ĞǀĞŶ ? ? ?ƐŽůĞƐ ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶĞĂĐŚďĂƐĞ ? ?(Carlos, Chairman, Palm Oil Stakeholder Committee) 
 
 “tĞ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ǀŽƚĞ  ?ŝŶ ĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ? ? ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ƐŽůĞƐ ?(Farmer, Group 
Interview, APFP) 
 
In addition, despite suggestions that some farmers cheated by side-selling, APFP had monitoring 
mechanisms in place to tackle the issue: 
 
 “tĞŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĨĂƌŵĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƐ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŽĨĐŽurse there is always 
ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽĞƐĐĂƉĞƐƵƐ ? ?(Maria, Social Secretary, APFP) 
 
Building on this theme, APFP also had a contribution in place whereby payments to farmers 
were automatically discounted with their required contribution, thereby setting a precedent 
that normalised monetary support towards the collective goals of the association. The findings 
indicate that with respect to rules, procedures and precedents, including the role of sanctioning, 
all of which are important elements of structural social capital formation (Molinas, 1998, 
Woolcock, 1998, Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000), APFP has systems in place that reflect high 
structural social capital. 
 
Social capital is embedded in wider social structures (Grootaert and Narayan, 2004) and as a 
result, an analysis of farmers at the associational level also justifies insight at the village level 
where farmers are situated. Working farmer groups in Peru are historically entrenched in the 
culture of Peru (Munoz et al., 2007) ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ  ‘DŝŶŐĂ ’ ? ĨĂƌŵĞƌ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ĚĞĞƉ- 
 174  
rooted from the Inca period, as a form of structural social capital because it reflects elements 
such as rules, roles, procedures and precedents (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
ƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞĚĂƚĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ‘ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ĨĂƚŚĞƌƐ ’ŽĨW&WǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚ ƚŽƵnderstand the 
beginnings of the association. During the establishment of palm production and the creation of 
APFP, Minga was prevalent among farmers as a means to catalyse the initial set-up of palm fruit 
in the area. According to one member, this was because farmers at the time were unable to 
afford the extra labour required to work in the fields and therefore Minga was a means to 
overcome these constraints: 
 
 “ ?tĞ ĚŝĚ DŝŶŐĂ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĂŶǇ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ǁŚŽ ǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ǁŽƌŬ ? Žƌ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŵ
wanted to get more money that we can ĂĨĨŽƌĚ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 




This corresponds with the benefits of structural social capital in the literature, as manifest in the 
traditional practice of Minga, especially with regard to boosting productivity and incomes of 
poor farmers (Weijland, 1994, Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999, Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000, Vasilaky, 
2013, Binam et al., 2004). This period of time when members participated in Minga was 
regarded by farmers as important to both the creation of APFP and the practical establishment 
of palm fruit in the area. The role of institutional support through the United Nations was an 
enabler in this process, specifically in terms of the provision of communal food which was 
perceived as a historically and culturally integral part of Minga: 
 
 “hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĐĂŵĞ ŚĞƌĞ ďĂĐŬ ƚŚĞŶ ĂŶĚ ŚĞůƉĞĚ ƵƐ ǁŝƚŚ ĨŽŽĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƐĞŶĚ ĨŝƐŚ ?
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƌŝĐĞĂŶĚďĞĂŶƐ ? ? “zĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚďǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĨĂƌŵĞƌ ? ? ?(Farmer, 
Group Interview, APFP) 
 
 “/ŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚŝƚǁĂƐďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵůƚŽǁŽƌŬďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐĂŵĞŚĞƌĞ
ĂŶĚďƌŽƵŐŚƚĨŽŽĚĂŶĚďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
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 “tĞƵsed to do group work, Mingas, they [the United Nations] facilitated handling for food, they 
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌƵƐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “dŚŝƐŝƐŚŽǁW&WƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ?tĞĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂŶĚŚĞůƉĞĚƚŚĞŵŽƵƚǁŝƚŚŐŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ
food and drink for the farmerƐ ? ?(Maria, Social Secretary, APFP). 
 
The findings showed that communal food was critical to bringing farmers together to conduct 
Minga. The role of communal food as a cultural commodity and facilitator of structural social 
capital supports the findings in the literature on culture as a factor in social capital formation 
(Coleman, 1990, Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997, Molyneux, 2002, Nilsson et al., 2012). Interestingly, it 
appeared from interviews with farmers that the United Nations had capitalised on the notion of 
food as a facilitator of structural social capital, manifest as Minga; pointing towards the role of 
institutional support in social capital (Khwaja, 2009, Grootaert and Narayan, 2004, Janssens, 
2010, Vasilaky, 2013). The present case study indicates that when institutional support and 
culture are combined in a way where the former maximises the social value of the latter, it can 
be a powerful enabler of social capital formation. 
 
According to Maria, APFP had continued to provide food to members as a means to bring them 
together to practise Minga. However interviews revealed that Minga as a practice had 
diminished in the villages of the members interviewed in recent years, despite it playing an 
important role when APFP was first created. The principal reason for this was that farmers no 
longer had the resource constraints evident when APFP had initially been created and farmers 
had since employed labour to work on the farms: 
 
 “ǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ŚĂƐ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? dŚĞ ŽǁŶĞƌ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚ ŽǁŶĞƌƐ are not involved in 
DŝŶŐĂ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “ ?tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞDŝŶŐĂ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŶŽǁƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂůŽƚŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ
less. ? ?&ĂƌŵĞƌ ? APFP) 
 
"Minga is not done now, but everyone looks after their own farm now and that does not allow 
every member to have an optimum cultivation in their farms. ? ?&ĂƌŵĞƌ ? APFP) 
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 “EŽ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝƐĞDŝŶŐĂ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇŝƐŶŽǁŵƵĐŚďĞƚƚĞƌŽĨĨ ?dŚĞŝƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚĂƚƵƐ
has changed. Everybody has got their own tools. The majority [of farmers] have their own 
ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĚŽDŝŶŐĂĂƐǁĞƵƐĞĚƚŽ ?tĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝƐĞDŝŶŐĂŝŶƚŚĞŐŽŽĚ
ŽůĚƚŝŵĞƐ ?ǁĞƵƐĞĚƚŽŚĞůƉĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
  “tĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĚŽDŝŶŐĂďĞĨŽƌĞ ?tĞ ?ŶŽǁ ?ŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇĨĂƌŵĞƌŚĂƐ
become independeŶƚ ? ?(Farmer, Group Interview, APFP) 
 
 “tĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĚŽ DŝŶŐĂ Ă ůŽŶŐ ƚŝŵĞ ĂŐŽ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ŶŽǁ ? ? ^ŝŶĐĞ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ŽƵƌ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ŚŝƌĞ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? tĞ ĂƌĞ ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ ŶŽǁ ĂŶĚ ǁĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ĚŽ DŝŶŐĂ ? ?
(Farmer, Group Interview, APFP) 
 
 “ǀĞƌǇƐŝŶŐůĞƉĞƌƐŽŶŚĂƐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƚŽŽůƐ ?ĞĨŽƌĞǁĞŵŝŶŐůĞĚ ?ďƵƚŶŽǁǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĞĂĐŚ
ŚĂǀĞŽƵƌŽǁŶŵŽŶĞǇ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
As already noted, Minga was primarily used by farmers when APFP was first created because 
farmers had resource constraints that meant they were unable to pay for waged labour, 
therefore they were more dependent on the efficiency savings that Minga provided. However as 
ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂĨƚĞƌWĂůŵWĞƌƵǁĂƐcreated and linked with 
APFP, farmers were less dependent on Minga to be economically sustainable. There was also a 
sense from interviews that Minga was now regarded as something that low class farmers 
practised, as one of the quotes reflects:  “tĞ ĂƌĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ŶŽǁ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ ?. This was 
despite farmers stating that they would benefit if Minga was still practised because, although 
they had hired labour, the owners themselves still worked on the farm. Interestingly it 
transpired from one interview that although most farmers had stopped practising Minga, hired 
labour had adopted the practise such that a group of workers working in one field would help 
another group of workers in another, followed by reciprocation at a later time. 
 
The evidence suggested that even though there were still perceived benefits to farmers in 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝƐŝŶŐDŝŶŐĂ ?ďŽƚŚĨƌŽŵĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ĂŶĚW&W ’ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂďƌŽĂĚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ
interviewees that Minga was less culturally acceptable due to rising economic status of farmers. 
This was in spite of APFP trying to encourage members to practise Minga by providing food and 
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drink to the individual village committees. It is well understood in the literature that culture and 
historical embeddedness is a factor in social capital formation (Lyon, 2000, El-Said and Harrigan, 
2009, Maclean, 2010, Woolcock, 1998, Coleman, 1990). In the present case study, the 
association between culture and structural social capital changed dramatically over a relatively 
short period of time  W with members noting that these 500-year working groups drastically 
faded when PalmPeru was created in 1998 as farmers moved from self-consumption to being 
more  “ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂů ?and  “ůĞĂĚĞƌ-ůŝŬĞ ?. There is a lack of research on the impact of market 
forces on social capital in the development literature (Kaganzi et al., 2009) and the present case 
study implies that the modernization of farmers was detrimental to the culture that previously 
sustained traditional forms of structural social capital. 
 
As noted, traditional structures of social capital such as Minga had deteriorated over recent 
years. However what had emerged were new, modern forms of structural social capital; APFP 
football tournaments among palm fruit farmers of different village committees. These had the 
effect of building social relationships not just within villages but also between villages, thereby 
extending structural social capital across farmers from different locations. One farmer noted the 
benefit of linking with other palm fruit farmers from different villages, enabled by these sports 
tournaments: 
 
 “tĞ ůĞĂƌŶ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŵŵŝttee, work is different, climate, soils are different. 
WƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂůƐŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ? ?ŝƚŝƐĂƵƐĞĨƵůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐ  ? ? ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽŵŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞŵ. ?
(Farmer, APFP) 
 
The facilitation of these tournaments are discussed under the section addressing governance. 
However as several farmers noted, these tournaments were valuable in creating linkages 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĂĐƌŽƐƐǀŝůůĂŐĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ďƌŝĚŐŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ’ ŝŶƚŚĂƚƐŽĐŝĂů
capital was not just built between similar farmers, but also farmers from different locations who 
would not otherwise have such a degree of interaction (Gittell and Vidal, 1998). There was also 
insight which showed how strong social capital at the village level (as opposed to inter-village 
level) enabled the sharing of practices: 
 
 “^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ƐŽŵĞ ƉůĂŐƵĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞƐ ƐŚŽǁ ƵƉ ? Kƌ ĂůƐŽŚŽǁ ĐĂŶ ǁĞ ĨŝŐŚƚ ǁĞĞĚ ĂŶĚ
maintenance, sometimes we have to use herbicides. Experience is also important, how they have 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚŝƚ ?ƚŚŝŶŐƐǁĞƐŚĂƌĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇŚĞƌĞ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
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Evidence from interviews also suggested that this manifestation of structural social capital had 
led to farmers learning new behaviours and production techniques, reflecting the literature on 
the innovative effect of social capital (van Rijn et al., 2012) and especially in terms of its impact 
on the sharing of agricultural practises (Binam et al., 2004). 
 
In summary, the main findings show that structural social capital was successfully formed 
among farmers in APFP. Table 13 summarises the findings. The next section presents the main 
findings for cognitive social capital among farmers in the PalmPeru GVC. 
 







Membership of APFP has grown significantly and at an accelerated pace 
since its creation. Between 1992 and 2000, associational membership grew 
from 120 to 250, but from 2000 to 2013, membership rose to 665. While 
Serra (2011) argues that associational membership alone is insufficient as a 
proxy for social capital, the qualitative evidence supported the findings for 
associational membership. 
Defined roles for 
leadership 
Clearly defined roles for leadership exhibited. Directive has executive power 
to make decisions once elected, differing from a cooperative model. 
Responsibility for different functions of the association delegated to 
individuals and no evidence of blurred responsibilities when it came to 




Rules, procedures and precedents congruent with high structural social 
capital. Members sanctioned when breaking rules and monitoring 
mechanisms in place. Contributions automatically discounted from farmers 
when selling their palm fruit such that contributing was now  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚ ’ ?
 
While procedures and precedents were strong at the organisational level, 
 ‘DŝŶŐĂ ’ĂƚƚŚĞǀŝůůĂŐĞlevel had diminished despite its strong presence during 
ƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨW&W ’ƐĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐǁĂŐĞƐůĂďŽƵƌĂŶĚ
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regarding themselves as too  “ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐŝĞ ?to partake anymore. However 
cross-village football tournaments among members of APFP facilitated 
cooperation and information sharing among farmers from different villages 
and backgrounds, enabling new behaviours and production techniques, 
suggesting that traditional forms of structural social capital had been 
replaced by new, modern forms. 
 
6.4.3 Cognitive Social Capital 
 
Cognitive social capital is defined as the norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that incline 
individuals to cooperate with one another (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). Unlike structural 
social capital that can be measured through observable processes and quantified through 
associational membership, cognitive social capital is associated with intangible dimensions such 
as trust and participation (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Reyes and Lensink, 2011, Botelho, 2013). This 
section presents the main findings on social capital in the research. While there was strong 
evidence of a rise in structural social capital at the organisational level, the evidence on cognitive 
social capital was more mixed and in some cases contradictory, with indications that the vertical 
decision making process in APFP alienated some farmers. Yet there was also evidence of a strong 
sense of duty and commitment by farmers to the association. 
 
From the evidence on structural social capital, it was clear that APFP had processes in place that 
provided defined roles for decision making through the system of delegates and an executive 
directive. However while this aspect of structural social capital was strong, this corresponded 
with a barrier to cognitive social capital formation. There was a perception from some 
interviewees in the association that they were not receiving information effectively in this 
vertical structure and a perceived lack of independent decision making: 
 
 “/ĂŵŶŽƚŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝĨ/ǁĂƐŶĂŵĞĚĂƐĨŝƌƐƚĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞ ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?
or vice president and if we had a position then we would have vertical information. But we 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
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 “&ŽƌĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝth the directive sometimes not everybody is happy with it. In that case, 
ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚĨĞĞůĂƐ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ? ?(Maria, Social Secretary, APFP) 
 
The first quote reflected a sentiment among some farmers interviewed that information was not 
disseminating down from the executive level of APFP to its membership base due to separation 
of roles in the association. In addition, Maria noted that some farmers had felt that the decision 
making process within the organisation restricted the freedom of members to make their own 
decisions because of the stringent rules and regulations imposed on members. The findings in 
the case study indicate that there could be a conflict between rising structural social capital and 
cognitive social capital. While rules and roles for decision making were strong, farmers perceived 
a fall in participation. Continuing with this theme, there was also evidence from interviews that 
indicated the membership growth and continued  ‘ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ’of the association had a 
negative relationship with the unity of the association: 
 
 “ĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŐƌŽǁŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀe lost effort as an 
organisation to keep ourselves united. ? ?&ĂƌŵĞƌ ? APFP) 
 
This contrasted with perceived participation in the association when it was first created: 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĂŶǇ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ĂŶ
organiƐĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵŚĞƌĞ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚŐŝǀĞƚŚĞŝƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŵŽǀĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ?(Farmer, 
APFP) 
 
Interviews with farmers suggested a change in ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ’participation over time. During the 
initial creation of APFP, norms and values reflected a high degree of collaboration, pointing 
towards high cognitive social capital. However according to farmers this had stunted as APFP 
grew and developed into a more professional organisation. As with findings on more defined 
decision making functions, the evidence indicates that as structural social capital grew, some 
farmers perceived that a sense of unity had been lost within the association, reflecting a fall in 
cognitive social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
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One aspect that emerged was how younger members were less inclined to participate in the 
decision making process because they were more interested in moving away from farming to 
opportunities elsewhere. Indeed farmers that were interviewed commonly stated that a benefit 
of being with APFP was they now had the income to provide for a better education for their 
children. Diego laid out the principal problem: 
 
 “dŚĞǇŽƵŶŐĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁĂŶƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ ?dŚĞŝƌ interests are different. Because of the rising 
economy, they [younger members] are leaving to go to the capital, in pursuit of an education and 
ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĐŽŵŝŶŐďĂĐŬ ? ? ?ŶŽďŽĚǇǁĂŶƚƐƚŽďĞĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀ  ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽƐƚĂǇŚĞƌĞ ?
dŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĞŶŽƵŐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?dŚĞǇĐĂŶŵĂŬĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐďƵƚ 
not everyone is participating towards making that decision. In a directive everyone should have 
ĂŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƐĂǇǁŚĞŶĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐŽŶƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?(Diego, Senior Technician, PalmPeru) 
 
This dynamic of farmers improving their economic position and, as a result, younger members 
looking for other opportunities suggests that when it came to social capital, APFP was a victim of 
its own success. APFP had grown into a successful collective organisation - indeed as UNODC 
documentation highlights, APFP registers the highest income per capita than any other 
sponsored collective organisation involved in ADP, including within the palm fruit sector. 
However as economic opportunities grew, the propensity to stay close to the association fell 
which reduced participation  W an indicator of cognitive social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997, 
Reyes and Lensink, 2011, Botelho, 2013). Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan (2007) and Miguel et 
al. (2006) hypothesise that rural-urban migration negatively impacts on social capital in rural 
areas because previous relationships weaken and evidence from the present case study suggests 
a similar situation. 
 
Despite the finding that cognitive social capital had not developed as strongly over time as 
structural social capital, there was evidence that ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’behaviour and attitudes were geared 
towards a sense of commitment to APFP. In particular, farmers presented a commitment to 
contributing to the association: 
 
 “/ĨƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚƚĞůůƵƐƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞŵŽƌĞ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚĚŽŝƚ ? ?(Farmer, Group Interview A, APFP) 
 
 “tĞĂƌĞŶŽƚĚĞƚĞƌƌĞĚ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞ ? ?ŝƚŝƐũƵƐƚĂĚƵƚǇǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽĚŽ ? ?(Farmer, Group Interview A, 
APFP) 
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 “dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐǁĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽŐƌŽǁ ?tĞďĞŐĂŶǁŝƚŚ ?
hectares, so we have been creating funds through savings from the payment [contributions] in 
ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ďƵǇ ŵŽƌĞ ƐĞĞĚ ĂŶĚ ŬĞĞƉƐ ƉůĂŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ? ƚŚŝƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĚŽŶĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “dŚŝƐĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĨŽƌW&W ?^ŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐŚĞůƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐĂƌĞ
paid with that money and other expenses. When plants have a disease, they can kill it with that 
money, along with social benefits for disease. That contribution is important, because diseases 
ĂƌĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚŵŽŶĞǇ ? ?(Farmer, Group Interview, APFP) 
 
When questioned on the topic of contributions, farmers exhibited a committed attitude. Some 
of those interviewed felt obligated to contribute to the organiƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐŝƚĂƐĂ ‘ĚƵƚǇ ’ĂŶĚ
were even accepting that they may need to contribute more if the association was to grow. In 
addition, farmers appeared to understand not just that they were obligated to contribute but 
why contributing was important, as the last farmer noted:  “dŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ŵŽŶĞǇ ?. The benefits of contributing were highly 
regarded by farmers, especially with respect to the medical services provided: 
 
 “tĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚďǇďĞŝŶŐƵŶŝƚĞĚ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐŵŽƌĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?(Group 
Interview, APFP) 
 
 “dŚĞǇĂůƐŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƌĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƐŝĐŬ ?ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽǀĞƌŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞƐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “tĞĚŽŚĂǀĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƵƐĞĨƵů ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŚĞŶǁĞŚĂǀĞŚĞĂůƚŚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ƚŚĞǇŐŝǀĞƵƐĂ
ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĂůŽĂŶŽƌĂĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇƚƌǇƚŽƐŽůǀĞŽƵƌƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “ŐƌĂƌŝĂŶ ŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ? ĐŽƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ƚĂŬĞŶ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂƐƐƵƌĞŚĞĂůƚŚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐanisation and 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽŶĞĂŶĚĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶĂůůǀŝůůĂŐĞƐ ? ?(Carlos, Chairman, Palm Oil 
Stakeholder Committee) 
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In addition, there was a wider sense that being part of an association meant that farmers were 
no longer on their own which justified the contribution and the benefits that arose: 
 
 “ĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƚŽĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞďĞƐƚǇŽƵĐĂŶŚĂǀĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽŶĞĐĂŶůĞĂƌŶĂůŽƚ ?ŝƚŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐďǇŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?(Group Interview, APFP) 
 
Farmers interviewed were accepting of the contribution system and understood the collective 
value of it. Many farmers interviewed felt that having the association provided a support 
mechanism which meant they were no longer  “ďǇŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ?. When asked whether they would 
consider leaving the organisation, there was no desire to do so, arguing that an extreme event 
would have to happen such as the association going bankrupt. These perceptions are indicative 
of high social capital in that a desire to contribute reflects attitudes and behaviour that 
facilitates collective benefits (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
Moving from the organisational level to the village level, interview data supported a notion of 
high cognitive social capital. While farmers had lost traditional forms of structural social capital 
as manifest in the diminished role of Minga, social relationships between farmers were strong 
and one reason for this was the prevalence of APFP members in villages: 
 
 “ǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ŝŶŵǇǀŝůůĂŐĞ ŝƐ ůŝŬĞŽŶĞďŝŐĨĂŵŝly and with other people outside yes because we all 
ŐƌŽǁŶĞĂƌůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞĂůůŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “tĞĂůůŬŶŽǁĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?tĞĂƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŽĨW&W ? ?/ŬŶŽǁŚŝŵ ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?/ůĞŶĚŚŝŵĂŶĚ
ƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌĚĂǇŚĞǁŝůůŚĞůƉŵĞ ? ?(Group Interview, APFP) 
 
Members join APFP not individually but through their respective palm fruit village committees, 
meaning that where there is a village committee there is also a concentration of APFP members 
within that village. Indeed due to the place of APFP as the dominant palm fruit association in the 
region, members noted that other palm fruit farmers in their villages were either members of 
APFP or not members of a collective organisation at all. Insight from interviews indicated that 
this prevalence of APFP members within palm fruit producing villages had the effect of building 
relationships at the village level because farmers become more familiar with each other. It is 
already well noted in the literature on the role of repeated interactions on social capital 
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formation (Lyon, 2000, Ostrom, 2000). The present case study suggests that cognitive social 
capital, reflected in the notion of members being  “ůŝŬĞ ŽŶĞ ďŝŐ ĨĂŵŝůǇ ?, was enabled by the 
strong presence of APFP at the village level because palm fruit farmers had existing relationships 
at the organisational level. 
 
Looking at the relationship with culture, the interviews showed that this was a likely factor in 
social capital formation. Despite coming from a region that was located in the Amazonian, one 
ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐƚŝůůŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĚĞƐĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ƵŶŝĨŝĞĚ ’ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ
with the literature on the prominence of Andean farmer cooperation in Peru (Maclean, 2010): 
 
 “&ĂƌŵĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŽƌŬŵŽƌĞ ? ? ?dŚĞǇĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŵŽƌĞƵŶŝĨŝĞĚ ?(Farmer, 
APFP) 
 
 “dŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ǀĞƌǇ ŶŽƚŝĐĞĂďůĞ ? dŚĞ ŽŶĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞũƵŶŐůĞ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƐƚƐ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ŝŶ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŶĞƐ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ũƵŶŐůĞ ? ĨƌŽŵ^ĂŶDĂƌƚŝŶ  ?ŶĚĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ?
From the Andes super, super farmers, very good because they always are strivŝŶŐĨŽƌŵŽƌĞ ? ?
(Maria, Social Secretary, APFP) 
 
Culture is widely understood to be a factor in social capital formation (Coleman, 1990, 
Akwabi- Ameyaw, 1997, Molyneux, 2002, Nilsson et al., 2012). Interviews with farmers 
indicated that there was a perceived cultural difference between those farmers from the 
Andes and those from the Amazonian region, which translates into a different attitude and 
behaviour towards cooperation that relates back to cognitive social capital. 
 
While the evidence on cognitive social capital was more mixed than that of structural social 
capital, there was compelling evidence to suggest that some aspects of social capital had 
formed through a strong sense of commitment and duty among farmers. Table 14 summarises 
the main findings on cognitive social capital. 
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The  “ƵŶŝƚǇ ?values of APFP had perceived to have diminished over time. At the 
beginning, norms and values reflected a high degree of collaboration but at the 
present, farmers felt that this unity had since been lost as APFP developed into a 
more professional organisation. Despite this, farmers still committed to APFP, 
especially in terms of an appreciation of collective action values and an 
understanding of the resulting mutual benefits. At the village level, norms and 
valued congruent with high social capital. Due to the concentration of APFP 





Positive attitude towards contributions and commitment to the association. No 
evidence of contrasting attitudes or beliefs among farmers or with management. 
Sentiment of loyalty to APFP and general agreement over direction. However 
indication that younger farmers less likely to participate due to changing attitudes 
towards economic opportunities outside of farming. At the village level, evidence of 
a cooperation and repeated interactions among farmers. 
 
 




The previous sections laid out the qualitative evidence concerning social capital. This section 
presents the findings on governance. Governance is defined as the idea that buyers have 
authority and power relationships that shape the participation of suppliers in the chain (Gereffi, 
1994, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). While social capital is understood to be a horizontal 
concept (Putnam, 1995) in that it is concerned with the relationships among farmers, 
governance is very much a vertical concept such that rather than the relationship among 
farmers, it is concerned with the relationship that farmers have with buyers (Bolwig et al., 2010). 
Based on the literature review, the findings on governance are structured around the following 
dimensions: Standards; Risk of Supplier Failure and Buyer Support; Information Flow and 




Evidence from the present case study showed that the principal standard PalmPeru required 
APFP to meet were specifications on appearance ĂŶĚ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ǁŚĂƚ ? ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ
standard setting (Reardon and Farina, 2002). Farmers noted that the quality element was 
especially important when delivering products to APFP: 
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 “tĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ŐŽŽĚ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ,ĂƌǀĞƐƚ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ŵĂƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĨƌĞƐŚ ? ?
(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉůĂŶƚ ? ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŚĂƌǀĞƐƚ ? ƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞĂ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƌŝƉĞŶŝŶŐ
ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
Meeting these standards was important to farmers because PalmPeru disregarded palm fruit 
that was not of the required standard. The nature of palm fruit means that if the fruit is not ripe, 
then it will not release sufficient crude palm oil; however if it becomes too ripe then a rise of 
rapid free fatty acids has a significant negative impact on the quality and quantity of the oil (Hai, 
2002). This was reflected in the standards set by PalmPeru as well as the quality control 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ƉƵƚ ŝŶ ƉůĂĐĞ ? ƚ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ ? Ă ƋƵĂůŝƚǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞƌ ǁŽƵůĚ ĐŚĞĐŬ ƚŚĞ ƉĂůŵ ĨƌƵŝƚ
that farmers brought to sell and if the product did not meet the condition specification then 
PalmPeru would not ďƵǇĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƉĂůŵĨƌƵŝƚ ?KŶĞĨĂƌŵĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞ process: 
 
 “tŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ  ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? ĂƐŬ ĨŽƌ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƉŝĐŬĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŝŵĞ ? ƌŝƉĞ ?there must 
always be a release from the head of the palm, there must always be a release of 4 to 5 seed, so 
ŝƚ ŝƐƵƐĞĨƵů ĨŽƌŽŝů ? ? ? /ĨŶŽƚ ? ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ?dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂ ĨƌƵŝƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞƌǁŚŝůĞĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞǇ
select it and whatever ripe goes through and the rest is put aside [rejected] ? ?&ĂƌŵĞƌ ? APFP) 
 
These quality standards were integral to the effective functioning of the chain because the 
ŽƉƚŝŵƵŵĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŝĐŬĞĚƉĂůŵĨƌƵŝƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĞĐƌƵĚĞƉĂůŵŽŝů
extracted from the fruit  W in essence driving quality of the palm fruit to increase the quantity of 
crude palm oil. As noted in the literature, buyers place parameters (i.e. standards) on farmers 
that shape how they participate in the GVC (Gereffi, 1994, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004) and in 
the present case, farmers were obligated to meet these parameters if they were to sell their 
product to PalmPeru (as members of APFP, they were obligated to do so). 
 
Very much linked with ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ǁĂƐ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĚƌŝǀĞ ƚŚĞ “ŚŽǁ ŵƵĐŚ ?
aspect of farmers participation; also an aspect of standard setting within the governance 
framework (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). At the time of the data collection, PalmPeru was 
building a second factory to increase palm oil production and there was evidence to suggest that 
PalmPeru was driving for higher yields and the instalment of new acres in its supply base (a topic 
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discussed further in the next section). While there was no set quantity that individual members 
or APFP were obligated to produce for PalmPeru, it was implicit from interviews that there was a 
significant desire for more production from its factory expansion, investments in new seedling 
nurseries and Carlos noted that PalmPeru were  “ĂůǁĂǇƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŽŐƌŽǁ ?ďĞ ďŝŐŐĞƌ ?. 
 
Findings from the case study point towards a rationale for governance over the GVC, especially if 
farmers are unable to meet these requirements without external support (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
Indeed there is a large technical difference between unsophisticated and sophisticated palm oil 
production (Poku, 2002, Hai, 2002) and it was clear from interviews that both APFP and 
PalmPeru were driving for the latter:  “tĞĂƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵŵŽƌĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵŝŶĚĞĚ ?, as 
Diego noted. For the chain to function in a way that PalmPeru desired, in terms of the condition 
of palm fruit prior to the milling process and a broader desire to increase production, a certain 
degree of intervention would be needed if APFP was to go beyond its unsophisticated 
beginnings, from farmers previously producing for self-consumption towards what could be 
regarded as more commercially competitive supply base. 
 
There was no evidence to suggest that standards had a direct relationship with social capital 
formation. However PalmPeru demanded a particular supplier competency to ensure that they 
as a business could grow and become more competitive, thereby setting a rationale for 
governing its supply base which reflects the governance model in the GVC literature (Gereffi et 
al. 2005, Humphrey and Schmitz 2004). 
 
6.5.3 Risk of Supplier Failure and Buyer Support 
 
The previous section outlined the role of standards in the PalmPeru GVC. The next step in the 
governance framework is to understand the risk of suppliers failing to meet these standards and 
consequently, the extent to which buyers must support suppliers so that the supply base has the 
competencies to effectively function in the GVC (Gereffi et al. 2005). This buyer support is often 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ’ŝŶƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞǁĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽ
access lucrative markets (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). It is widely understood in the literature 
that governance facilitates upgrading (Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, 
Wiegratz et al., 2007)  W in large part because the fortunes of buyers and suppliers are 
intertwined which incentivises buyer support. This section presents the findings on the extent 
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that members of APFP were able to meet standards set by PalmPeru and the support PalmPeru 
provided for APFP to upgrade. 
 
As already described, farmers were perceived to be unsophisticated in terms of palm production 
prior to the integration between APFP and PalmPeru  W  “ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞƐ ?, as one farmer put it. This 
notion was supported by Carlos (Chairman of Palm Oil Stakeholder Committee) who noted that 
farmers in APFP would typically use ineffective fertilizer inputs and had limited technical 
knowledge of palm fruit production prior to integration. Before APFP became part of the 
PalmPeru GVC, the association sold to intermediary traders with little formal coordination 
between them, pointing towards a spot market-based structure that lacked a governance 
mechanism (Gereffi et al. 2005). However when PalmPeru was created and APFP integrated into 
the GVC, greater support was provided to farmers: 
 
 “tŚĞŶWĂůŵWĞƌƵƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ?ǁĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇďŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĞĨƌƵŝƚďƵƚĂůƐŽŐĂǀĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ
ƉůĂŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?(Pedro, Senior Technician, PalmPeru) 
 
PalmPeru instructed farmers on the type of fertilizer to be used as this was, in the eyes of Diego, 
the most effective means to maximise yield. One of the perceived benefits of being in the 
PalmPeru GVC according to a number of farmers was that PalmPeru subsidized fertilization 
inputs, ensuring that farmers used the type which was deemed by the technical team as the 
most effective. Indeed the data provided by the United Nations showed that fruit yields for APFP 
farmers had risen significantly since integrating with APFP, suggesting that the tight control over 
process may have been a contributing factor. Farmers were taught how to apply the fertilizer by 
PalmPeru technicians coming directly to the field: 
 
 “dŚĞǇ  ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? ŐŝǀĞ ƚŚĞŵ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĂŝĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŵ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ĨĞƌƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?(Pedro, President, 
APFP) 
 
 “tĞŚĂǀĞĂ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ŝƐ ŝŶŽƵƌĨĂƌŵ ?ĂŶĚǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĚŽĂ ƚǇƉĞŽĨ
ĨĞƌƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞǇ ƚĞĂĐŚ ƵƐ ? ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ƉĂůŵ ǁĞůů ? ǁĞ have to listen to their 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞŶŽƌŵĂůůǇǁŽƌŬ ?ŚŽǁĐĂŶ/ƐĂǇ ?>ŝŬĞƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “ŐƌŽŶŽŵŝƐƚĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚƚƌĂŝŶƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŐŝǀĞƚĂůŬƐ ?(Farmer, APFP) 
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The evidence showed that there was governance over the chain that went far beyond a spot- 
market structure since PalmPeru had control over the type of fertilizer that members of APFP 
used, thereby demonstrating a high degree of coordination in the chain (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2004). Furthermore the knowledge required to effectively apply fertilizers and the notion that, 
ƉƌŝŽƌ ƚŽ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŚĂĚ Ă “ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ ?understanding of production 
techniques, indicated that there was a need for intervention if APFP was to meet the necessary 
requirements (Gereffi et al., 2001). While the United Nations were heavily involved during the 
set-up stage of APFP, there was no further institutional support provided because: a) it was 
deemed by the UNODC that the PalmPeru GVC was sustainable and therefore should not be 
buoyed by ADP; and b) Maria stated that local government support was unreliable due to the 
politicization of such support and its cyclical nature based on election years. This independence 
that APFP now experienced meant that its success, as well as the PalmPeru GVC more broadly, 
ƌĞůŝĞĚŽŶWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ support. 
 
In addition to training and subsidization of fertilizer inputs, PalmPeru also closely analysed and 
ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĞĚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ĐƌŽƉƐ ?Pedro noted that PalmPeru provided technical workers who go and 
visit farmers on the field, which was backed up by Diego who described the process: 
 
 “tĞŚĂǀĞƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐǀŝƐŝƚƐƚŽƚŚĞƉůĂŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĚŽŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƐŚĞůƉƐƵƐdo an evaluation on 
the farmer. This brings up matters of nutrition and fertilization. This effects the evaluation of the 
quality of the crops. We can then show the farmers how they have done with growing the crops 
and if anything has to be changed, what is wrong and what is should be like. The sanitary 
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŽŶĐĞĂŵŽŶƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨĂƌŵĞƌŝƐĞǀĞƌǇ ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ? ?(Diego, Senior 
Technician, PalmPeru) 
 
dŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂůƐŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚWĂůŵWĞƌƵĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƐŽil and 
tightly controlled inputs in a way where the entire production process was overseen: 
 
 “dŚĞǇĂŶĂůǇƐĞĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞǇƚĞůůǇŽƵǁŚĂƚƚŽƵƐĞďƵƚƚŚĞǇĂůƐŽďƵǇŝƚĨŽƌǇŽƵ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
dŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚWĂůŵWĞƌƵĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƐŚĂƉĞĚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?EŽƚŽŶůǇĚŝĚƚŚĞ
buyer provide training and subsidize fertilization, but PalmPeru also monitored and controlled 
the process by which farmers produced palm fruit. Indeed the notion of a buyer conducting 
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inspections, evaluating farmers and providing feedback points towards a very high level of 
control over a supplier. This level of control is indicative of a buyer who is concerned about the 
risk of supplier failure and reflects a high degree of governance over the chain (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011, Gereffi et al., 2005). 
 
As noted, the findings strongly indicated that the production process at APFP was controlled and 
monitored by PalmPeru. Further establishing the notion that governance was key to the 
WĂůŵWĞƌƵ 's ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŚŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ W&W ’Ɛ 
capabilities. In particular, the broader aim to increase production as reflected in the construction 
of a second palm oil mill led to investment in subsidizing new palm oil nurseries and expanding 
crops of APFP members: 
 
 “dŚĞǇ ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ĂůƐŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶƚŚe installation of new saplings. So a sapling may cost 10 soles, 
ƐŽWĂůŵWĞƌƵƉĂǇƐƐŝǆƐŽůĞƐŽĨŝƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂƌŵĞƌŽŶůǇƉƵƚƐŝŶĨŽƵƌ ?(Pedro, President, APFP) 
 
 “ŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶWĂůŵWĞƌƵĂŶĚW&WŝƐĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚĐĂůůĞĚE^ ?E^ŝƐ
in charge of building palm seedlings nurseries so that we as farmers and members of the APFP 
ĐĂŶĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚĨĂƌŵŝŶŐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĂƐ ? ?(Farmer H, APFP) 
 
 “dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?dŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐĨŽƌƉĂůŵŽŝů ? ?(Maria, Social Secretary, APFP) 
 
Interviews with farmers also demonstrated how important increasing quantity of palm fruit was 
considered by themselves, with many stating that a key benefit of being in partnership with 
PalmPeru was that their support enabled them to expand areas to grow palm fruit. This linked in 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌďƌŽĂĚĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŝŵŽĨWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? “ĂůǁĂǇƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŽŐƌŽǁĂŶĚďĞďŝŐŐĞƌ ?, as Carlos 
put it. What the evidence showed was that PalmPeru was actively seeking to process upgrade 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002) - in that much of their support for APFP could be linked with the 
development of capabilities associated with the process of palm fruit production with the end 
goal of increasing crude palm oil output, whether that be through improving the quality of the 
palm fruit (thereby maximising extraction) or incentivizing the plantation of more palm fruit 
crops. Given the strong indications of governance over the chain, the case study corresponds 
with the literature on the link between governance and the propensity to upgrade suppliers 
(Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007). 
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Further to process upgrading, the interviews also revealed a different type of upgrading whereby 
members of APFP were taught how to manage their own finances and become more 
entrepreneurial. A weakness identified by PalmPeru, as stated by Diego, was that some 
members of APFP would not be able to manage their own finances because although incomes 
had grown; farmers would have large unpaid debts to financial institutions. Instead of saving or 
investing incomes back into their field, some farmers purchased luxury items that they could not 
pay back. It was suggested by Carlos that this was a consequence of a  “ĐŽĐĂŵŝŶĚƐĞƚ ?, meaning 
that farmers had previously been embedded in a mentality of low investment, poor financial 
management and a lack of entrepreneurialism. To remedy what both Diego and a number of 
stakeholders at APFP considered as a risk of supplier failure, PalmPeru provided training: 
 
 “tĞǁĂŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽƵƌ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞ ůĞĂĚĞƌ-like and more competitive. To have a better 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?(Maria, Social Secretary, APFP) 
 
 “dŚĞƐĞ ǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉƐ ĂƌĞ ĨƌŽŵ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŵŽŶĞǇ ĂŶĚ ĂůƐŽ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ůŝŬĞ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ŵŽƌĞ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƌƚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŬŶŽǁ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?(Pedro, 
President, APFP) 
 
 “/ƚ ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĞŵ ŚŽǁ Ă ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
dŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?(Diego, Senior Technician, PalmPeru) 
 
What also emerged was that social capital was considered to be an area that needed to be 
supported. As previously noted, a serious concern of DŝĞŐŽ ’Ɛ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǁĂŶŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
members in the decision making process at APFP, as reflected in younger members lacking a 
desire to be part of the directive. This was because it impacted on ƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ
actions  W if it was perceived that members of APFP did not have enough say, then the decisions 
of PalmPeru that had consequences for APFP may not be regarded as justifiable. As a result, 
participation (and therefore social capiƚĂů )ǁĂƐĂŶĂƐƐĞƚĨƌŽŵŝĞŐŽ ’ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ view: 
 
 “It is better [that farmers participate] so that we can not only get a claim that everyone agrees 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ŬŶŽǁ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝƐ ŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
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ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ? ĨƚĞƌ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŝůů ĐŽŵĞ ďĂĐŬ ? dǁŽ ǇĞĂƌƐ ůĂƚĞƌ ĂŐŽ there was training and 
now they participate more with decision making. ?(Diego, Senior Technician, PalmPeru) 
 
The insight from Diego showed that through the workshops, farmers were participating more in 
APFP, especially younger farmers who were at risk of leaving the area and moving to the capital, 
Lima. This was corroborated by other interviewees that noted PalmPeru had indeed worked with 
APFP to boost bottom-up participation in the association, from the village committees to the 
directive: 
 
 “tŽƌŬƐŚŽƉƐĂƌĞ important because they are run by professional people, and they teach us about 
many things. I mean, they teach us to cultivate palm and also the economical side of the 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ůƐŽŝŶƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐŝĚĞ ?ŚŽǁƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐůŝŬĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐŽƌǀŝůůĂŐĞƐ ? ?
(Farmer, APFP) 
 
On a conceptual level, the findings suggest a complex relationship between governance, buyer 
support and social capital. Without participation, the PalmPeru felt that its governance over the 
chain would be less valid and therefore provided support to run workshops and teach farmers 
about how to work as a collective organisation, from the committee to the associational level. In 
part this could be regarded as a result of the vertical integration between APFP and PalmPeru in 
terms of the shareholder relationship between the two  W  “WĂůŵWĞƌƵŝƐW&W ?, as more than one 
farmer was quoted as saying. While it was well known in the literature that social capital is 
important for legitimizing local institutional models of governance (Brunori and Rossi, 2007, 
Bebbington et al., 2005), there is less known about the role of social capital in building buyer 
governance as defined in the GVC literature (Gereffi, 1994, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). The 
ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ŚĞƌĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ďƵǇĞƌ ’Ɛ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ? ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ǁĂƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŝŶ
legitimising governance over the PalmPeru GVC. 
 
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶW&W ’ƐĂĨfairs may have been associated 
with social capital formation among farmers, there was also evidence to suggest that not just 
participation within the decision making structure of APFP (indicative of structural social capital) 
was developed, but also cognitive social capital at the village level was also improved. Sport has 
a historical place in the social capital literature  W WƵƚŶĂŵ ’ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůǁŽƌŬƵƐĞĚďŽǁůŝŶg clubs in 
America as examples of social capital formation (Putnam, 1995). Interviews with farmers 
 193  
revealed that PalmPeru, in conjunction with APFP, organised football tournaments among APFP 
village committees, as well as providing basŬĞƚďĂůůŚŽŽƉƐƚŽĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ children: 
 
 “WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ŚĂƐ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ ŽƵƚ ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ĂŵŽŶŐ committees. Every year all the 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƐĂƐĂĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚǁĞĚŽ ?ĨŽŽƚďĂůů ?ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “tĞŐĞƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƉĂƌƚǇĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚĞ ?ĨŽŽƚďĂůů ?ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞŵĞƚ
people we had not seen in a long time. It encouraged people to support farmers from other 
ǀŝůůĂŐĞƐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “dŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ  ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? ŚĂǀĞ Ă ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŐŝǀĞ ƚŚĞŵ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ĨŽƌ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐ ? ƚŚĞǇ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ďĂƐŬĞƚďĂůů ŚŽŽƉƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? ?(Maria, Social 
Secretary, APFP) 
 
As noted in the section addressing Cognitive Social Capital, there were significant social benefits 
that arose from these football tournaments and sport more broadly among farmers; in particular 
ĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ‘ďƌŝĚŐŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂů ’(van Rijn et al., 2012) whereby farmers from different locations 
were interacting and sharing farming practices. These tournaments were funded and organised 
ďǇWĂůŵWĞƌƵĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞďƵǇĞƌ ’ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ  W in fact due to 
financial constraints, PalmPeru had momentarily stopped funding the tournaments for six 
months and coŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ƐƚŽƉƉĞĚ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ƉůĂĐĞ ? ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ƌŽůĞas 
facilitator was integral. According to Diego, the tournaments were an explicit attempt to 
encourage  “ƵŶŝƚǇ ?and  “ŐƌŽƵƉ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?and the interviews demonstrated how greater 
cooperation among farmers was not just good for APFP, but good for PalmPeru also. Many 
farmers interviewed stated that workshops and the social events organised by PalmPeru had 
been beneficial to both learning about roles and responsibilities within the association as well as 
building relationships with other farmers. 
 
What the evidence shows is that upgrading facilitated by buyer support goes beyond process, 
production and functional dimensions as Schmitz (2002) lays out. Developing suppliers for the 
benefit of the GVC as a whole can also mean buyers taking steps to build social capabilities of 
suppliers, thereby shaping the process of social capital formation. Governance that goes beyond 
operating as arms-length and transactional is also more likely to induce learning by suppliers 
 194  
from buyers (Zanfei and Saliola, 2009, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011) and in the present case 
study, this included learning how to be in a collective group. 
 
6.5.4 Information Flow 
 
This section outlines the main findings on information flow between APFP and PalmPeru. 
Information flow is an important dimension of governance because as the knowledge and 
information necessary to carry out a process becomes more complex and face-to-face 
communication becomes ever more important, the role of governance intensifies (Gereffi et al. 
2005). The PalmPeru GVC displays evidence of information flow characterised by regular, face- 
to-face communication which was relatively open. 
 
The main findings showed that there was regular communication between PalmPeru and APFP  W 
as Pedro noted, stakeholders from each organisation communicated  “ŶĞĂƌůǇ ĞǀĞƌǇ ĚĂǇ ? ?with 
suggestions that there were few conflicts between APFP and PalmPeru because  “ǁĞ ƐŚĂƌĞ
ŝĚĞĂƐ ?. This sentiment was shared by Diego who noted that communication between PalmPeru 
and APFP was both regular and very open. APFP and PalmPeru also shared offices in the same 
building which facilitated regular flows of information. 
 
Information sharing appeared to be important to the functioning of the GVC because as 
WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ǁĂƐ W&W ’Ɛ ŽŶůǇ ďƵǇĞƌ ĂŶĚ ǀŝĐĞ ǀĞƌƐĂ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉly, both organisations 
coordinated closely to ensure that palm fruit supply did not exceed the capacity of palm oil 
extraction. As already noted, the nature of palm fruit means that it cannot be stored for 
extensive periods of time due to over-maturation and subsequent corrosion (Poku, 2002, Hai, 
2002). It was not uncommon from interviews with farmers to hear that they had been directed 
by PalmPeru to periodically stop harvesting palm fruit because of capacity issues at the 
PalmPeru factory. There was a demand from some farmers to have more information 
concerning this to ensure that harvesting could be effectively planned, in essence relating to 
scheduling standards in the GVCs (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). The evidence suggested that 
information was important to the functioning of the GVC which is indicative of a high degree of 
governance (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, Schmitz, 2005). 
 
In addition to information related to scheduling, PalmPeru also communicated to farmers the 
process standards in terms of how they should produce palm fruit. This was done through face- 
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to-face contact, with technicians from PalmPeru coming directly to villages to speak with 
farmers and then supplemented with documentation: 
 
 “tĞ Ăƌe told [the standards] directly by PalmPeru, also through a document and during the 
ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
All the farmers that were interviewed were content with this process and felt that face-to-face 
was an effective method for them to understand what was required of them. This kind of face- 
to-face communication between buyer and suppliers is indicative of a high degree of governance 
over the chain (Gereffi et al. 2005). In addition to farmers learning of their obligations to 
PalmPeru through face-to-face communication, this channel was also important for farmers to 
learn information about PalmPeru itself. The delegate system (discussed under Structural Social 
Capital) meant that farmers had representatives who would liaise with stakeholders at PalmPeru 
to keep farmers informed: 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ƚǁŽ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ǁĞ ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŐŽ ƚŽ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ ŽƵƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞǇ
ĐŽŵĞĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞƚŚŝƐƚŽƵƐĚƵƌŝŶŐĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
This two-way communication, which suggests a high degree of coordination between APFP and 
PalmPeru, is indicative of a network style of governance because it demonstrates mutual 
information flows between actors (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). In particular, farmers were 
provided with information on oil prices by stakeholders from PalmPeru which had an impact on 
how farmers felt about the relationship: 
 
 “dŚĞǇ ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ĐŽŵĞƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵƵƐ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĐŽŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂŶƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?Ănd everyone 
comes and informs us, they say why the price has been low. This makes me happier... It is good to 
be informed by them. When the oil price is low, they come here and tell us what is happening, 
members ask why and they are told the reasons why thĞŽŝůƉƌŝĐĞŝƐůŽǁ ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “zĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŽŝůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŐŽŽĚ ?/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƐƚŚĞǇŐŝǀĞƚŽƵƐ ?ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ?(Farmer, 
APFP) 
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While there was no actionable benefit from knowing why the price of palm fruit was high or low, 
it was still regarded as important information to farmers because it made them feel  “ŚĂƉƉŝĞƌ ?, 
indicating that the benefit was emotional rather than functional. The evidence showed that 
PalmPeru regarded this as an important exercise, as reflected in key stakeholders; from the 
manager to the accountant, directly coming to villages and justifying the price that farmers were 
offered for their palm fruit through a face-to-face channel. This was corroborated by Maria and 
several farmers who noted that the previous manager of PalmPeru was not well thought of by 
stakeholders at APFP precisely because he did not come directly to villages and communicate 
face-to-face with farmers  W indicating that this kind of information, in likelihood due to its 
emotive nature, could not be easily codified through standardized documentation. All of the 
evidence strongly points towards information as an integral aspect of governing the PalmPeru 
GVC and suggests that the prominence of face-to-face as a channel meant that information was 
difficult to codify (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
 
Farmers not only wanted to know about prices but also the internal workings of PalmPeru itself, 
in part because many were technically shareholders of the company and therefore expected this 
kind of information to be provided to them: 
 
 “&ĂƌŵĞƌƐ ƐĂǇ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞ ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ŝŶ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŽ ƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚ ďĂƐŝĐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ
demand equal participation and evaluate the ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇǲƐ ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?Ɛ ?ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞǇ
are demanding that, they have been receiving training related to the plant for years, but they 
want managerial training... they want to know the income and profit, they have their shares and 
they want to knoǁƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŝƚ ? ?(Carlos, Chairman, Palm Oil Stakeholder Committee) 
 
Farmers showed a real desire to not just receive information but to better understand the 
internal workings of PalmPeru because: a) it was the only buyer of APFP and therefore the 
health of PalmPeru closely correlated with its own; and b) many farmers are shareholders of 
PalmPeru and therefore have a private stake in the buyer. However what is especially pertinent 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĂĚ ŽŶ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽĨ W&W ĂƐ a collective 
organisation: 
 
 “dŚĞǇ ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ĐŽŵĞĂŶĚůĞƚƵƐŬŶŽǁŚŽǁƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝƐŐŽŝŶŐ ?/ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽŬŶŽǁĂďŽƵƚ
ƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?/ǁŽƵůĚĨĞĞůŵŽƌĞƚƌĂŶƋƵŝů ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŽƌĞƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?
I am a happier member of APFP if we are infŽƌŵĞĚ ? ?(Group Interview, APFP) 
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 “tĞĨĞĞůďĞƚƚĞƌǁŚĞŶǁĞŬŶĞǁŚŽǁƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ  ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ŝƐŐŽŝŶŐ ? /ĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŐƌŽǁƐ ?
our economy will also grow, we will be happier to pay education for our children, to support our 
children... but if the company [PalmPeru] is going bankrupt, we will not be happy. When we are 
ŶŽƚ ŐŝǀĞŶ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ůĞĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐĂŶŐƌǇ Ăƚ W&W ? ?(Group Interview, 
APFP) 
 
As will be discussed further under Relationships and Trust, the very close relationship between 
PalmPeru and APFP meant that many stakeholders interviewed, from the manager of PalmPeru 
to members of APFP, regarded the fortunes of both organisations to be intertwined, as one 
farmer put it:  “dŽŵĞ ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵŝƐW&W ?. Indeed as noted, the shareholder relationship and the 
fact that PalmPeru had an exclusive supplier in APFP and APFP had an exclusive buyer in 
PalmPeru, reflected a real sense of shared fortunes among the two organisations; mirroring a 
network governance structure (Keane, 2008, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). In the eyes of 
farmers, both organisations shared responsibilities. Consequently, the level of information 
received by farmĞƌƐĨƌŽŵWĂůŵWĞƌƵĚŝĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁards the buyer, but 
also towards their own collective organisation. 
 
6.5.5 Relationships and Trust 
 
It is broadly accepted in the literature that relationships and trust along the GVC are critical 
mechanisms of governance (Bolwig et al., 2010, Gereffi, 1994, Frederick and Gereffi, 2009, 
Morrow et al., 2004, Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002), in most part because relationships/trust and 
governance both share an agenda of reducing transaction costs in GVCs (Vieira and Traill, 2008). 
Long-term, trusting relationships enables governance to function effectively because it prevents 
opportunistic behaviour, which is destructive to governance and more characteristic of arms- 
length spot market relationships in GVCs (Sako and Helper, 1998, Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002, 
Riisgaard et al., 2010). The PalmPeru GVC demonstrated evidence of strong relationships, 
characterised by a perception of interdependency between buyer and supplier. 
 
One way of uncovering the type of governance is to understand the structure of relationships in 
the GVC  W if there is one buyer but many suppliers, this is indicative of a quasi-hierarchical 
governance structure where power is unevenly distributed.However if there is one buyer and 
one seller, then this suggests a network governance structure where power is more mutual 
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(Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). The evidence in the PalmPeru GVC clearly pointed towards 
network governance structure because PalmPeru and APFP had only one buyer/seller, reflecting 
the mutuality of the relationship. Figure 15 presents the similarity of the PeruGVC to a network 
style of governance compared to other types of governance. 
 
 
Figure 15: Network governance structure of the PalmPeru GVC 
 
Looking at the structure alone suggests a network type of governance as proposed by 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2004). As previously discussed, APFP and its members have the 
opportunity to become shareholders of PalmPeru. All the farmers interviewed were 
shareholders and there was a sentiment that this was a desirable aspiration for members of 
APFP because it generated an annual dividend. When PalmPeru was in need of more capital (at 
the time of data collection, this need corresponded with the construction of a second factory) 
the company would offer shares to APFP members: 
 
 “WĂůŵWĞƌƵǁĂŶƚƐƚŽŐĞƚŵŽƌĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŽĨĨĞƌĂŶĚƐĞůůƐŚĂƌĞƐ ?ǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĂƌĞĂŶW&W
ŵĞŵďĞƌ ?ǇŽƵĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽďƵǇƐŚĂƌĞƐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
The relationship between this structure and how members regarded their relationship with 
PalmPeru was highly significant because some farmers saw APFP and PalmPeru as a single 
integrated entity rather than two distinct organisations which, legally, they were. The perception 
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of farmers of their relationship with PalmPeru was linked with how they saw their relationship 
with APFP. This further reinforced this notion of inter inter-dependency, with PalmPeru 
dependent on APFP to produce palm fruit (given it was the only significant palm fruit producing 
organisation in the region) and APFP dependent on PalmPeru to not just buy its palm fruit, but 
to provide a secure channel and to bring economic benefits to the local area: 
 
 “dŚĂƚ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ  ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? ŝƐ ŬĞƉƚ ĂůŝǀĞ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƵƐ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ƚŚĂŶŬƐ ƚŽ ƵƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ŝƐ
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “ ?dŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ŝƐƐĞĐƵƌĞƚƌĂĚĞǁŝƚŚWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “KŶĞŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐŶĞǁƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?/ŵĞĂŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŝƚƐƚŚĂƚWĂůŵWĞƌƵ
are obtaining we are increasing the amount of jobs in ƚŚĞĂƌĞĂ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
This level of interdependency is further evidence of a network form of governance because 
breaking away from the existing arrangement would, for both organisations, be very costly  W a 
criterion for network governance structure (Humphrey and Schmitz (2004). The evidence also 
suggested that at the organisational level, there was a strong working relationship between 
PalmPeru and APFP. Stakeholders from PalmPeru and APFP noted that there were few 
disagreements and a high degree of collaboration: 
 
 “EŽƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝƐŐŽŽĚ ?tŚĞŶWĂůŵWĞƌƵƚĂůŬƐĂŶĚŽĞƐƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?W&WĚŽĞƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?
ĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝƐǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚ ? ? ?EŽ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĂŶǇĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?(Pedro, 
President, APFP) 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ŐŽŽĚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ W&W ĂŶĚ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ĂŶĚ ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ
because they are starting to create another factory for 2037. They work well together there is a 
really good integration between APFP and PalmPeru. Sometimes they come together and they 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚƚŽĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶǁĂǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂŶǇƌĞĂů
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?EŽ ? ?(Maria, Social Secretary, APFP) 
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 “tĞ ?WĂůŵWĞƌƵĂŶĚW&W ?ŚĂǀĞĂŐŽŽĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ůŝŬĞ ĂĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?[Diego, Senior Technician, 
PalmPeru] 
 
 “tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŐŽŽĚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ƵƐ ĨŽŽĚ Žƌ ůƵŶĐŚ ǁŚĞŶ ǁĞ ŐŽ ƚŚĞƌĞ  ?ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ? 
(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “Over everything, [the benefit of selling to PalmPeru] is the economic benefit and also to be able 
ƚŽůŝǀĞĐĂůŵůǇ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “tĞǁŽŶ ?ƚƋƵŝƚ ?ďƵƚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŐƌŽǁ ?tĞǁŽƵůĚďĞǁŽƌƐĞŝĨǁĞůĞĨƚ ? ?(Group 
Interview, APFP) 
 
Farmers were broadly appreciative of the relationship with PalmPeru. This was because of the 
way the company had brought tangible benefits to members of APFP and the perceived 
professionalism of the company, as one farmer noted:  “DŽƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ ĂƌĞ ďĞŝŶŐ
done weůů ?. Farmers perceived the relationship to be valuable precisely because it was not 
transactional and arms-length:  “ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŽŶůǇƐĂůĞƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?, as one farmer described other palm 
fruit intermediaries in the region. Farmers noted that since APFP had integrated with PalmPeru, 
ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ ŶŽǁ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƉĂǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ’Ɛ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞǀŝůůĂŐĞ ůĞǀĞů
showed a relatively high standard of living; with palm fruit growers typically having newer and 
larger homes with satellite dishes attached compared to their non-palm fruit growing 
neighbours. Indeed the data provided by UNODC shows significant growth in the incomes of 
APFP members; even high compared to the second largest palm fruit collective organisation 
supported by ADP in Peru. 
 
The broad sentiment of farmers and the data on incomes and growing palm oil extraction points 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĞŶĂďůĞƐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚured governance models to work 
without the threat of opportunism (Frederick and Gereffi, 2009). Stakeholders from PalmPeru 
and APFP showed no desire, or even a consideration, of breaking the relationship and some even 
noted that they would stay with APFP precisely because of the relationship with PalmPeru: 
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 “tĞǁŽƵůĚƐƚĂǇǁŝƚŚW&WďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ǁĞĂƌĞůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞ
ŝƐŶŽƚĂƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŽĨĂƌƚŽůĞĂǀĞ ? ?(Group Interview, APFP) 
 
Unlike an arms-length market structure, opportunism can be destructive to a network type of 
governance because of the level of interdependency between a supplier and buyer. The 
PalmPeru GVC exhibited non-opportunistic characteristics, both in terms of structure and 
sentiment. There was no evidence of asymmetrical power in the relationship  W PalmPeru 
invested in various aspects of APFP, from training workshops to nurseries, and APFP had the 
capacity to supply large quantities of palm fruit (relative to other palm fruit associations in Peru) 
and had a shareholder stake in PalmPeru. This suggests that the PalmPeru GVC did not have a 
quasi-hierarchical governance structure because, rather than the buyer having asset specific 
investments in the supplier, both organisations had shared assets (nurseries and shares) which 
reflects a network rather than a captive relationship (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). 
 
In terms of trust, there was no evidence that emerged which indicated that there was a 
breakdowŶ ŽĨ ƚƌƵƐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ W&WĂŶĚ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? &ƌŽŵ ŝĞŐŽ ’Ɛ ƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ? ĐŚĞĂƚŝŶŐ ǁĂƐĂ
concern of PalmPeru, although it was also noted that this was only a minority of farmers. 
However interestingly, this concern was also from other members of APFP and not just the 
directive that felt that cheating PalmPeru would harm APFP: 
 
 “^ŽŵĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƐǁŝƚĐŚƚƌĂĚŝŶŐƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐŵĂůůĞƌĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
PalmPeru pays every 15 days and some other companies pay every eight days or even in one 
ĚĂǇ ?ƵƚǁĞĂƌĞŶŽƚĚĞƚĞƌƌĞĚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞWĂůŵWĞƌƵŝƐŶŽƚĂŽŶĞǇĞĂƌĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
agreement and the rules, you cannot benefit another company, they [other farmers] are 
favouring their profit, they are harming us we need to look for a strategy for the company 
[WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ƚŽŬĞĞƉŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
This sense of solidarity against farmers that cheat PalmPeru was reflected in a sense of social 
sanctioning, where farmers would confront those that cheated because it was felt that side- 
selling PalmPeru was, in essence, defrauding members of APFP: 
 
 “tĞƚĂůŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁĞŬŶŽǁĂƌĞĐŚĞĂƚŝŶŐ ?(Farmer, APFP). 
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 “tĞ ďƌŝŶŐ ŽƵƌ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ďƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ  ?ƚŽ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? ĂƌĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚŝŶŐ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĚŽ ? ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
 “dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ / ŚĂǀe noticed. They [APFP farmers] protect PalmPeru, they monitor each 
ŽƚŚĞƌƚŽŵĂŬĞƐƵƌĞWĂůŵWĞƌƵƐƵĐĐĞĞĚƐ ?(Carlos, Palm Oil Stakeholder Committee, Chairman) 
 
As already alluded to, the close integration and interdependency between PalmPeru and APFP, 
indicative of a network style of governance, blurred the lines between the two organisations  W 
PalmPeru had asset specific investments in the form of training and palm fruit nurseries, and 
APFP members had asset specific investments in the form of shares held in PalmPeru. As 
previously noted, the evidence indicated that the value chain relationship was characterised by 
trust. All of this appeared to have the effect of incentivising farmers to monitor each other to 
prevent cheating of PalmPeru and, due to the close interdependency, themselves. 
 
As noted under Structural Social Capital, the initial creation and set-up of APFP was facilitated by 
the UN. Between 1992 and 2000, associational membership grew from 120 members to 200. 
However growth in associational membership, a proxy of structural social capital (Adhikari and 
Goldey, 2010, Gotschi et al., 2009), grew at a fast pace after the initial set-up period and at a 
time when the involvement of the UN was stopped in 2002. This suggests that while institutional 
support was initially important to the formation of structural capital, supporting the link 
between development agencies and social capital formation in the development literature 
(Khwaja, 2009, Grootaert and Narayan, 2004, Janssens, 2010, Vasilaky, 2013), another factor was 
likely responsible for the rapid growth in associational membership after this period. In fact the 
United Nations stopped providing institutional support for the PalmPeru GVC, due to the 
perception that APFP and PalmPeru were economically sustainable, at precisely the time when 
associational membership growth accelerated. The beginning of the relationship between APFP 
and PalmPeru did however shortly precede the growth in associational membership, suggesting 
that the coincidence of these two phenomena reflects a relationship between governance and 
structural social capital. 
 
It is argued by Serra (2011) that associational membership alone does not sufficiently reflect 
structural social capital without a qualitative context behind it. There was qualitative evidence in 
the present case study that showed a relatioŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ’ƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚǇƚŽ ũŽŝŶW&W
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and the relationship APFP had with PalmPeru. One participant noted that farmers in his village 
organised and joined APFP precisely because this was the path to sell their produce to PalmPeru: 
 
 “tĞŚĂĚƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ŝŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽďƌŝŶŐ ŝŶŽƵƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ƚŽWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?
W&WŝƐƚŚĞƌŽƵƚĞƚŽWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?(Farmer, APFP) 
 
As previously noted, farmers generally viewed the relationship with PalmPeru to be a means to 
improve their own economic situation, yet the only means to do this was to become a member 
of APFP due to the one-buyer-one-supplier structure characteristic of network governance. 
Furthermore, not only did farmers have to join APFP to capitalize on the comparably lucrative 
prices that PalmPeru offered, but farmers would also have to organise at the village level and 
join as a village committee. The evidence suggested that there was likely a link between the 
nature of value chain relationship with PalmPeru - a dimension of governance (Gereffi et al. 
2005), and structural social capital. 
 
As was noted under Structural Social Capital, while organisational forms of structural social 
capital did expand within APFP, traditional forms appeared to diminish. Interviews indicated that 
at the beginning of the relationship with PalmPeru, Minga was used as a means to improve palm 
fruit production and facilitated by communal food provided by the UN (food is important part of 
the Minga tradition). But as farmers become less dependent on Minga and received support to 
upgrade from PalmPeru, the role of Minga as a traditional form of structural social capital 
lessened: 
 
 “ĞĨŽƌĞǁĞǁĞƌe members, we worked by ourselves, but once the committee and PalmPeru was 
formed, we worked in groups. We used to work in groups because there was not any economic 
support back then, we worked in groups, that is how we supported each other, until we started 
ƚŽ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƉĂůŵ ĨƌƵŝƚ ? tĞ ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ĚŽ DŝŶŐĂ ĂĨƚĞƌǁĂƌĚƐ ? tĞ ŐŽƚ ŚĞůƉ ĨƌŽŵ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ? ǁĞ
ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĚŽDŝŶŐĂĂĨƚĞƌǁĂƌĚƐ ?(Group Interview, APFP) 
 
As previously described under Structural Social Capital, there was a widely held sentiment 
among APFP members interviewed that Minga was no longer relevant because their economic 
circumstances had changed so radically since APFP integrated with PalmPeru and, as the above 
quote reflects, PalmPeru was now the dominant support mechanism for farmers:  “tĞŐŽƚŚĞůƉ 
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ĨƌŽŵWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ?ǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĚŽDŝŶŐĂĂĨƚĞƌǁĂƌĚƐ ?. What the findings suggest is that governance 
ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĂĚ Ă  ‘ĐƌŽǁĚŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ’ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁith structural social capital in the present case 
study, at least on its more traditional manifestations, because farmers saw a diminished 
ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨW&W ’ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ PalmPeru. 
 
The case study presented a complex picture between the nature of the value chain relationship 
and structural social capital, with an enabling role at the organisational level but a potential 
barrier when considering more traditional forms of structural social capital. There was also 
evidence of a link between governance and cognitive social capital. Farmers had a broadly 
trusting view of the relationship with PalmPeru and this avoided conflict within APFP which was 
especially important given the blurred lines of responsibility perceived by stakeholders. Table 15 
summarises the main findings on governance in the PalmPeru GVC case study. 
 






While PalmPeru does not demand certified palm fruit of its suppliers (e.g. RSPO 
certification), quality standards are both required and controlled for as a means to 
maximise palm oil extraction. Palm fruit is tested by a quality controller at the milling 
stage for ripeness and appears to be critical to the effective functioning of the GVC, 
mirroring the literature which stresses the importance of an optimum condition of 
palm fruit for palm oil use. Closely related is the drive by PalmPeru to increase 
production. 
Risk of supplier 
failure and buyer 
support 
Members of APFP initially unsophisticated and  “ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ ?in palm fruit production, 
with APFP operating in a spot market structure with no governance. However after 
integration into the PalmPeru GVC, greater support provided by PalmPeru in terms 
of fertilizer subsidization and training to professionalise farmers and APFP now 
independent from institutional support. Close monitoring of farmers by PalmPeru 
conducting field visits, tight control of fertilizer inputs and investment in new palm 
seed nurseries. Strong evidence of process upgrading. 
 
^ŽĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂŶŽƚĂďůĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛefforts to upgrade due to the concern of 
waning participation of younger members in APFP. Workshops aimed to develop 
involvement of farmers which had improved participation in the decision making 
process. The primary motivation for PalmPeru to encourage farmer participation in 
the decision making process of APFP was to legitimise its role as governor within the 
context of a vertically integrated relationship. 
 
PalmPeru funded and facilitated sports tournaments among APFP village committees, 
reflecting structural social capital benefits. Evidence suggested that these tournaments 
ǁĞƌĞŽŶůǇŵĂĚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚWĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?WƌŝŵĂƌǇŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
ƚŽ ďƵŝůĚ  “ƵŶŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ  “ŐƌŽƵƉ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?, with PalmPeru regarding greater 
cooperation among farmers to be in its own self-interest as well as W&W ’Ɛ 
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Information flows 
Evidence indicated regular information flow and face-to-face communication 
between APFP and PalmPeru, with a consistent sharing of ideas. Information 
important to the functioning of the PalmPeru GVC because of coordination over 
palm fruit supply and palm oil processing capacity, pointing towards a high degree of 
governance over the chain. Evidence of a mutual dependency on two-way 
communication that required face-to-face contact, indicative of network type of 
governance. Due to the interdependency and vertical integration between PalmPeru 
ĂŶĚ W&W ? ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ďǇ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ĂůƐŽ ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
towards APFP, reflecting a link between governance and social capital formation at 
the organisational level. 
Relationships and 
trust 
Findings pointed towards a one-buyer-one-supplier relationship with a high degree 
of interdependency and vertical integration. Evidence of shared assets, a broad 
sentiment of collaboration, trust and a perceived win-win relationship between both 
organisations, all of which are indicative of a network type of governance with 
blurred lines of responsibility. 
 
High degree of interdependency and vertically integrated relationship incentivised 
farmers to monitor each other to prevent cheating, reflecting a link between governance 
and structural social capital at the organisational level. However relationship with 
PalmPeru a barrier to traditional forms of structural social capital at the village level due 
ƚŽĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƌŝƐŝŶŐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨ living. 
 
This chapter outlined the main findings from the PalmPeru GVC. The results differed from the 
first case study in that although structural social capital increased within the boundaries of a 
governed GVC, cognitive social capital did not deteriorate to the extent as it did in the 
PeruCacao GVC. The next chapter brings the findings together from both case studies to discuss 
the implications. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 laid out the main findings from the PeruCacao and PalmPeru case studies. Yin 
(2009) advises that in case study research that involved more than one case study, it is valuable 
to conduct a cross-case analysis to identify similarities and differences. This chapter compares 
and contrasts the two case studies, relating the findings back to the literature on development, 
governance and social capital formation. The chapter ends by presenting the contribution of 
knowledge. 
 
7.2 Similarities between Case Studies 
 
As both case studies were selected based on their scope for exploring social capital formation 
and GVC governance ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽĨWĞƌƵ ’ƐůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚWƌŽŐƌĂŵ  ?W ) ? ƚŚĞ
clearest similarity is one based on context; both in terms of local culture/history (farmers in case 
studies were located in the same region of Peru) and the institutional milieu set by ADP. Farmers 
in the PeruCacao and PalmPeru GVCs had been impacted by tŚĞ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ’ŝŶWĞƌƵ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
lives of farmers subject to drug cartels, crime, narco-terrorism, law enforcement and 
opportunistic politics (Bastos et al., 2007). Likewise farmers in the PeruCacao and PalmPeru 
GVCs have also both been exposed to ADP. They shared the same beginnings; cacao and palm 
ĨƌƵŝƚ ǁĞƌĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ŝŶ WĞƌƵ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞ  ? ? ? ? ’Ɛ ĂŶĚ ĞĂƌůǇ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ ďǇ ĚŽŶŽƌ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
government as a replacement crop for coca (USAID, 2010). Cacao and palm fruit are also part of 
the wider push by ADP, with ADP representing an institutional structure as defined by Uphoff 
(1993), to build social capital among farmers through agri-food chain development (USAID, 2010, 
UNODC, 2013). The set-up and creation of collective organisations in both case studies were 
driven by institutional support, both in terms of the wider institutional structure of ADP and the 
prominence of international development agencies. 
 
Moving from the context to the specific construct of social capital, similarities emerged. Cacao 
Collective and Bean Committee in the PeruCacao GVC and APFP in the PalmPeru GVC all 
experienced significant rises in associational membership since creation  W a proxy for structural 
social capital formation (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, Gotschi et al., 2009). Despite concerns in the 
findings and the literature that associational membership does not on its own provide a full 
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reflection of social capital (Serra, 2011), the qualitative evidence supplementing this provided a 
strong indication in both case studies of a rise in structural social capital. 
 
An interesting theme to emerge from the qualitative evidence was the notion of 
 ‘ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ’ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƐŝŵƉůĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ
working to a more entrepreneurial and business-minded approach. In the PeruCacao GVC, 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ĐĂƌĚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ƚŽ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŶĞǁ ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ
mechanisms for farmers who side-sold were implemented. In the PalmPeru GVC, mechanisms 
were also put in place to monitor and sanction members who broke the rules as well as 
automated contributions through the discounting of palm fruit. The parallel rises in more 
effective rules, procedures and precedents corresponds with the formation of structural social 
capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
In addition to more effective rules, procedures and precedents, both case studies exhibited 
defined roles for leadership, also a dimension of structural social capital (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna, 2000). In the PeruCacao GVC, one collective organisation (Bean Committee) 
introduced a dedicated manager to lead the cooperative where there was no leader before and 
the manager in the other collective organisation (Cacao Collective) had taken a more 
entrepreneurial role, taking greater responsibility for decision making. In the PalmPeru GVC, the 
directive of APFP had executive power and individuals were responsible for different functions of 
the association, both of which had developed over time. However, while the historical trajectory 
of structural social capital was positive in the two case studies, the scope for development in the 
future appeared to differ (section 7.3). 
 
Despite rises in structural social capital at the organisational level in both case studies, 
traditional forms of structural social capital diminished at the village level among PeruCacao and 
PalmPeru farmers, manifest in the falling adoption of Minga. In both case studies, a change in 
culture and to some extent integration into the GVC was identified as a factor for its 
deterioration. However, there were some differences between the two case studies, as will be 
noted in section 7.3. 
 
In terms of cognitive social capital, there were some similarities between the two case studies. 
While the findings suggested that structural social capital had risen among farmers in both the 
PeruCacao and PalmPeru GVCs, the evidence on cognitive social capital was less positive. 
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Farmers in the PeruCacao GVC resisted an increase in member contributions and there was 
evidence of mistrust in the management of collective organisations and indeed among the 
directive itself. Farmers in the PalmPeru GVC perceived diminishing  “ƵŶŝƚǇ ?over time and 
younger farmers were less attracted to participating in APFP. While social capital was clearly not 
as strong as structural social capital, there was some evidence to suggest that farmers in the 
PalmPeru GVC had developed more cognitive social capital than in the PeruCacao GVC and in 
fact, there were indications that cognitive social capital had actually deteriorated in the latter. 
 
Moving from a comparison of social capital towards that of governance, both case studies 
reflected evidence of governance over the GVC, with buyers shaping the participation of farmers 
in accordance with the definition of GVC governance in the literature (Gereffi, 1994, Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2004). Farmers in the two case studies followed standards set by the buyer, with 
Cacao Collective and Bean Committee pursuing organic certification driven by PeruCacao and 
APFP committed to quality standards set by PalmPeru. Linked with this was the necessity of 
buyer support to facilitate the meeting of these standards. Previous to their integration into 
governed GVCs, farmers in both case studies were operating in transactional spot markets with 
few requirements demanded of them. However after integration, there was a necessity for 
buyers to explicitly step in to facilitate the upgrading of farmers and close monitoring of 
practices, all of which are indicative of a high degree of governance (Gereffi et al., 2005, 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). 
 
Further to the similarities in buyer support was the nature of the upgrading process. In 
particular, buyers in both case studies set up workshops with the aim to improve the 
participation of farmers. There was a very explicit attempt to improve both structural social 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĂŶĚ ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ďƵǇĞƌƐ ’ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ 's ? ƚŚĞ
incentive to develop social capital was related to the dysfunction and poor direction of collective 
organisations that impacted on the ability of PeruCacao to supply high quality (and consequently 
higher value) cacao to European chocolatiers. In the PalmPeru GVC, the incentive to develop 
social capital could be found in ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝƐĞ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛgovernance over its sole 
supplier. However the evidence suggested in both case studies that it was easier to upgrade 
structural social capital than cognitive social capital, in large part due to the cultural 
entrenchment of the latter. 
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Moving onto information flow as a dimension of governance, there were parallels between the 
PeruCacao and PalmPeru GVCs. There was regular information flow and face-to-face 
communication between collective organisations and buyers and there was clearly a necessity 
for information sharing for effective functioning of the chain - indicative of a governed GVC 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). The nature of relationships and trust between buyers and 
suppliers were likewise essential to the functioning of case study GVCs. Both PeruCacao and 
PalmPeru had asset-specific investments in their suppliers, meaning that if the relationship was 
to break, buyers would lose non-recoupable investments. For Cacao Collective and Bean 
Committee, certification was financially supported by PeruCacao, and PalmPeru set-up nurseries 
ĨŽƌW&WƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚǁĂƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚŝŶďŽƚŚĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ
and trust were fundamental to buyers maintaining their hold on these investments and suppliers 
continuing to benefit from them, mirroring the literature on the role of relationships and trust to 
maintain governance in GVCs (Frederick and Gereffi, 2009). Despite these similarities, there 
were also important differences in the nature and structure of the relationship in the GVC, 
discussed in section 7.3. 
 
7.3 Differences between Case Studies 
 
While case studies shared the same institutional environment in the form of ADP, the micro- 
context contrasted. PeruCacao had its own NGO - HelpCacao, acting as a dedicated support arm 
and a channel to funnel wider institutional support from ADP projects. Through this network of a 
buyer, an NGO and institutional support, PeruCacao supported collective organisations and 
developed the competencies of its suppliers over time, reflecting the role that multi-faceted 
linkages have in bringing collective organisations into competitive value chains (Mutersbaugh, 
2005, Roy and Thorat, 2008, Neilson, 2008, Okello et al., 2011, Asem-Bansah et al., 2012, Challies 
and Murray, 2011). In contrast, the PalmPeru GVC case study exhibited significant support from 
the United Nations during the creation and set-up of APFP and PalmPeru, but later lost this 
support due to the perception that the GVC was now commercially sustainable. According to the 
development literature, support from development agencies is critical to social capital formation 
(Khwaja, 2009, Grootaert and Narayan, 2004, Janssens, 2010, Vasilaky, 2013). Although the 
PeruCacao GVC continued to receive support since its creation, while the PalmPeru GVC had 
ceased to receive any, there were no notable differences in social capital formation between the 
two case studies that could be sufficiently explained by the contrast in the micro- context.
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Another notable contrast was in size of collective organisations and income. Cacao Collective and 
Bean Committee had 231 and 90 members enrolled respectively, compared to 665 members in 
APFP. It is argued by some in the literature that as groups grow, social capital is harder to form 
(Becker and Ostrom, 1995, White and Runge, 1995). However, this was not evident in the 
present research and in fact the findings contrasted with this notion because it was the large 
collective organisation - APFP, that appeared to have stronger levels of social capital compared 
to the significantly smaller Cacao Collective and Bean Committee. Likewise, some of the 
challenges facing Bean Committee in terms of its scope for sanctioning were directly attributable 
to its small size. The economic situation of farmers also differed greatly. Both documentation 
from the UNODC and observations by the researcher showed that incomes of palm fruit growers 
were significantly greater than those of cacao farmers, even though prior to ADP, both faced a 
similar socio-economic situation influenced by coca production in the region. 
 
When comparing structural social capital formation among farmers, there were some 
differences. While both case studies experienced a rise of structural social capital within their 
respective collective organisations, the scope for further development differed. In the PalmPeru 
GVC, farmers were open to contributing more to APFP and there was little evidence of push back 
against the increasingly hierarchical structure of the collective organisation. Conversely, 
evidence from the PeruCacao GVC indicated that the continued intensification of structural 
social capital at its current rate was unlikely to be sustainable because farmers and some 
members of the directive were either strongly resisting these changes or completely ignoring 
them through side-selling or failing to contribute. While there is a link here between structural 
and cognitive social capital such that the former is facilitated by sufficient stock of the latter  W 
reminiscent of the overlap between the two (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000); what really defined 
ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ǁĂƐ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’existing attitudes towards social 
structure. Farmers in the PalmPeru GVC had only ever known a social structure in APFP that was 
hierarchical in nature and were predisposed to further development of structural social capital, 
whereas farmers in the PeruCacao GVC were used to a social structure where rules, monitoring, 
sanctioning and strong leadership were almost non-existent. 
 
Despite cognitive social capital being less evident than structural social capital across both case 
studies, the findings indicated that cognitive social capital formation was higher in the PalmPeru 
case study. Farmers interviewed in the PeruCacao GVC were resistant to contributing to their 
collective organisations, had a high propensity to side-sell, in some cases expressed deep 
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mistrust in the directive and there was even evidence to indicate mistrust among the directive 
itself. However in the PalmPeru case study, in spite of falling participation among younger 
farmers and a sense that the freedom of farmers had fallen, a high level of commitment was 
observed in terms of a willingness to contribute and an understanding of its value to the 
collective by farmers, thereby reflecting a degree of social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 
2000). While not necessarily being cases that reflected extremes, it can be concluded that some 
cognitive social capital formation was evident among farmers in the PalmPeru GVC and less so in 
the PeruCacao GVC. 
 
Moving from differences in social capital to differences in governance, there were no significant 
contrasts in standards. Although collective organisations faced different standards in terms of 
organic certification for cacao and quality standards for palm fruit, in essence both were 
associated with product parameters in terms of appearance and quality (Reardon and Farina, 
2002) ĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ(Reardon 
et al., 2001b). On a broad level, buyer support was evident in both case studies, with a risk of 
supplier failure if buyers did ŶŽƚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞŝŶƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞďǇƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ
governance in both case studies and corresponding with the literature on governance and buyer 
support (Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007). 
 
Although on a broad level there were no obvious differences between buyer support of 
PeruCacao and PalmPeru, as already mentioned, one small yet important aspect where buyer 
support did differ was where PalmPeru invested in cross-village football tournaments at the 
village level among APFP farmers. This filled the hole in village structural social capital when 
Minga diminished as a cultural practice. PeruCacao on the other hand did not facilitate 
cooperation at the village level, in part because villages had a diverse range of members from 
different collective organisations, with Cacao Collective and Bean Committee typically 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĐĂĐĂŽ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ǀŝůůĂŐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ WĞƌƵĂĐĂŽ ’Ɛ ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ
ƚŚĂƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ’ǀŝůůĂŐĞƐǁĞƌĞďĞǇŽŶĚŝƚƐƐĐŽpe of responsibility. The impact of this was that there 
was a structure for information sharing among APFP farmers not just within villages, but 
between villages. This contrasted with the villages of Cacao Collective and Bean Committee 
which lacked such a structure for cooperation when Minga faded. 
 
The idea of social capital deteriorating as a result of changing cultural attitudes is well 
understood in the literature (Nilsson et al., 2012, Molyneux, 2002). However as far as is known, 
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the notion of a buyer in a GVC investing in the social capabilities at the village level for the 
purpose of social capital formation is novel to the existing body of literature and contests the 
pessimistic view of the role of outside influencers, including buyers, on social capital formation 
(Messner, 2004, Bingen et al., 2003, Rabellotti, 2004, Lyon, 2000, Coleman, 1990, Vollan, 2012, 
Pretty and Ward, 2001). 
 
Information flow was an aspect of governance that was identified as essential to the functioning 
of the GVC in both case studies. An area of difference was how information from buyers was 
being disseminated to farmers. In the PeruCacao GVC, there was evidence of some farmers 
feeling that information was not being effectively passed down by PeruCacao and that 
PeruCacao placed more importance on information sharing with the directive than with farmers. 
On the contrary, the PalmPeru GVC exhibited a much greater focus on face-to-face, two-way 
communication directly with APFP members. The contrast in case studies parallels the difference 
in the literature between a quasi-hierarchical governance structure where information and 
power is asymmetric in favour of the buyer and a network governance structure where 
information flow is two-way and power is more evenly distributed (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2004). 
 
Evidence that there was a variance in governance types between case study GVCs was further 
supplemented by differences in the relationship structure of the GVC. In the PeruCacao GVC, 
there was one dominant buyer and a multitude of collective organisations acting as suppliers. 
This kind of structure is indicative of a quasi-hierarchical GVC because there are several suppliers 
dependent on a single buyer (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). Juxtaposing this was the PalmPeru 
GVC, with PalmPeru and APFP representing the buyer-supplier relationship and a high degree of 
vertical integration. The PalmPeru GVC is indicative of a network governance structure with a 
one buyer, one supplier relationship (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). 
 
Digging deeper into the governing relationship and trust, there were clear differences that 
emerged. Farmers interviewed in the PeruCacao GVC were generally discontent with being in a 
 ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ’ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚWĞƌƵĂĐĂŽĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞŽĨƐŽŵĞ farmers to break the 
relationship and sell to intermediaries. This was in part due to the perception by some cacao 
farmers that rewards were unevenly distributed between PeruCacao and its suppliers, reflecting 
the importance of the way distributed rewards and risks are perceived in governed GVCs 
(Kaplinsky, 2004b, Gereffi and Lee, 2012). Indeed the lack of trust in the PeruCacao GVC was a 
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real threat to the sustainability of the GVC given that renewal of the contract with PeruCacao 
would have to be voted on by farmers and the leadership of Cacao Collective in particular could 
quite easily be voted out if farmers perceived that the directive was not working in their 
interests. On a fundamental level, a quasi-hierarchical governance structure necessitates buyers 
ƚŽ ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞ ’ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĂƐƐĞƚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƐŵ
(Gereffi et al. 2005); however farmers in the present case study were discontent precisely 
because they did not want to be in a captured relationship. 
 
dŚĞ ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ  ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ’ ŝŶ 'sƐ ŝŽĨƚĞŶ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ’
scope for product, process and functional upgrading (Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 
2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007), but there is nothing in the literature about what being captured 
means for the social relationships among farmers. Understanding this phenomenon is critical to 
the question of how suppliers participate in GVCs because while there could be ample scope for 
upgrading, it means very little if the relationships between farmers break down and collective 
organisations consequently exit the GVC in favour of spot-market participation. Given that 
integration into lucrative export chains is a key element of current rural development strategies 
(Fischer and Qaim, 2012) and governance plays a growing role in such value chains (Gereffi and 
Lee, 2012), the findings go beyond the narrow scope of impacts at the farm level that the GVC 
literature has considered thus far. 
 
Farmers in the PalmPeru GVC presented a very different picture to that of the PeruCacao GVC. 
Interviews with APFP members showed a broad sentiment of collaboration and trust in PalmPeru 
and no desire to break the GVC relationship. Many farmers in APFP were shareholders in 
PalmPeru, somĞ ŽĨ WĂůŵWĞƌƵ ’Ɛ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ďŽĂƌĚ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŽĨ W&W ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ
genuine inter-dependency in the relationship with little evidence of asymmetric power. There 
was no sign in the PalmPeru GVC that the relationship between APFP and PalmPeru was under 
threat and every reason to believe that it would continue in the future given the strong 
commitment of interviewees in both organisations. The nature of relationships and trust are in 
most part overlooked in the original GVC framework (Riisgaard et al., 2010) - the contrast in the 
case study findings demonstrate how important these dimensions are in order to fully explore 
the concept of governance in GVCs. The findings highlight that while governance could be 
constraining for cognitive social capital as was the case in the PeruCacao GVC, it may also have a 
positive association if the nature of the governing relationship lends itself as such. 
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The present research is exploratory by nature and therefore while it cannot prove or disprove 
propositions, it can generate propositions around the formation of concepts (Yin, 2009). Despite 
the limited scope of the research to cover all influencing variables that shape social capital 
formation, emerging factors that correspond with the literature are documented to highlight 
themes that support the existing body of research. This is then followed by laying out the novel 
contribution to knowledge of the present research; principally the proposition of a theoretical 
relationship between social capital formation and governance of GVCs and, on a broader level, a 
perspective on social capital using the governance framework that augments existing models of 
social capital formation. 
 
7.4.2 Existing Literature on Social Capital Formation 
 
The research identified a number of factors in social capital formation among farmers that 
participate in GVCs, many of which correspond with the social capital literature. Rules and 
sanctioning were important in both case studies in enabling social capital in that it constrains 
individualistic behaviour that is destructive to collective organisation (Becker and Ostrom, 1995, 
Coleman, 1990, Pretty and Ward, 2001, Molinas, 1998, Woolcock, 1998) and the PeruCacao GVC 
case study highlighted not just monetary sanctioning but reputational sanctioning also 
(Nooteboom, 2007). On the other side of the coin, the PeruCacao GVC and the Bean Committee 
cooperative in particular showed how enforceable rules and sanctioning that are seen as too 
constricting by group members can be detrimental to social capital formation (Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2001, Nilsson et al., 2012). Strong leadership of collective organisations was also a 
factor in both case studies, reflecting the role of leadership in social capital formation (Serra, 
2011, Vollan, 2012, Goetz and Rupasingha, 2006, Krishna, 2004, Kaganzi et al., 2009) and 
structural social capital formation specifically (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). To an extent, the 
findings demonstrated the complexity of separating cause and effect in social capital research in 
that rules and sanctioning enabled the formation of social and also represented a manifestation 
of social capital as well (Lyon, 2000). 
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It is argued that the qualitative differences among members of the group can be a barrier to 
social capital formation, especially when related to cultural differences (Woolcock, 1998, Beard, 
2007, Klitgaard and Fedderke, 1995, Easterly and Levine, 1997, Castle, 1998, Huffman and 
Feridhanusetyawan, 2007). In the PeruCacao GVC, religious heterogeneity was a barrier to social 
capital formation at the village level among farmer members, especially with regard to the 
practice of Minga, a manifestation of structural social capital. Linked with this is the role of 
culture and historical context in social capital formation. The findings are in agreement with the 
literature that culture is a factor in social capital formation (Nilsson et al., 2012, Molyneux, 
2002). Indeed a lack of a homogenous culture among farmers in the PeruCacao GVC was a 
particular barrier to social capital formation at the village level, reflecting arguments made in the 
literature (Munoz et al., 2007, Aggarwal, 2000). It has been observed in the literature that 
Andean communities typically regard the indigenous population in South America as having a 
very different identify (Ansion, 2004). However despite this, there was no evidence to suggest 
that ethnic and religious diversity was a factor in the PalmPeru GVC despite these differences 
existing among farmers, reflecting the literature (Bhattacharyya et al., 2004). 
 
In both case studies, the findings not only showed that structural social capital was formed, but 
was formed in a short space of time. In the PeruCacao GVC case study, structural social capital 
had significantly developed inside collective organisations within 2-3 years, with more effective 
rules, procedures and precedents put in place. Likewise farmers in the PalmPeru GVC went from 
 “ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ ?ways of working to a highly professionalised association in less than 10 years. Some 
authors propose that social capital can be formed in a short period of time (Grootaert and van 
Bastelaer, 2002, Kaganzi et al., 2009). Given that cognitive social capital formation was not 
especially strong in either case study, maturity could be more important as an enabler where this 
particular dimension of social capital is concerned which would correspond with the literature 
that argues since trust is culturally and historically embedded, it cannot be created within such a 
short space of time (Maclean, 2010, Woolcock, 1998, Lyon, 2000). Indeed given there was 
evidence that cognitive social capital had marginally increased more in the PalmPeru GVC than 
the PeruCacao GVC, and the former had over three times more time to develop than the latter 
within the context of buyer-supplier engagement, maturity could be a factor in explaining 
differences between the two case studies. 
 
Some authors contend that the role of actors such as NGOs and international development 
agencies act as enabling forces for social capital formation (Khwaja, 2009, Grootaert and 
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Narayan, 2004, Janssens, 2010, Vasilaky, 2013). These actors were evident in both case studies, 
although their role differed greatly. In the PeruCacao GVC, the role of development agencies was 
critical to providing support to collective organisations in terms of the provision of technicians 
and farmer workshops. In the PalmPeru GVC, although the United Nations provided significant 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌW&WĂŶĚWĂůŵWĞƌƵĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞŵďƌǇŽŶŝĐ ’ ƐƚĂŐĞ ? ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůsocial capital 
formation appeared to actually develop after this institutional support was cut off. Despite this, 
it would be false to say that institutional support was not critical in the PalmPeru case study 
given that its very creation was dependent on it. 
 
7.4.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The previous section summarises the themes and factors that were both identified in the 
research and correspond with the existing body of knowledge on social capital. While social 
capital has been studied extensively in the literature, how social capital is formed has been paid 
relatively less attention and gaps remain in a social capital conceptual framework (Staber, 2007). 
It is now well established that governance plays a significant role in shaping how farmers 
participate in GVCs (Gereffi and Lee, 2012) and there are calls for research into how governance 
impacts the immediate milieu that farmers operate in (Bolwig et al., 2010, Challies, 2008, Fold 
and Gough, 2008) and in particular, how governance mĂǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ’ ŽĨ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ
(Messner, 2004). To review, the research question of the thesis was as follows: 
 
How does the Governance of a Global Value Chain shape the formation of social capital among 
farmers? 
 
The study contributes to the development literature by developing propositions, initially 
presented in the conceptual framework chapter, on the association between governance and 
social capital based on the insights drawn from the findings. Until now, there has been no known 
attempt to bring a governance perspective to a social capital conceptual framework. The 
theoretical arguments made here go beyond existing views in the literature which have typically 
regarded social capital formation to be an endogenous process or in other words, that the 
factors that enable social capital among farmers are contained solely within a particular group of 
farmers, rather than external structures that enable or constrain social capital (Lyon, 2000, 
Ostrom, 1992, Becker and Ostrom, 1995). 
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In both case studies, structural social capital formation increased substantially since integration 
into the GVC. This was evidenced by more effective rules, roles for decision making, procedures 
and precedents that correspond with the formation of structural social capital (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna, 2000). These changes to structural social capital took place in collective 
organisations after they integrated into governed GVCs. The insights suggested that how buyers 
shape the participation of farmers - the very definition of governance (Gereffi and Lee, 2012, 
Frederick and Gereffi, 2009), may have had a positive association with structural social capital 
formation. However based on the findings, it is also very likely that the association was 
moderated by a range of factors  W most notably the institutional context and culture. Therefore, 
a theoretical contribution to the literature is the proposition that: 
 
P1: Governance can be an enabler of structural social capital formation among farmers in a 
Global Value Chain, shaped by the institutional context and existing attitudes towards social 
structure 
 
The findings from the case studies provide insight for the theory behind P1. Collective 
organisations in GVCs that operate in spot-markets, where the only governor is that of price, 
have low demands placed on them, reflected in the absence of stringent standards and buyers 
that actively shape participation (Gereffi et al. 2005). But when farmers integrate into a 
governed GVC, the rules of the game change. New standards emerge, demands on farmers 
intensify and the propensity for buyers to intervene increases. With new rules of the game, 
collective organisations must change and one aspect of this is structural social capital; the rules, 
roles for decision making, procedures and precedents that provide the framework for 
cooperation among farmers. Indeed in the two case studies, this change was not a choice of 
farmers isolated from the external environment; it was an explicit demand of buyers. 
 
In terms of other factors, the case studies presented findings that suggest that the scope for 
governance to form social capital is shaped by at least two factors. The first is the institutional 
context. A clear similarity between the two case studies was their embeddedness in the rich 
institutional context provided by ADP, reflected in the secondary data that was presented and 
summed up by the owner of Cacao International:  “tĞ ůŝǀĞ ŝŶĂŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
probably too many projects available ĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇŝƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵ ?. In the PeruCacao 
GVC, it was clear that institutional support had a powerful role in facilitating the training, 
workshops and the implementation of the social technician in conjunction with the support 
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provided by PeruCacao. What was especially noteworthy was that not only did PeruCacao siphon 
funding from the institutional environment, but there were also indications that the propensity 
of NGOs to offer their support may have increased by the existence of dedicated buyers, due 
to the perception that a governed GVC signalled a more economically sustainable GVC. 
 
In the PalmPeru GVC, the role of the institutional context was less clear given that structural 
social capital appeared to rise after institutional support was pulled. However it is certainly true 
that the creation of PalmPeru and APFP was entirely dependent on the support provided by the 
United Nations and therefore it could be said that the conditions for the governing relationship 
were very much shaped by the institutional context. Contrasting with the idea that governance is 
 ‘ĚĞ-ůŝŶŬĞĚ ’ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƵƚŽƚŽŵŝǌĞĚ ’ĨƌŽŵthe institutional context which has typified much of the GVC 
literature (Gibbon, 2001, Petkova, 2006, Ponte et al., 2014), the findings show that the 
institutional environment it is a key factor to consider when understanding how governance 
shapes participation of farmers. 
 
The second factor  W existing attitudes to social structure, also emerged when analysing the link 
between governance and structural social capital. In this context, existing attitudes to social 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ŝƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂƐĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůƐŽĐŝal capital, or in 
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐƚŚĞƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ŚŽǁǁĞĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐŚĞƌĞ ’- ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚŝƐƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ’ŝŶ
the social capital literature which is seen as largely unchanging and historically embedded (Lyon, 
2000, El-Said and Harrigan, 2009, Maclean, 2010, Woolcock, 1998, Coleman, 1990). There is also 
a clear conceptual similarity between existing attitudes towards structural social capital and 
cognitive social capital, since attitudes and beliefs that are conducive to cooperation is a 
dimension of cognitive social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
Although there was no juxtaposition because both case studies exhibited high structural social 
capital among farmer groups, it was evident in the PeruCacao case study that a willingness by 
collective organisations to change the rules, roles for decision making, procedures and 
precedents was a necessary condition. Cacao Collective had developed its structural social 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŚĂĚŽŶůǇďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞďǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ’ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ
signs that members were beginning to push back against this new structure in part because they 
were used to norms where rules were negligible. Bean Committee, while developing its 
structural social capital far beyond what existed prior to integration into the PeruCacao GVC, was 
facing challenges in putting in place sanctioning mechanisms because members were not used to 
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these new structures. In the PalmPeru GVC, there was no sign that structural social capital could 
be stunted in the future because members of APFP had only ever known a  ‘ƚŽƉ-ĚŽǁŶ ’
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ’ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ĨŝƌŵůǇ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚ ’ ŝŶƚŽthe 
organisational culture. Furthermore, at the farm level, inter-village sports tournaments financed 
by PalmPeru was a success precisely because it capitalised on an activity that was a more 
relevant social structure to farmers than Minga. 
 
Moving the discussion from structural social capital, there is also no known theory on the 
association between governance and cognitive social capital in the literature. In the PeruCacao 
GVC case study, there was limited evidence of cognitive social capital formation and even 
indications of deterioration. This contrasted with PalmPeru GVC, where although cognitive social 
capital formation was not as explicit as that of structural social capital, there was evidence of 
unity among farmers and a commitment to APFP. The two case studies exhibited contrasting 
governing relationships based on the GVC framework in the literature (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2004). In particular, the nature of the governing relationship differed. The second proposition to 
emerge from the findings is: 
 
P2: Governance can be an enabler or barrier for cognitive social capital formation among 
farmers, depending on the nature of the governing relationship 
 
The theoretical foundation of P2 stems from the existing GVC literature and the findings in the 
present research. It is well understood in the GVC literature that the nature of relationships and 
trust along the chain is an important component of governance (Bolwig et al., 2010, Riisgaard et 
al., 2010, Vieira and Traill, 2008, Wiegratz, 2008, Wiegratz et al., 2007), including the way 
rewards and risks are distributed (Kaplinsky, 2004b, Gereffi and Lee, 2012) and the extent that 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ŝƐ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ďŽƚŚ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ(Frederick and Gereffi, 
2009). In the PeruCacao GVC, many farmers perceived the relationship to be one-sided, lacking a 
 ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐ information flow. The sentiment was that their 
self-determination had been restricted as a result of integrating into the GVC, indicative of a 
quasi-hierarchical governance structure where the buyer must enforce protective measures to 
secure asset-specific investments (Gereffi et al. 2005). The findings suggest that the poor 
relationship with PeruCacao injected a degree of social dysfunction within collective 
organisations, with side-selling prevalent, members not meeting their obligations with regard to 
contributions, mistrust in leadership and conflict among farmers. 
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In the PalmPeru GVC, the relationship between buyer and supplier was very different. 
Although APFP could only sell to PalmPeru, PalmPeru could only buy from APFP also. There 
were no real alternatives for either organisation to buy or sell elsewhere due to their unique 
scale in the region; they were inter-dependent with shared assets between both parties, and 
power and information flow was evenly distributed in the relationship  W all of which is 
characteristic of a network governance structure (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). In this 
governing relationship, ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ  ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ’ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ďƵǇĞƌ ĂŶǇ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ďƵǇĞƌ
ǁĂƐ ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ’ďǇĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚW& ĂŶĚWĂůŵWĞƌƵǁĞƌĞ ‘ŝŶŝƚ
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ’ ?dŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůassociation here is that a positive governing relationship fed into a 
more cohesive collective organisation, despite there still being challenges in cognitive social 
capital formation. If a ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ ‘ǁŝŶ-wiŶ ’ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂŶĚƚƌƵƐƚŝŶŐ ?then 
there is less incentive for farmers to side-sell, a greater willingness to contribute and 
consensus rather than conflict over the direction of the collective organisation, all of which is 
manifest from cognitive social capital. 
 
Table 16 summarises the theoretical contribution to knowledge derived from case studies and 
the existing literature. 
 
The core of the upgrading proposition in the literature is that buyers develop their supply base 
because buyers and suppliers in governed relationships fail or succeed together. Given it is 
well understood that social capital generates a range of benefits, from productivity gains 
(Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000, Vasilaky, 2013, Binam et al., 2004) to agricultural innovation 
(van Rijn et al., 2012, Lambrecht et al., 2014), it is surprising that social capital has not been 
explicitly positioned as part of the discourse on governance and upgrading among suppliers 
thus far. The present research therefore offers a contribution by highlighting the social capital 
is an important factor for farmers to upgrade in GVCs. 
 
An unexpected finding was one that went beyond the interaction between governance and 
social capital, to the interaction between structural and cognitive social capital. It is assumed 
in the literature that structural and cognitive social capital is complimentary and reinforcing 
(Adhikari and Goldey, 2010, van Rijn et al., 2012). What emerged in the PeruCacao GVC was 
that increases in structural social capital can be detrimental to cognitive social capital because 
farmers did not trust in the more stringent rules being constructed around them, which 
translated into tensions within collective organisations. In the conceptual framework, it was 
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assumed a complimentary interaction between structural and cognitive social capital would 
come from the findings, yet a more contentious and complex relationship materialised. 
 
Table 16: Propositions development from the research 
Propositions Theory 
Governance can be an 
enabler of structural 
social capital formation 
among farmers in a Global 
Value Chain, shaped by 
the institutional context 
and existing attitudes 
towards social structure 
When integrating into governed GVCs, collective organisations 
must transform their capabilities to meet new and more stringent 
standards placed on them; including their internal rules, roles for 
decision making, procedures and precedents. In some cases, 
buyer support is necessary. 
 
The scope for governance to shape structural social capital is 
moderated by the institutional context and existing cultural 
norms. A context rich with institutional and donor support can 
incentivise and facilitate the efforts of buyers to invest in the 
social capabilities of farmers. Existing cultural norms also 
moderates the degree that farmer groups are willing and able to 
change their internal processes that reflect improvements in 
structural social capital. 
Governance can be an 
enabler or barrier for 
cognitive social capital 
formation among 
farmers, depending on 
the nature of the 
governing relationship 
The nature of the governing relationship with a buyer is either an 
area of consensus or an area of discord among farmers. When the 
governing relationship is characterised by mistrust, a perceived 
losing outcome and asymmetric information flows; side-selling 
ĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŐƌŽƵƉ ’ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƌŝƐĞĂŶĚ
the willingness to contribute falls. 
 
On the other hand, when the governing relationship is 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇƚƌƵƐƚ ?ĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?ƚǁŽ- way 
communication and interdependency; there is less incentive to 
side-sell, fewer areas for internal conflict to arise from and 
farmers are more inclined to contribute because they have more 
confidence in the direction of the collective group.  
 
On a methodological level, the study contributes to the literature by highlighting the issue of 
associational membership as a potentially paradoxical proxy indicator for structural social 
capital. In the PeruCacao GVC case study, both Cacao Collective and Bean Committee had a 
surge of membership that was given rise by poor enforcement of rules and procedures. 
Although Serra (2011) questions associational membership as an indicator; as far as is known, 
the present study is the first to empirically demonstrate that high associational membership 
can be the result of a breakdown in aspects of structural social capital  W specifically rules and 
procedures that facilitates effective (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). 
 
On a broader level, the present research contributes to the literature by bringing a new 
perspective to social capital formation in GVCs. It is well understood that buyers shape the 
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participation of farmers (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2002, Gereffi et al., 2001); yet despite this 
there has been limited attempts to bring together the vertical concept of governance with 
horizontal phenomena at the farm level (Challies, 2008, Fold and Gough, 2008, Bolwig et al., 
2010) and ŵŽƌĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ? ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ’ ŽĨ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ŝŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ countries changes 
when integrated into GVCs has not been sufficiently explored (Messner, 2004). When 
considering the meta-theories of rural development, the study contests the two ends of the 
theoretical spectrum that has historically characterised rural development theories. The GVC 
and governance model is manifest from an exogenous approach; the basic claim in the GVC 
literature is that the drivers of rural development are found outside of rurality and GVCs 
represent the link that channels wealth from developed, urban consumers to farmers 
(depending on how risks and rewards are distributed). On the other hand, the endogenous 
approach to rural development is at the core of current theories of social capital formation 
because they focus on internal linkages as the source of development and regard outside 
linkages as ineffective or detrimental to this process (Lyon, 2000, Ostrom, 1992, Becker and 
Ostrom, 1995, Vollan, 2012, Pretty and Ward, 2001). 
 
The present study expands these approaches by demonstrating the ƉŽǁĞƌ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ŶĞŽ- 
ĞŶĚŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ’ŵŽĚĞůǁŚĞƌĞďŽƚŚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂŶĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůŝŶŬĂŐĞƐĂƌĞĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ(Ray, 2002). When 
scholars call for more to be done to bring the analysis of GVCs and the analysis of the local milieu 
together (Bolwig et al., 2010, Neilson, 2008, Challies, 2008, Fold and Gough, 2008) - the 
combination of the vertical with the horizontal, they are implicitly arguing for a neo-endogenous 
approach rather than the extremes of the theoretical spectrum. The present research takes a 
small but important step in contributing to the development literature by bridging social capital 
formation with governance of GVCs into a single piece of research, thereby combining the 
vertical with the horizontal and as a result, the exogenous with the endogenous. 





The previous chapter presented the discussion of findings from the two case studies, identifying 
similarities and differences and how the findings contribute to the literature. This final chapter 
concludes the thesis by addressing the research question and indicating a direction for future 
research. 
 
Section 8.2 presents the answer to the research question based on the empirical findings, 
synthesising the arguments that were made. This is followed by section 8.3 with the implications 
of the research, both theoretical and policy wise. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 presents the limitations of 
the study and provides advice on which issues would be worthwhile to investigate in the future 
within this context. The chapter ends with section 8.6 that briefly places into context the 




The findings revealed a number of different enablers and barriers to social capital formation 
among farmers in GVCs. Some of the themes that emerged from the findings corresponded with 
the literature and the conceptual framework developed as part of the overall research design, 
including: rules and sanctioning, group diversity (ethnic and cultural), culture/history and the 
role of the institutional context (including institutions and institutional organisations). This study 
reinforced the role of these factors in social capital formation among farmers when placed 
within the context of a GVC. 
 
Moving on from the findings that support the previous literature, the main aim of the 
exploratory study was to explore what the role of governance is in the formation of social capital 
among farmers in GVCs. The findings in both case studies indicated that structural social capital 
rose substantially among farmers when their respective collective organisations integrated into 
governed GVCs as evidenced by more effective rules, roles for decision making, procedures and 
precedents being put in place. In the PeruCacao GVC case study, collective organisations 
displayed evidence of better defined leadership roles and more effectives rule and sanctioning 
over time, for instance introducing control cards and excluding members for cheating. Likewise 
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in the PalmPeru GVC case study, the farmer association had developed an executive decision 
making structure with different functions delegated to specific individuals and strict monitoring 
mechanisms put in place to prevent cheating. While farmers in both case studies experienced a 
diminishing of traditional structural social capital at the village level, the evidence suggested that 
this was due to the cultural context and in the PalmPeru GVC case study new forms of structural 
social capital had been facilitated by PalmPeru to replace its traditional predecessor. 
 
While structural social capital was formed in both case studies, the picture of cognitive social 
capital was mixed and as a result, the findings were more nuanced and complex. Both GVCs 
exhibited explicit governance from buyers, but the nature of the governing relationship differed. 
In the PeruCacao GVC, the relationship between PeruCacao and the two case study collective 
organisations was characterised by mistrust, a lack ŽĨ Ă  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ĂƐ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ďǇ
farmers and asymmetric information sharing in favour of PeruCacao. The juxtaposition of this 
was offered by PalmPeru GVC where the governing relationship displayed a high level of trust 
and interdependency, a perceivĞĚ  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ
communication that flowed in both directions. 
 
Corresponding with a distinct governing relationship was the contrast in cognitive social capital 
among farmers. In the PeruCacao GVC, cognitive social capital was low; there was resistance 
from farmers to increase contributions, prevalent cheating through side-selling and mistrust in 
the management among members and even among the Directive itself. In the PalmPeru GVC, 
although the picture was not the juxtaposition of the PeruCacao GVC, there was evidence that 
farmers had a strong commitment with regard to a propensity to contribute and an appreciation 




8.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
The research began by acknowledging that a conceptual framework of social capital amongst 
farmers in governed GVCs is incomplete. Therefore the contribution of the study was not one 
based on confirming a theoretical proposition, but rather developing propositions derived from 
the case studies that could be tested through further research  W an ideal contribution of case 
study methodologies (Bennett, 2004, George and Bennett, 2005, Yin, 2009). This section lays out 
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the proposed propositions, developed from the propositions presented in chapter 3, followed by 
a discussion of its contribution to the wider theoretical literature. 
 
The two theoretical propositions of the present research are separated by the two dimensions of 
social capital, structural and cognitive. The first theoretical proposition concerning cognitive 
social capital was as follows: 
 
P1: Governance can be an enabler of structural social capital formation among farmers in a 
Global Value Chain, shaped by the institutional context and existing attitudes towards social 
structure 
 
A theory of this association was developed in the discussion of the findings. Groups of farmers 
who go from spot-markets to governed GVCs face different rules of the game that force them to 
change how their organisational processes operate  W processes that correspond with structural 
social capital. An analogy may shed light on the proposition. If a sports club that had played in a 
lower league one day suddenly found itself in the highest league  W it would have to change the 
way it operated, from how the team was managed to a stricter regime for its players. Previous 
procedures and precedents would no longer apply  W it would, in effect, have to organise itself in 
a way that was conducive to the new competitive environment it now faced. If the team 
received external financial support from a sponsor, then its ability to develop would be greatly 
increased; through better training facilities to more experienced coaches  W but if limited external 
support were provided, it would be difficult to conceive how such a club would survive in the top 
league. If the team looked upon this new structure favourably, they may have a greater chance 
to stay up  W but if players were previously embedded in an attitude towards structure 
characterised by regularly skipping training, failing to keep to an appropriate diet and/or placing 
little value in the authority of the manager, the ability of the club to make the kind of necessary 
structural changes would be contested. 
 
The analogy is transferable to structural social capital among farmers in governed GVCs. 
Collective organisations that were previously used to selling to spot-markets with few external 
pressures, akin to the lowest sports leagues, now compete in environments analogous to the 
highest leagues that demand strict standards and in turn, farmers must transform their 
structural social capital to participate. In short, groups of farmers either structurally adapt or 
they are relegated from governed GVCs (dynamic ex-suppliers of PeruCacao knew well). The 
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institutional context can facilitate and incentivise buyers to invest in the social capabilities of 
farmers, and existing attitudes towards social structure moderate the willingness and capacity of 
farmers to develop their social capital. 
 
Moving from the theoretical implications for structural social capital to cognitive social capital, 
the second proposition to emerge as a result of the research was as follows: 
 
P2: Governance can be an enabler or barrier for cognitive social capital formation among 
farmers, depending on the nature of the governing relationship 
 
When the nature of the governing relationship is typified by a lack of trust, the relationship is 
not mutually beneficial and information flow is not two-way; the propensity of farmers to side- 
selů ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ ’Ɛ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ Őƌow while the disposition to 
contribute falls. On the other side of the coin, when the governing relationship is characterised 
by a high degree of trust between buyer and suppler, the relationship ŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ  ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ’
and interdependent and information flows both ways; there is less propensity to side-sell, 
farmers are more confident in the direction of the group and therefore more inclined to 
contribute, and there is one less topic for farmers and management to disagree on. At its most 
basic level, the proposition is based on the idea that for a collective organisation, the governing 
relationship with a buyer is either an area of accord or an area of conflict for farmers and the 
directive to clash over and therefore the nature of the governing relationship can serve as either 
an enabler or barrier to social capital formation. 
 
Until now, there have been limited attempts to understand the role of governance on horizontal 
phenomena at the farm level (Neilson, 2008, Challies, 2008, Fold and Gough, 2008, Bolwig et al., 
2010, Messner, 2004) and especially with regard to how participation in GVCs, constrained by 
the structure of governance ? ƐŚĂƉĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ’ŽĨ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ(Messner, 2004). There is a rich 
account in the literature on how governance ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ĨŽƌ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƵƉŐƌĂĚĞ ’ ?
making better products, making them more efficiently and/or moving to different functions of 
the chain (Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004, Rabellotti, 2004, Wiegratz et al., 2007). But while this 
has developed a theory of governance that explains participation of farmers, it lacks a basis for 
exploring a theory of governance that gives explanatory power for the participation among 
farmers. The majority of studies in the development literature on social capital formation see it 
as an endogenous process internalised within a unit of analysis, or in other words the factors 
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influencing social capital formation among a group of farmers are contained within that group. 
dŚŝƐ ŵŽƐƚ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƐƚĞŵƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ŽůĞŵĂŶ ’Ɛ(1990) 
original three conditions of social capital formation all relating to internal characteristics 
(closure, stability and ideology) and future discussions likewise pointing towards endogenous 
factors (Lyon, 2000, Ostrom, 1992, Becker and Ostrom, 1995, Vollan, 2012, Pretty and Ward, 
2001). While the findings cannot be empirically generalised due to the nature of case study 
research, it does in a small but important way contribute towards a theory of social capital 
formation that explores the role of a system external to a group of farmers  W governance. 
 
On a meta-theoretical level, the study highlights the role that neo-endogenous theories can play 
in rural development. As already alluded to, the gaps in the governance and social capital 
literature in many ways stem from their starting theoretical positions. The argument that GVCs 
represent a tool for rural development is very much characteristic of a neo-classical, exogenous 
approach because the fundamental claim is that the source of rural development comes from 
sources outside of rural spaces, ultimately reliant on the needs of consumers. This is reflected by 
the notion that the scope for countries and regions to thrive is increasingly dependent on their 
participation in GVCs governed by powerful buyers (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, Gereffi and Lee, 
2012, Reardon and Farina, 2002, Lee et al., 2011). On the other side, previous discussions of 
social capital have typically taken an endogenous approach to rural development because it 
focuses on local resources as the source of development and concentrates on capacity building 
at the rural level  W in this case, capacity representing the stock of social capital among farmers. 
 
Rather tŚĂŶƚĂŬŝŶŐĂ ‘ŽŶĞŽƌƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ’ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚĨŽůůŽǁĞĚĂŶĞŽ- 
endogenous theory of rural development (Ray, 2002). In this model, there is an acceptance that 
both internal and external linkages are valuable to the process of rural development. 
Interestingly the argument that the analysis of GVCs needs to incorporate an understanding of 
phenomena at the farm level  W the combination of the vertical with the horizontal, is indirectly 
an argument for neo-endogenous approaches to rural development. As far as is known, the 
present research study is one of the first to approach social capital formation from a neo- 
endogenous position. 
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8.3.2 Methodological Implications 
 
The research demonstrated the deficiency of associational membership growth as a proxy 
indicator for structural social capital when used in isolation. While Serra (2011) discusses this 
issue, the present study is the first to empirically highlight the validity of associational 
membership. Put simply, what the PeruCacao GVC case study showed was that growth in 
associational membership can in some circumstances be a reflection of low structural social 
capital. It puts into doubt the notion that  ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ’ŝƐĂŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚƌŽŶŐƐŽĐŝĂů
capital (Eisingerich et al., 2010) because a lack of barriers to joining a network can in some 
circumstances be the antithesis to strong structural social capital. 
 
Ironically while the typical argument in the methodology literature is that qualitative methods 
lack validity (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006), qualitative dimensions of social capital may actually 
have a better case for validity than some quantifiable indicators because of the multifaceted 
nature of social capital. The implication is that future research on social capital could benefit by 
capturing qualitative dimensions of social capital alongside quantitative measures to get a more 
complete picture of the social phenomenon. 
 
8.3.3 Policy Implications 
 
The most relevant policy implications of the present research lay within the context that the 
case studies were placed. This section begins by briefly reviewing foundational principles of ADP 
that relate to the research topic and then from this, sets out new insights to policy that the 
present study puts forward. Given the multiple components of ADP and the narrow focus of the 
study, the implications laid out here focuses on policy related to the governance of GVCs and 
social capital development. 
 
An objective of ADP in Peru is to develop social capital of farmers as a means to bring farmers 
into collective organisations that can compete in competitive agri-food chains. Both USAID and 
the UNODC refer to social capital as a critical success factor (USAID, 2010, UNODC, 2013). Both 
institutional organisations highlight agri-food buyers as important stakeholders in ADP, not least 
ŽĨ Ăůů ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŚŽůĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚŝĐŬĞƚƐ ’ ĨŽƌ ĨĂrmers to access lucrative export chains that make 
cacao and palm oil commercially viable alternatives. Indeed given the significant economic 
benefits of coca production (Lupu, 2004, Léons and Sanabria, 1997), set within a context of 
systemic poverty in rural Peru (IFAD, 2011), the policy of bringing farmers into competitive 
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export chains appears to be the only realistic means to combat coca production (UNODC, 2013, 
Lupu, 2004). Therefore there is a dual intended outcome when it comes to value chain 
development from ADP, both of which are interrelated. On the one hand, farmers need to 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞŝŶƚŽ'sƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇŵŽƌĞƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůďƵǇĞƌƐƚŽǁŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƚŝĐŬĞƚ ’ƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?KŶ
the other hand, farmers need to develop their social capital and collectively organise to be 
commercially viable suppliers in GVCs. 
 
The study highlights that how farmers are governed in GVCs by buyers could be a factor in how 
social capital is shaped. As it currentůǇƐƚĂŶĚƐ ?WƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ‘ďƌŽĂĚďƌƵƐŚ ’ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ
of farmers in GVCs and there is no evidence to suggest that the nature of the governing 
relationship is addressed from a policy perspective. While it is not disputed that market access 
to agri-food markets is critical, a policy implication here is that more needs to be done to 
support the governing relationship once market access has been achieved. On the surface, the 
PeruCacao GVC case study achieves all the value chain development aims of USAID (2012); 
improved farm-level production practices, better capacity of collective organisations and private 
investment. Yet underneath was an untrusting governing relationship and conflict among 
farmers and managers. As a consequence, there were questions on the sustainability of Cacao 
ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ’Ɛparticipation in the GVC due to the risk of farmers voting to exit the GVC or 
PeruCacao expelling Cacao Collective from the GVC. The PalmPeru case study however provides 
a positive example that can be transferred to policy recommendations. With a governing 
relationship that exhibited perceived equity between parties, information sharing and trust, 
cognitive social capital had scope to grow. In short, to minimise the risk of social capital 
breakdown among farmers in GVCs, ADP policy could seek to intervene in governing 
relationships to facilitate: 1) outcomes that are perceived as equitable by participants; 2) 
information flows that are two-way; and 3) the building of buyer-supplier trust.  ‘,Žǁ ’this could 
be achieved is a separate question of course and the mechanisms by which policy can effectively 
enable these outcomes is an area for future study. 
 
The role of culture was a consistent theme throughout the research. While it is well understood 
that culture is a factor for social capital formation in the academic literature (Lyon, 2000, El-Said 
and Harrigan, 2009, Maclean, 2010, Woolcock, 1998, Coleman, 1990), it is remarkably 
understated in ADP policy material and poorly accounted for in the so called  ‘^ĂŶMartin ŵŝƌĂĐůĞ ’
model. This San Martin miracle is a regional case study that is put up as the framework for the 
rest of rural Peru to follow (Cabieses, 2010) and GVC integration of collective organisations has 
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undoubtedly been a success in San Martin when considering the large economic gains achieved 
in the region through value chain development (UNODC, 2013). 
 
However interviews with stakeholders that had interacted with farmers from different regions, 
as well as farmers themselves who compared their own ways of working with those originating 
from the Andes, suggested there were different cultural characteristics in San Martin compared 
to Ucayali (where case study collective organisations were based), reflecting a rich history of 
traditional Andean farming groups (Ansion, 2004)  W characteristics that enable structural change 
in collective organisations. The case studies showed that existing attitudes towards social 
structure could be a moderating factor when considering how governance shapes social capital 
formation. Indeed more recent analysis of the San Martin case study shows that one component 
of its success lay not just with the promotion of collective organisations, but also the willingness 
of stakeholders to change (UNODC, 2013). 
 
Adding further granularity to the findings, not only were institutional support and existing 
attitudes towards social structure identified as moderating factors, but there also appeared to 
be a relationship between the two, separate from the issue of governance. In the PalmPeru GVC, 
the support by the United Nations explicitly tapped into the existing social structures of farmers 
 W reducing set-up and maintenance costs for farmers through Minga. The findings showed that 
when institutional support facilitated by ADP and cultural aspects are combined in a way that is 
complementary, the impact on social capital formation can be very powerful. As shown in the 
PalmPeru GVC case study, even in the face of diminishing relevance of Minga, modern forms of 
structural social capital can be developed that could likewise be capitalised on from a policy 
perspective. The implication for ADP is that institutional support is most effective when it is 
combined with a rich understanding of attitudes towards social structure at the village level. In a 
country where micro-cultures are so prevalent, the viability of the  ‘^ĂŶMartin ŵŝƌĂĐůĞ ’to be a 
transferrable policy model for alternative development is questioned. The implications for policy 
is that granularity and nuance should be prioritised over the notion of a  ‘ŵŽĚĞů ’when it comes 
to supporting GVC integration and the development of social capital. 
 
While the implications of the study questions some assumptions in ADP, it also supports the ADP 
in the promotion of institutional and donor assistance. In the PeruCacao case study, it was clear 
how fundamental this kind of support was to enable viable participation in the GVC, not just in 
terms of the technical aspects associated with certification, but also the workshops, training and 
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social technician that contributed to structural social capital formation. Furthermore, the 
incentive for Cacao International to create the PeruCacao GVC and include small collective 
organisations rather than its traditional large cooperative producing-exporting suppliers was 
ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌŝĐŚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ PĂƐƚŚĞŽǁŶĞƌŽĨĂĐĂŽ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŶŽƚĞĚ “We 
live in an environment where there are probably too many projects avĂŝůĂďůĞ  ? ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ Ă
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƚŽŶŽƚǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞŬŝŶĚŽĨƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?,. Likewise in the second case 
study, the very existence of PalmPeru and its supplier APFP, as well as the governing relationship 
between them, was facilitated and shaped by the United Nations (despite losing this support 
once commercially sustainable). 
 
The aim of ADP to bring together a multitude of institutional and donor organisations to support 
the formation of social capital formation among farmers for the purpose of GVC integration is 
both supported and further encouraged. This is not only because it is identified in the literature 
as a key factor for social capital formation (Khwaja, 2009, Grootaert and Narayan, 2004, 
Janssens, 2010, Vasilaky, 2013), but based on the novel contribution of the present study, such 
institutional and donor support may moderate the influence of governance on social capital 




The main limitation of the present study was one of methodology. It was strongly argued in the 
methodology chapter that a qualitative case study approach was best placed to investigate the 
research problem because of its exploratory nature and the intended deliverable of theoretical 
propositions that could be further tested in future research. It is certainly argued that the choice 
of a qualitative case study method was vindicated based on the richness of the findings. 
Ultimately any research question that begins with why or how is best suited to a qualitative, case 
study approach (Yin, 2009). Nevertheless, as with any chosen method, a trade-off exists that 
reveals limitations to the findings. 
 
The key limitation related to the theoretical limitations of such an approach is the inability to 
empirically generalise case study research even though the propositions can be generalised on 
an analytical level (Bryman, 2008). The empirical findings of case studies provide a rich 
understanding of the micro level, but less so at a macro level as would have been the case in a 
large quantitative study. As a result, empirical findings from the present study do not test a 
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model for governance and social capital formation and consequently the theoretical implications 
are far from conclusive and therefore warrant further investigation by others. Considering 
specifically the association between governance and social capital formation, there may also be 
factors moderating the relationship that were not identified in the present research, suggesting 
that not only testing but further exploration could also add new insight, especially when placed 
within a context that contrasts with rural Peru. In short, the study should be regarded as a small 
but important step in the right direction in building a novel theoretical understanding of 
governance and social capital formation. 
 
In addition to the limitations of the theoretical implications, and again related to the choice of 
methodology, is the narrow scope of case studies compared to the wider ADP which involves a 
large number of farmers and value chains. While there is no published data on the total number 
of stakeholders who have been impacted by ADP, the scope and scale is clearly vast  W in 2010 
alone, $500 million was invested by international development agencies as part of the program 
(USAID, 2012). The ability to generalise findings to wider policy implications is limited and should 
be taken with caution. Despite this, the case studies do provide rich examples of ADP in action 
and therefore while they cannot be generalised to every case, they do highlight issues that can 
be applied to other case studies where similar circumstances are evident  W a concept known as 
case-to-case transferability (Yin, 2009). The propositions developed from the study can be seen 
as an attempt to provoke thought and discussion of governance and social capital concepts in 
ADP policy circles. 
 
8.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The nature of the study was exploratory in that the research aim was to  ‘ŽƉĞŶ ƚŚĞ ďŽǆ ’ ŽŶ
governance of GVCs and social capital formation among farmers. Given that an outcome of the 
study was the presentation of propositions, the next logical step would be a more formal testing 
of these propositions to ultimately determine whether the theoretical contributions are proved 
or nullified. Therefore one recommendation for future research would be to apply a study 
mirroring a theory testing methodology that has the power to generate more robust empirical 
generalisations (Bryman, 2008). This would contribute towards further developing a theory of 
governance and social capital formation in GVCs. In addition, it would also go some way in 
moving governance research beyond single case study methods as used in the present study as 
well as a large number of previous studies(Tran et al., 2013, Weijland, 1999, Mutersbaugh, 2005, 
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Roy and Thorat, 2008, Shiferaw et al., 2008, Neilson, 2008, Fischer and Qaim, 2012, Challies and 
Murray, 2011). 
 
As already mentioned, there may also be opportunities of further exploratory research in the 
topic of governance and social capital formation, especially in different case study contexts. 
While the present study was purposefully concentrated and in-depth to effectively investigate 
the two concepts, it is probable that there are other phenomena that were not evident in the 
case studies. Outside of a Peru/ADP context, different dynamics may be present. Social capital is 
a concept that is uniquely context specific (Cleaver, 2005, Bebbington, 2007, Serra, 2011) and 
theories of its formation need to be adapted to take this into account  W DŽƐƐĞ ’Ɛ(2006) study on 
the implications of the Indian cast-system on the social capital of farmers typifies the 
significance of context. As a result, a recommendation for future research is that supplementary 
exploratory studies in different contexts to Peru and ADP should be pursued. 
 
For the purpose of theory building, different contexts provide an ideal area for new research. 
However for ADP policy, there is also value in undertaking further research on social capital 
formation among farmers in case study GVCs that incorporates the multi-dimensional nature of 
the concept. According to USAID (2010), ADP has created social capital among rural 
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ P  “Evidence of social capital generated by ADP includes the investments of 
community members in associations and cooperatives to improve training, acquisition of 
production inputs, and improved and value added post-harvest and marketing activities of their 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?(p. 19-20). This could be argued as a crude view of social capital, missing the state of 
the structural elements that aid cooperation and the level of trust among farmers (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna, 2000) and ultimately being more of a platitude than an understanding. Although 
the findings themselves cannot be empirically generalised, the present study highlights the value 
of a nuanced, in-depth approach to social capital. A recommendation for future research within 
the context of ADP would be to follow a more nuanced approach to evaluate whether social 
capital, in all its complexity and multiple dimensions, truly has been formed as a result of ADP. 
 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The development literature has up to now overlooked the notion that the social capital of 
farmers in GVCs is enabled or constrained within the structure of governance, relying mostly on 
factors that are contained within groups of farmers and considering everything outside of that 
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system to be inevitably detrimental or negligible. Groups of farmers represent a structure of 
participation and clearly there are endogenous factors that form social capital. But, what the 
present study highlights, is that there are other structures of social behaviour which farmers 
participate in that may influence social capital formation. The GVC represents such a structure - 
a highly significant one to current rural development strategies, with a multitude of governing 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐƚŚĂƚƐŚĂƉĞĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ’ participation. 
 
It is hoped that the present study provokes a discussion on two levels. Firstly, there is desire in 
development circles to bring farmers into governed GVCs (Shepherd, 2007); however there 
needs to be a greater consideration of the consequences of such a strategy at the rural level  W 
the integration ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǀĞƌƚŝĐĂů ’ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂů ’ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂů
theory needs to be more innovative in its thinking to avoid hitting an impasse. Social capital has 
ďĞĞŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ’ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ (Grootaert, 1998), yet 
ironically, social capital is missing links to make it a more complete theoretical model. Future 
advancements in social capital theory will require fresh approaches that push the boundaries of 
present thinking that has thus far been characterised by rigidity. 
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Appendix 
 
Example interview transcript: Farmer from Association of Palm Fruit Producers 
 
 
Interviewer: First of all, I would like to ask for permission first to record, we are now doing... 
well, he is doing a study on the creation of social value through palm oil plantations, he wants to 
understand how farmers work within APFP, in this case, but we are taking a look at other cases 
and organisations as well, so he wants to understand how you work, the information will be 
anonymous, it is not necessary for you to tell us your name. Well, to begin with, tell us how 
many palm oil hectares you have? 
Speaker: I have 20 hectares. 
Interviewer: 20, do you hire workers? 
Speaker: We have workerƐ ?ďƵƚǁĞĚŽŶ ’ƚŚĂǀĞƐƚĂďůĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?
Interviewer: Permanent workers. How many do you hire a year? 
Speaker: What I normally do are contracts and I pay them. They ask how many hectares I want 
them to work for and if it is convenient, I give to them and pay them. 
Interviewer: How many times do you hire them per year? 
Speaker: Well, twice a year. 
Interviewer: Twice? How many workers? One or two? 
Speaker: It is normally carried out with two. 
Interviewer: Two? But are you permanently working with your family? How many of your family 
help you? 
Speaker: Me and my wife, my children. 
Interviewer: How many children? 
Speaker: Four 
Interviewer: How long have you been cultivating palm? For how many years? 
Speaker: We have been cultivating since 1992. 
Interviewer: 1992? Why did you decide to cultivate palm? 
Speaker: Because there was not anything then, we used to cultivate coca. 
Interviewer: Did you use to have coca? 
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Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: How did that change? What happened? 
Speaker: An NGO [by "NGO", respondent is referring to the United Nations] came to offer it. 
Interviewer: An NGO came? 
Speaker: It came in order to cultivate palm. 
Interviewer: Did the NGO give you something? 
Speaker: The NGO gave us a greenhouse, plants. 
Interviewer: Seeds? 
Speaker: Seeds, plant, they gave us everything, the government also helped us. (Inaudible) That 
was not here... 
Interviewer: Will you serve him? 
Speaker: (Farmer speaking with a community member) The NGO used to help us, we used to 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ǁĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĚŽ “ŵŝŶŐĂ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞ ?among five or six of us. 
Interviewer: ŝĚǇŽƵƵƐĞƚŽĚŽ “ŵŝŶŐĂ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞE'K ?
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: How did the NGO help you? 
Speaker: They used to give us food. 
Interviewer: Food. They gave you plants and seed. How many hectares did you install? 
Speaker: Five. 
Interviewer: Five. 
Speaker: People here did not want to cultivate palm, they used to cultivate coca. 
Interviewer: Why did you decide to do it then? 
Speaker: I thank an engineer, he was very friendly, he suggested me to cultivate it, he motivated 
me to cultivate palm, we´ll do anything possible to get plants for you, and he used to motivate 
us. 
Interviewer: Do you have any other crops apart from palm? 
Speaker: Yes, we cultivate tapioca and maize. 
Interviewer: Tapioca, maize, what else? 
Speaker: Banana, what we normally eat. 
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Interviewer: How long have you belonged to APFP? 
Speaker: We are the first members, the founding members. 
Interviewer: What year did that begin? 
Speaker: 1995 or 1996. 
Interviewer: 1996. 
Speaker: Yes, we are the first founders, since 1996, we have worked a lot in that factory. 
Interviewer: Did you belong to another organisation before that? 
Speaker: No. 
Interviewer: It was the first one then. Why did you decide to become an APFP member? 
Speaker: This organisation has got the point to get everyone together while cultivating palm, we 
wanted to belong to an association. 
Interviewer: (Pause) Are you an APFP shareholder? 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: Has it been easy or difficult to be a shareholder? 
Speaker: Difficult, whenever it... the association did not have money, but the NGO was giving us 
palm before, they supported us with the factory, we did not have money, but there was already 
a president, he said if you all work; all members... Why? To have the shares and working in the 
factory... 
Interviewer: What has been easy or difficult while being a 
shareholder?  
Speaker: Have the five hectares and be a member. 
Interviewer: KŬĚŝĚŶ ’ƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞǇŽƵƌ ?ŚĞĐƚĂƌĞƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ?
Speaker: We already have them, yes. 
Interviewer: Why else? 
Speaker: How can I say it...? PALMPERU´s president and the directive used to say we should have 
more shares, and I would say why would I have more? We did not know, I did not know what 
profit and shares were... and they told us afterwards why... 
Interviewer: Did they carry out trainings? 
Speaker: Yes, the company would bring trainers and the company would bring an NGO to train 
us... 
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Interviewer: What benefits have you received while being a shareholder? 
Speaker: Every year, according to what the company profits, we are given something. 
Interviewer: You receive a profit at the end of the year then? (Interviewers speaking English) 
When you deliver your product to PALMPERU, what requirements are you asked for? For 
example, requirements; to deliver a ripe product, are that easy or difficult to fulfil these? 
Speaker: This was not achieved during the first years, but most of the members are now 
delivering it. The company is telling us to do so, if we deliver our ripe bunches, we are working 
well, delivering... 
Interviewer: What are the requirements that PALMPERU asks for? 
Speaker: What for? 
Interviewer: Fruit delivery... 
Speaker: Be a member... 
Interviewer: Whenever you deliver the product to PALMPERU, what do they look for on the 
fruit? 
Speaker: Ripe. 
Interviewer: Ripe? What else? 
Speaker: It should be ripe mostly... 
Interviewer: Ripe. 
Speaker: We harvest, we normally wait for 8 days until we do this, if we do this after 8 days, we 
get a lot of fruit... sometimes grains are rotten. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) are you asked to use a specific fertilizer? Do you use 
one or the other? 
Speaker: Yes, we fertilize every year. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what does PALMPERU require for production? Do 
they ask you for a specific process for your palm? 
Speaker: We have a special technique, sometimes they are in our farm, and we need to do a 
type of fertilization. They teach us. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) has it been easy or difficult to fulfil these 
requirements for you? 
Speaker: Of course, in order to produce palm well, we have to listen to PALMPERU technicians 
Interviewer: But, has it been easy for you or a bit difficult? 
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Speaker: A bit difficult, because we normally ǁŽƌŬ ? ? ?,ŽǁĐĂŶ/ƐĂǇ ? ? ? ? “ŚĂŵƉĂǌ ?
Interviewer: What do you mean? You ĚŽŶ ’ƚĨŝŶŝƐŚ ?Or... 
Speaker: We work in this way... How can I say...? You cultivate and you let it grow... If it 
produces, it will do so... 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) How are you communicated about these 
requirements asked by PALMPERU? Documents? Face to face? 
Speaker: That is why the company has its technicians, they communicate us. Through them 
Interviewer: Face to face? 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: Is not there a document where that is stated? 
Speaker: No, they rarely send a document... 
Interviewer: Not where it states how the fruit must be ripe? Do you think they can communicate 
that better or is it all right like that? 
Speaker: No, we communicate well, when they come. 
Interviewer: Face to face. (Interviewers speaking English) What is your opinion about 
PALMPERU? What are they doing well and what are they doing wrong? 
Speaker: PALMPERU has emerged a lot, it has grown a lot from what it was before, they have 
another plant under construction, building more green houses, more palm green houses, and 
the company is growing and working. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) anything good or bad about PALMPERU? What do 
you think? Anything else apart from that? (Interviewers speaking English) 
Speaker: What can I say? 
Interviewer: Anything negative? 
Speaker: We are normally in the farm, the company works, there is a directory, there are also 
two representatives we choose that go to PALMPERU and find out and then they come and 
communicate this to us during an assembly. 
Interviewer: Have they told you anything negative so far? 
Speaker: No. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what is your opinion about the palm oil buyer? 
Speaker: The ones that buy from PALMPERU? 
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Interviewer: Yes, what do you think about them? What are they doing well or what are they 
doing wrong? 
Speaker: They buy all... 
Interviewer: Oil? 
Speaker: Oil. They say prices has gone down. 
Interviewer: Prices are down? 
Speaker: 200, now, it has gone down a lot. 
Interviewer: Per tonne? 
Speaker: Yes, per tonne. 
Interviewer: Dollars? 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what do you think about the price being low? 
Speaker: According to PALMPERU, they say oil price goes down because of the international 
price. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) How were you informed about that? 
Speaker: How were we informed? They come here; they come every five or six months, they 
come down from the base, the manage and everyone comes here and they inform us here in an 
assembly. 
Interviewer: From PALMPERU or APFP? 
Speaker: PALMPERU 
Interviewer: Every six months? 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: Twice a year? 
Speaker: The come to inform us, the manager comes, the accountant comes, and everyone 
comes and informs us, they say why the price has been low. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) How do you feel when they inform you? 
Speaker: Happy. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) If you were not given the information by 
PALMPERU? Would you have felt different? 
Speaker: Of course. 
Interviewer: How would you feel if you are not informed? 
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Speaker: Of course, sometimes you don ’ƚŬŶŽǁĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚŝƐ happening. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) can you describe how were you first introduced as a 
member in APFP, can you tell me the story? How did you become a member? 
Speaker: In order to be an PALMPERU member, they asked for requirements, first of all to 
become a member, they asked then our identification card, they asked for... 
Interviewer: But before that, did you go by yourself to APFP? Did they come here? 
Speaker: They came here to inform us. 
Interviewer: They came here? 
Speaker: They came and informed about requirements and public registration 
Interviewer: And you decided to become a member then...? 
Speaker: Yes, we accepted to give all the documents they asked for, we fulfilled these 
requirements and became members. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) He says you would be a bit upset if PALMPERU 
would not inform you properly. Can you explain further what type of information is important 
for you? Can you explain a bit more? 
Speaker: Mostly about negotiations they have had. 
Interviewer: Negotiation. (Interviewers speaking English) What else? (Interviewers speaking 
English) Why is it important for you? (Interviewers speaking English) Why is the information that 
is provided important for you? 
Speaker: That is how we get to know, the prices they sell with, prices they buy for, how much 
money they spend, and that is why... 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) He wants to know why would you be angry if you 
ĚŽŶ ’ƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽĨŽƌŚŝŵƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ĐĂŶǇŽƵƚĞůůƵƐǁŚǇŝƚŝƐ 
important for you to receive the information (Interviewers speaking English) For example... If 
you are not given information about the price being low, you would be upset, if you are given 
information, you would be happy, but why? 
Speaker: What can I say...? It is good to be informed by them, but when the oil price is low, they 
come here and tell us what is happening, members ask why and they are told the reasons why 
oil price is low. There is oil from Colombia, Ecuador, and Malaysia, there is competition, and they 
ƐĂǇŝƚŝƐĐŚĞĂƉĞƌƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ’ƚƉay taxes, and we pay everything. 
 279  
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) he wants to understand why sometimes you are 
angry and why sometimes you are happy with information? Why? 
Speaker: (Silence) that is the reason lady. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what benefits have you received from the 
organisation so far? From all these years? What benefits have you received? 
Speaker: Profit the company has every year. 
Interviewer: They have every year, what else? 
Speaker: We are given plants. 
Interviewer: For free? 
Speaker: Yes, we are given for 3 hectares. 
Interviewer: Every year. 
Speaker: Yes, it depends on how much the company produces and if they are close from the 
green house. Every member gets a different quantity per hectare. 
Interviewer: They give you these for free? What else? 
Speaker: They sell to us everything we need for the farm. 
Interviewer: What is sold for example? 
Speaker: What is cultivated, they sell fertilizers; they deliver it and sell it. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what benefits would you like to receive that you 
have not received so far? What would you like to receive that you haven´t...? 
Speaker: We would like to... We ask the company to check if it is possible to construct a house 
for each of us. 
Interviewer: A house to live? 
Speaker: Yes, for each of the members. 
Interviewer: Here? 
Speaker: Yes, here in the community, that is what us members are waiting for... 
Interviewer: What else? Anything else you would like? 
Speaker: (Silence) 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) how often do you have meetings? 
Speaker: Every month. 
Interviewer: Each month, do you do workshops as well? 
Speaker: No, just meetings? 
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Interviewer: Every month? (Interviewers speaking English) Are they here? 
Speaker: Yes, here. We ask a lot, the company to train us with workshops, these normally take 
place in the village or the city, whoever is interested goes therĞ ?ďƵƚŵŽƐƚŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐĚŽŶ ’ƚŐŽ
Interviewer: tŚǇĚŽŶ ’ƚǇŽƵŐŽ ?/ƐŝƚƚŽŽ far? 
Speaker: It is too far, it could also take place here, they can organise a lunch and be there all day 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) How do the meetings that take place every month 
here help you? The monthly meetings. 
Speaker: We are informed in the meetings; we are informed whatever happens in the local 
organisation, what they are doing, that is doing it, what the company is doing. What we are 
asking for, we are informed about all of that... 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what is your opinion about APFP´s directive? What 
do you think about them? What are they doing well and what are they doing wrong? 
(Interviewers speaking English) We will not tell them what you tell to us. 
Speaker: APFP is building a factory and they are investing money on that... 
Interviewer: What else are they doing well and wrong? What do you think about the directive 
and directors? 
Speaker: The directive has recently changed. 
Interviewer: What do you think about the prior directive? 
Speaker: They have not done anything. 
Interviewer: dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ’ƚĚŽŶĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?
Speaker: Nothing is to be seen. 
Interviewer: What else have they done? For example? 
Speaker: They must finish that factory. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what do you think about PALMPERU´s manager? 
Speaker: From what I have heard, he is working well, he is a good manager 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) 
Speaker: He recently joined, we did not have a manager, and an accountant was managing the 
company. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) how is the manager working well? 
Speaker: because he is now doing everything we have been informed about, he is informing us. 
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Interviewer: He comes all the way here? 
Speaker: Yes, he suggests what we should do... 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) How have you learnt about responsibilities and rules 
in APFP? Have you learn about this in workshops or trainings? 
Speaker: Workshops. 
Interviewer: In workshops? 
Speaker: Years ago. 
Interviewer: Have they come here? 
Speaker: Yes, they have come here. 
Interviewer: In workshops and training. Also talking to other farmers? 
Speaker: Also. Yes 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) do you feel you need to know more about 
responsibilities and rules in APFP? 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Speaker: Because I just would like to learn more. 
Interviewer:  ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌƐƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŶŐůŝƐŚ ),ŽǁĚŽĨĂƌŵĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶǇŽƵ “ĐĂĐĞƌŝŽ ?ŚĞůƉĞĂĐŚ
other?  
Speaker: We do  “ŵŝŶŐĂ ? 
Interviewer: ŽǇŽƵĚŽ “ŵŝŶŐĂŚĞƌĞ ? ?
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking EngůŝƐŚ )tŚǇĚŽǇŽƵĚŽ “ŵŝŶŐĂ ? here? 
Speaker: Because there are not any workers who want to work, or some of them want to get 
ŵŽƌĞŵŽŶĞǇƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶĂĨĨŽƌĚ ?tĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĚŽŝŶŐ “ŵŝŶŐĂ ? ?ƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁǁĞŐŽƚŽƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ’Ɛ
farm, the day after that we go to another one. 
Interviewer: They want to charge more. 
Speaker: They want to charge 30 soles. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) how often do you talk to other farmers? 
Speaker: We speak every day. 
Interviewer: Every day? 
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Speaker: We talk about different topics every afternoon, is production low? High? 
Interviewer: Is that related to agriculture? What else? 
Speaker: About the company. What do you know about the company? What do you know about 
APFP? Someone must know something, so they inform us. 
Interviewer: You speak to other farmers, what benefits if any are there when you speak to other 
farmers. 
Speaker: We get to know what they are doing and what I am doing. We find out about each 
other. 
Interviewer: Is that information new for you? 
Speaker: No, we ask each other every day what people are doing. 
Interviewer: But what? What topics? 
Speaker: I am cultivating my corn, my palm. 
Interviewer: What do you do with that information afterwards? 
Speaker: I think, if he is cultivating something special, why am I not doing this? I should do it too. 
If they are cultivating more things, they will earn and I can earn more. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) you say ? ? ?'ŽŝŶŐďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞ “ŵŝŶŐĂ ?ƚŽƉŝĐ ?ŝĚǇŽƵ
ƵƐĞƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚƚŽŽ ? “DŝŶŐĂƐ ?ŝĚǇŽƵƵƐĞƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŝĚǇŽƵĐƌĞĂƚĞŝƚor has it 
always been around? 
Speaker: No, always. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) about farmers from outsiĚĞǇŽƵƌ “ĐĂĐĞƌŝŽ ? ?ĚŽǇŽƵ
speak about the same topics? With other palm producers, for example. 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: Do you speak about the same? (Interviewers speaking English) Do you get different 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌ “ĐĂĐĞƌŝŽ ? ? 
Speaker: zĞƐ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵƚĞůůƵƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŶŐĐŽĐŽĂ ? “ĐŽĐŽĂŝƐůĞƐƐĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? ? “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
too much work ǁŝƚŚƉĂůŵ ? ?/ĐĂŶŶŽƚĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐƌŽƉ ?/ŚĂǀĞbeen doing this for a long 
time. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) any useful you have received? (Interviewers 
speaking English) New and useful? 
Speaker: No. 
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Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) we are nearly finished. (Interviewers speaking 
English) What is your opinion about NGOs? 
Speaker: Some NGOs are good. 
Interviewer: They are good. 
Speaker: they have come here, we never thought there would be a school in this little town. 
Thanks to PALMPERU and APFP who have pressured, we have a world-class school here. That 
has been carried out through an NGO. 
Interviewer: What do they provide? 
Speaker: Sport, they come every day; there are teachers from Lima that are training children, 
from five to 17 years old. 
Interviewer: five to 17 years old, how are you feeling about that? 
Speaker: Very happy, because of football especially. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) Why is it good? 
Speaker: It is sport what they should do instead of other activities. Young people mostly 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) Are NGOs bad sometimes? He wants to know 
words. Is there anything wrong NGOs have carried out? 
Speaker: /ĂůǁĂǇƐůŝƐƚĞŶƚŽƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŚĂǀĞƐƚŽůĞŶŵŽŶĞǇ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ’ƚĚo anything 
beneficial for people, and they only come here for ŵŽŶĞǇ ?dŚĂƚ ’ƐǁŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞ heard 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) can you describe in detail about stealing? How do 
they steal? What have you listened to? What is the story? 
Speaker: During projects, they steal the money during projects. 
Interviewer: Do they take the money? 
Speaker: Of course. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) who told you about this?  
Speaker: Leaders comment about it sometimes, they come here and tell us. (Inaudible) They do 
ĐŽŵĞŚĞƌĞ ?tĞǁŽŶĚĞƌǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚŵŽŶĞǇ ?ǁŚǇĚŽŶ ’ƚƚŚĞǇŝŶǀest the money in 
 “ĐĂĐĞƌŝŽƐ ? ?ǁŚǇĚŽŶ ’ƚƚŚĞǇŝŶǀĞƐƚ there... 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what do you think about the government? 
(Interviewers speaking English) What do you think about the local government? The local 
government? What do you think? 
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Speaker: You know... Every leader has its good and bad, some persons are liked some are not, 
ƐŽŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŽŵĞĚŽŶ ’ƚǁŽƌŬĂƚĂůů ?ƐŽŵĞƐĂǇƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚĚ ŝŶŐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?>ŽƚƐŽĨĨĂƌŵĞƌƐŚĂǀĞ
been given palm projects by the regional president. 
Interviewer: Have you also been helped? 
Speaker: Not me, other farmers that have not had the chance. He has given them five palm 
hectares. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) for farmers who did not have them before? 
Speaker: Yes, they are doing more green houses. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) who do you trust more? NGOs or the government? 
Speaker: (laughter) NGOs. 
Interviewer: NGOs. Why? 
Speaker: Because they do a project and they come here and they are looking at their work, but 
government from here, they come and go, they sometimes ĚŽŶ ’ƚĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌǁŽƌŬǁĞůů
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) what cultural differences if any have you found from 
people who come from the highlands and the jungle? Regarding work. 
Speaker: Of course. 
Interviewer: For example? 
Speaker: People like me who come from the jungle, we have a different working style, and 
people who come from the highlands they work, how can I say..., they plough land in their farm, 
they do it very low, and we do it differently, when there is a summer, we don´t do it like that... 
Interviewer: Are you saying that they work a bit more? 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) In terms of cooperation? Who cooperates more? 
People from the jungle or from the highlands? 
Speaker: Whenever it is time to cooperate we do so, we support each other and we do so 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) when a farmer from the highlands has to support a 
farmer from the jungle... (Interviewers speaking English) Or for examƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞŶ “ŵŝŶŐĂ ?ŝƐ
carried out, do they cooperate? 
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) do you feel closer to people from the jungle or the 
highlands? 
Speaker: They are all they same for me, we are all the same. 
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Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) how long have you been a farmer? 
Speaker: Since I was a child. 
/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌ PůůŽĨǇŽƵƌůŝĨĞ ?/ƐƚŚŝƐƚŚĞ “ĐĂĐĞƌŝŽ ? ?ƚŚĞDĂĐŚŝĚĂŚƵůĂ “ĐĂĐĞƌŝŽ ? ?
Speaker: Yes. 
Interviewer: What part of Peru are you from? 
Speaker: From San Martin. 
Interviewer: San Martin? Do you feel closer to the jungle then? The jungle or the highlands? 
Speaker: From the jungle. 
Interviewer: (Interviewers speaking English) thank you for your time; we appreciate your 
information a lot. 
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Photographs during fieldwork 
 
Homes of Cacao Collective farmers 
 
Village with high prevalence of cacao growers 
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Drying cacao beans 
 
House of palm fruit grower 
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Palm fruit estate  
 
 
